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Abstract 
A Chant of Dilation: 




Adviser: Professor Joan Richardson 
A Chant of Dilation analyzes Walt Whitman’s poetic engagement with two very 
modern ideas: the materiality of the mind and the discursive nature of science. During the 
antebellum period these ideas found expression in the popular science of phrenology, the 
theory that the mind was divided into various faculties physically located in different 
parts of the brain. This theory would find a ready audience in Whitman, a poet 
preoccupied with the body, the soul, and their connection. The writings and publications 
of premier American phrenologists Orson and Lorenzo Fowler, surveyed in this project, 
rhetorically mediated emerging conceptions of the brain-embodied self by exploring the 
relationship between religion and materialism. Phrenology also provided Whitman and its 
many followers with an empowering sense of self-knowledge based on its rich 
vocabulary of dozens of mental faculties. At the same time, by equating mind and brain 
and claiming the existence of innate, inheritable faculties, phrenology raised the 
possibility of biological determinism, unsettling seemingly essential beliefs in the soul, 
agency, and moral responsibility. In Whitman’s correspondingly complex deployments of 
phrenological terms and themes, the poet embraces, confronts, and answers the 
implications of a material mind through the means most readily available to him as a 
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poet: metaphor, ambiguity, and the performative use of language. By situating Whitman’s 
response to phrenology alongside a number of Romantic and post-Romantic intellectuals 
similarly occupied by its language, including Georg Friedrich Hegel, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., and William James, I demonstrate its hitherto 
overlooked cultural significance as a discourse that prompted philosophical concerns 
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When we employ the term Phrenology it conveys to our mind no such idea as a science of 
bumps, as it is vulgarly called; nor is it Craniology or a science of the skull. It is the 
science of the mind. It includes within its circle the nature, conditions, and habits of the 
human mind, as far as they are known. 
 




























Phrenology’s Song of the Self:  








Whitman’s Answer:  








Phrenology Revised:  



















A Chant of Dilation analyzes Walt Whitman’s poetic engagement with two very 
modern ideas: the materiality of the mind and the discursive nature of science. During the 
antebellum period these ideas found expression in the popular science of phrenology, the 
theory that the mind was divided into various faculties physically located in different 
parts of the brain. This theory would find a ready audience in Whitman, a poet 
preoccupied with the body, the soul, and their connection. The writings and publications 
of premier American phrenologists Orson and Lorenzo Fowler, surveyed in this project, 
exhibit a frequent concern over the supposed antithesis between religion and materialism. 
In addition to rhetorically mediating emerging conceptions of the brain-embodied self, 
phrenology empowered Whitman and its many followers with self-knowledge 
accompanied by a rich vocabulary for its expression. Positing dozens of mental faculties, 
phrenologists created a psychological lexicon encompassing intellect and instinct, reason 
and emotion, the moral and the sexual. At the same time, by equating mind and brain and 
claiming the existence of innate, inheritable faculties, phrenology raised the possibility of 
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biological determinism, unsettling seemingly essential beliefs in the soul, agency, and 
moral responsibility. In Whitman’s correspondingly complex deployments of 
phrenological terms and themes, the poet embraces, confronts, and answers the 
implications of a material mind through the means most readily available to him as a 
poet: metaphor, ambiguity, and the performative use of language. 
Read through the lens of the phrenology texts directly influencing their 
production, “Song of Myself,” “Faces,” and other canonical works by Whitman thus take 
on new meaning and sophistication, while such seeming ephemera as his phrenological 
chart, included in early editions of Leaves of Grass, acquire central importance. The 
extravagant claims of phrenology’s practitioners to be able to read character through the 
shape of the skull still tend to overshadow the actual richness of its cultural reception 
during the antebellum period. Though from today’s perspective easily categorized as a 
pseudoscience, phrenology offered explanations of personality, behavior, human 
development, and hereditary inheritance that its numerous adherents and sympathizers 
found entirely credible. In addition to surveying the works of the Fowlers, I situate 
Whitman’s response to phrenology alongside a number of Romantic and post-Romantic 
intellectuals similarly occupied by its language, including Georg Friedrich Hegel, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., and William James. In so doing, I 
demonstrate phrenology’s nineteenth-century cultural significance as a discourse, a 
language of the mind, which articulated a harmony between science and religion for 
some, while raising critical questions about the relationship between language and 
science for others. Before explaining in greater detail Whitman’s absorption of and 
response to phrenology at the conclusion of this introductory essay, I provide an 
Borst& 3&
overview of phrenology’s European origins and development, emphasizing the increasing 
attention in recent scholarship paid to its importance to nineteenth-century social reform, 






















The Brain is the Organ of the Mind 
 
 Phrenology began with Franz Joseph Gall. While practicing medicine in Vienna 
in the 1780s and 90s, Gall turned down an offer to become the emperor’s physician for 
the sake of his own research, the results of which he was then formulating into the 
doctrines of phrenology. Though his close disciple Johann Gaspar Spurzheim would alter 
and add to his ideas after their split in 1813, the core tenets would remain: that the brain 
was the organ of the mind, that it was split into a plurality of regions each housing a 
different mental faculty or behavioral tendency, that the size of these regions (or organs) 
corresponded to their strength, and that their size—and therefore power—was reflected in 
the shape of the skull.1 The number of organs would depend on the phrenologist: for Gall 
27, Spurzheim 37. (Later the Fowlers would at different times posit 37, 41, and 43).2 
Even as they sparked the attention of many, Gall’s ideas caused controversy from the 
start for the seeming threat they posed to religion and morality and for recalling the 
materialism associated with Revolutionary French radicalism. In 1802, the Austrian 
government officially forbade discussion of his theories; later, after Gall resettled in Paris 
with Spurzheim in 1807 following a tour of Europe, the Emperor Napoleon made his own 
negative views of their system known, implicitly forcing (according to the phrenologists) 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
1Spurzheim was also largely responsible for the name “phrenology,” indicating that the name was 
“derived from two Greek words” for “mind” and “discourse,” while Gall used the terms 
‘organology’ and ‘cranioscopy’ (Spurzheim, Phrenology 1: 12). See Noel for full discussion of 
the term’s origins.  
2 Compare the Fowlers’ Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied (1837), The Illustrated Self-
Instructor in Phrenology and Physiognomy (1854), and Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and 
Applied (1892). 
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the scientific and medical community to follow suit, even those who had originally 
welcomed them (Tomlinson 58-62).  
 Spurzheim, often to Gall’s chagrin, developed and emphasized phrenology’s 
social implications in his writings and lectures, doing much to popularize the science 
especially among the reform-minded. Following Spurzheim’s proselytizing efforts in 
Britain and the United States, phrenology became what Roger Cooter has described as an 
“important vehicle of liberal ideology,” significantly influencing “penology, education, 
and the treatment of the insane” (7). Spurzheim’s modifications allowed for much greater 
optimism regarding the human condition and the possibility of its improvement. Gall had 
argued that the faculties were innate and largely unchangeable, though in his view society 
could be profitably re-organized by a ruling elite informed by the laws of the mind 
(Tomlinson 67-68). He also viewed evil as an inherent part of human nature, positing 
such faculties as THEFT and MURDER.3 In contrast, Spurzheim believed that individual 
character could be—to some extent—cultivated through exercise and education and the 
race or nation improved through careful selection of spousal partnerships.4 Moreover, he 
viewed many of Gall’s faculties as linked too narrowly to specific behaviors. 
Spurzheim’s revised terminology was instead more abstract and without reference “to 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
3 Because phrenology’s terms are often indistinguishable from the most common of words (HOPE, 
LANGUAGE, and SELF-ESTEEM were among the faculties posited by phrenologists), I have 
rendered the names of phrenological faculties in small caps throughout my text to bring them into 
bolder relief. This both replicates a frequent typographical practice of phrenologists like Orson 
and Lorenzo Fowler and acknowledges how invisible phrenological language may be to twenty-
first-century eyes, despite its popularity during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
4 According to Spurzheim, “the state of health of both parents, their age, and their previous 
manner of living, contribute[d] to the development of the embryon” (Education 46). For the 
comparative Lamarckianism of Gall and Spurzheim see Tomlinson (65, 90); of Combe see Van 
Wyhe (120-121). Spurzheim’s emphasis on inheritability led to the later eugenics-minded 
marriage manuals of the Fowlers, which directed readers to choose spouses according to the best 
mix of phrenological traits to be inherited by their progeny (Hereditary Descent). 
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any good or bad purpose”: THEFT and MURDER became ACQUISITIVENESS and 
DESTRUCTIVENESS (Phrenology 1: 12). According to Spurzheim, the sins with which Gall 
named these faculties resulted only from their incorrect, unbalanced development; when 
allowed or encouraged to follow their natural course they promoted human preservation 
and happiness. In such theories George Combe found relief from the Calvinist gloom of 
his Scottish upbringing; after attending one of Spurzheim’s lectures in 1815 the lawyer 
would go on to become, like Spurzheim, one of phrenology’s major popularizers in 
Britain and the United States, the latter of which he toured from 1838 to 1840. Though 
largely forgotten today, Combe’s The Constitution of Man (1828) was “one of the best-
selling books of the century” (Van Wyhe 96); Ralph Waldo Emerson hailed it as “the 
best Sermon I have read for some time” (qtd. in Davies 15). One of the major themes of 
“Combe’s bible of secularism”—and one that certainly would have resonated with 
Emerson—was the connection between moral and natural laws (Tomlinson 99). Acting in 
accordance with the laws of nature as disclosed by phrenology could help individuals 
lead healthy, happy lives; understanding the physiological basis of criminality and 
insanity—or that they even had a basis in physiology—could guide reformers in 
developing more humane and effective practices. 
 Spurzheim’s particular brand of phrenology also struck a chord in the United 
States. “It seemed in truth the philosophy of a free country,” writes historian Madeleine 
Stern, “this doctrine that man’s character could be read from the shape of his skull and 
improved by the exercise of various mental functions” (XII).5 Though the first American 
phrenological societies had already formed in the early 1820s, Spurzheim’s four-month 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
5 Much of the following has been adapted from Stern’s Heads and Headlines, which remains the 
most exhaustive family biography of the Fowlers. 
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1832 lecture tour of the northeast (which ended with his death in Boston) sparked a boom 
in its popularity. It was around this time while studying at Amherst that Orson Fowler 
became an impassioned convert to phrenology (along with classmate Henry Ward 
Beecher, who had initially investigated phrenology in order to debate against Fowler). 
Orson and his brother Lorenzo would go on to set up a combination phrenology practice, 
publishing firm, and museum—their Phrenological Cabinet—headquartered in New York 
City beginning in 1836. Their organization would survive into the beginning of the 20th 
century, publishing multiple editions of multiple works on phrenology authored by the 
Fowlers, especially Orson: their first book, Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied 
(1837) ran through sixty-two editions in twenty years. In addition to their own writings 
on phrenology, Fowlers and Wells (Samuel Robert Wells joined them in 1843) published 
reform-related literature on subjects like tight-lacing and water cure; previously-
published works by Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe; and several periodicals. Their 
American Phrenological Journal ran from 1838 to 1911, reaching a monthly 
circulation—one of the largest in the country—of 20,000 in 1847 and 50,000 by the mid-
fifties.6 Also among their many projects: a book of poetry called Leaves of Grass, which 
they published anonymously in 1856, having already distributed the first edition in 1855. 
 Despite the scope of phrenology’s influence, it remains a necessary ritual in 
histories of the subject to acknowledge how frequently popular memory recalls 
phrenology as little more than a “Dickensian caricature of science” (Cooter 9). As 
historian Stephen Tomlinson has remarked, Mark Twain’s portrait in The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn of the Duke and Dauphin, bumbling con men who “take a turn to 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
6 Publication data taken from Davies (54-55, 60) and Stern (138). 
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mesmerism and phrenology when there’s a chance” among other scams, is far more 
remembered than the impact of Combe’s Constitution (xi; Twain 118). But phrenology’s 
popularity, its origins in the medical community, and its acceptance by such prominent 
nineteenth-century figures as Whitman, Beecher, Horace Mann, Hiram Powers, Horace 
Greeley, and Samuel Gridley Howe, defy the misconception it was merely an “arcane 
science shared by a few eccentrics,” or that it was only a naïve fad (Colbert xiv). In some 
respects, phrenology was defined by questions about its image and legitimacy from the 
outset, questions which were closely tied to its popularization and often posed by 
phrenologists. Its scientific legitimacy bore a seemingly inverse relationship to its 
practical social applications and public head readings: Gall had worried Spurzheim 
diminished the credibility of his system; Combe and the Edinburgh Phrenological Society 
questioned the intellectual rigor of the Fowlers; and the American Phrenological Society, 
concerned with the itinerant phrenologists damaging their reputation, established an 
American Institute of Phrenology to train practitioners, its faculty including a number of 
Fowlers (Davies 47, 53). Part of the difficulty in classifying phrenology exclusively 
either as pseudoscience or science, fad or intellectual movement, is the fact that there 
were different kinds of phrenology and phrenological practice. Thus, while asserting 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s lack of IDEALITY (the faculty associated with poetry), 
Edgar Allan Poe would clarify he did not mean to endorse the “marvels and 
inconsistencies of the Fowlers et id genus omne,” even as he appeared to accept 
phrenology’s basic principles (760). 
 A Chant of Dilation focuses on the phrenology of the Fowlers (which was in more 
ways than not the phrenology of Spurzheim). The principal reasons for this focus are: 
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Orson and Lorenzo Fowler’s direct relationship to Walt Whitman, the popularity of the 
Fowlers in the United States, and the fact that their publications included works by more 
respected phrenologists and journals as well as their own. Therefore, when I use the term 
‘phrenology’ to refer to something beyond the Fowler’s specific brand, I do not mean to 
imply a monolithic system adhered to by all phrenologists or phrenology sympathizers, 
but rather have in mind its most basic tenets as set forth by Gall, such as the brain being 
the organ of the mind and the power of the faculties being revealed through the shape of 
the skull. I also leave unsettled the question of whether it is anachronistic to define 
phrenology as a ‘pseudoscience,’ other than to say I question the assumption of a clearly 
demarcated body of knowledge free from failures in objectivity, as well as the 
assumption that phrenology was entirely wrong (it wasn’t—see below). I’ve avoided 
using either term when possible, when impossible I’ve alternated between the two in 
order to acknowledge both phrenology’s many methodological problems and the fact that 
many seriously regarded it as a science during its time. In the context of my investigation, 
the point is to some extent moot: phrenology meant science to Whitman and others, and 
the meanings of science and materialism in the nineteenth century are among my primary 
concerns in understanding Whitman’s poetry and the cultural function the Fowlers 
served.  
 This is not to suggest that phrenology was not criticized as pseudoscientific in its 
own time. In addition to the charges that their ideas subverted morality, phrenologists 
including Gall and Spurzheim were faulted for lacking both logic and evidence, Dr. John 
Gordon in the Edinburgh Review calling one of their books “nothing but a perpetual 
substitution of assertion for demonstration, and conjecture for fact” (228). Yet many of 
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phrenology’s primary insights have proven prophetic. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
salutes Gall’s prescience in Descartes’ Error (1994): 
In no uncertain terms [Gall] stated that the brain was the organ of the spirit. With 
no less certitude he asserted that the brain was an aggregate of many organs, each 
having a specific psychological faculty. Not only did he part company with the 
favored dualist thinking, which separated biology from mind altogether, but he 
correctly intuited that there were many parts to this thing called brain, and that 
there was specialization in terms of the functions played by those parts. The latter 
was a fabulous intuition since brain specialization is now a well-confirmed fact. 
(14)7 
 
In the last edition of The Mismeasure of Man (1996), Stephen Jay Gould admits to having 
“a warm spot in my heart for the phrenologists.” In explaining why he leaves phrenology 
out of his critique of theories of numerically quantifiable innate intelligence (even though 
he covers the nineteenth century), Gould writes:  
Phrenologists celebrated the theory of richly multiple and independent 
intelligences. Their view led to [. . .] the theory of multiple intelligences: the 
major challenge [. . .] to the entire tradition of rankable, unitary intelligence 
marking the mismeasure of man. By reading each bump on the skull as a measure 
of “domesticity,” or “amativeness,” or “sublimity,” or “causality,” the 
phrenologists divided mental functioning into a rich congeries of largely 
independent attributes. With such a view, no single number could possibly 
express general human worth, and the entire concept of IQ as a unitary biological 
property becomes nonsense. (22) 
     
The notions of the materiality of the brain and a “rich” plurality of independent brain 
functions may not be as strikingly memorable as the claim to be able to read the skull, but 
these doctrines were at phrenology’s core. And as I discuss throughout this dissertation, it 
is phrenological language that prepares a way for these ideas, rendering them partially 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
7 However, as Damasio also points out, theories like Gall’s contributed to an overemphasis on 
“brain ‘centers’” as opposed to the neural networks and systems through which the brain actually 
operates (14). See more recently Knight’s “Neural Networks Debunk Phrenology.” 
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palatable to an age wary of materialism and invested in the idea of a unitary self (i.e. the 
soul).8  
Phrenology is also frequently remembered for its contributions to nineteenth-
century scientific racism, a well-deserved legacy, but one that again obscures 
phrenology’s variety, nuance, and what I consider its essential self-conflicts. The 
biological determinism that persisted to varying degrees throughout phrenology’s 
incarnations readily lent itself to constructing hierarchical racial taxonomies. Many of the 
Fowlers’ books, for example, contain phrenological racial profiles with “Caucasians” 
designated as “superior in reasoning power and moral elevation to all the other races” 
(Illustrated 41). Gender, national, and even religious character were similarly defined and 
classified. Because of this tendency to reify stereotypes, Herman Melville targets 
phrenology for ridicule and critique in Moby-Dick as an example of his culture’s 
obsession with imposing readings on the bodies of racial others.9 Tomlinson has shown 
how the social policies promoted by Horace Mann and Samuel Gridley Howe were 
actually shaped by phrenology’s eugenic implications, which led these reformers on a 
“search for a superior New England bloodline” (xv).  
It may not be surprising, therefore, that Samuel George Morton asked George 
Combe to contribute an essay on racial differences to his Crania Americana, a major 
statement of antebellum scientific racism and of the “American School” of ethnology. 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
8 In Phrenology and the Origins of Victorian Scientific Naturalism, John Van Wyhe argues 
phrenology contributed to the gradual development of scientific naturalism during the nineteenth 
century, contrary to the view that it emerged abruptly in the aftermath of 1859’s On the Origin of 
Species. According to Van Wyhe, the ardent calls of Combe and others to look to “nature” for 
evidence when countering their critics promoted a growing “cult of naturalism” (94). 
9 See chapters 79 and 80 of Moby-Dick. For an examination of Melville’s critique of antebellum 
scientific racism’s basis in ethnology, craniology, and phrenology, see Otter (101-171). 
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Morton promoted craniometry and polygenesis, the theories, respectively, that moral and 
intellectual capacity corresponded to the size of the skull and that different human races 
descended from entirely distinct ancestors. Yet during his North American tour Combe 
was taken aback by the racism he witnessed even in the Free States, recognizing in some 
blacks mental developments equal to mentally well-developed whites. Instead of 
Morton’s simple correlation between skull size and character, Combe—like many other 
phrenologists including the Fowlers—focused on the sizes of organs relative to one 
another as the primary determinant of character; he also dismissed Morton’s arguments 
for polygenesis (Tomlinson 231-234). In phrenology, the concept of innate racial types 
often conflicted with the idea that exercise (as well as environment) could affect the 
development of the mental organs. This law of exercise was, however, emphasized to 
varying degrees by different phrenologists, and never without limiting qualifications.10 
As Cynthia Hamilton aptly points out, phrenology “became freighted with mixed 
messages, recognizing wide differences in individual capacities and talents while 
resisting a fatalistic view of human nature” (176).  In fact the “self-improvement aspect 
of phrenology” (sometimes highlighted by the Fowlers) allowed phrenology to attract 
interest even among African-Americans, as well as from the anti-slavery publications The 
Liberator, The National Era, and The Slave’s Friend (180). In A Chant of Dilation, my 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
10 Colbert summarizes the ambiguity in this way: “As a program of personal improvement, 
phrenology was warmly embraced by Jacksonian America. The theory lent itself to a land of 
‘self-made’ individuals because it valued initiative and perseverance above the preferment that 
advanced the careers of the privileged. At the same time, it maintained that the parameters of 
mental and physical ability were largely drawn by heredity, and one could only make the best of 
endowments received at birth” (xii). The fixity of these parameters varied according to the 
phrenologist. In 1842, the Fowlers’ American Phrenological Journal would praise the “principle 
of the increase of organs” as a “favorite Doctrine of Spurzheim”; thus they “regretted to hear 
Geo. Combe [. . .] maintain that the form of the scull could not be materially changed after 
thirty—a doctrine overthrown by a multitude of facts of the most direct and unequivocal 
character” (“Article IV: On the Increase” 113). 
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own reading of Fowlerian phrenology interprets such “mixed messages”—especially with 
regard to biological determinism—as attempts to encompass and resolve major 
ideological tensions of the period.  
That Gall found inspiration and confirmation for his theories in observing the 
occupants of schools, asylums, and prisons foreshadowed where phrenology would have 
some of its greatest social impact.11 In addition to fueling reform-era fads like water-cure, 
temperance, and mesmerism (an overlap of interests demonstrated in the publications of 
the Fowlers), phrenology helped mold the institutions and policies managing education, 
insanity, and crime, often in progressively modern ways.12  It tended to emphasize the 
importance of regulating early childhood development, discourage corporal punishment 
of students as ineffective and harmful, and promote a pedagogy grounded in the practical, 
moral, and experiential as opposed to a Latin-based or overly abstract and verbal 
curriculum.13 For Horace Mann, Samuel Gridley Howe, “and other followers of George 
Combe,” writes Tomlinson, “the natural laws and moral imperatives of phrenology 
justified a secular scientific curriculum and a ‘softer’ child-centered pedagogy as the 
means of correctly training a rational and virtuous citizenry” (xiv).  
This concern with education as a means for improving citizenry relates directly to 
phrenology’s interest in insanity and criminality, both of which, according to phrenology, 
were seen as biological and correctible conditions more akin to illness than sin. Just as 
the populace could be morally, intellectually, and physically improved through education 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
11 See Capen’s biography of Spurzheim on the germination of Gall’s ideas (18-19).  
12 See Stern (chapters 3 and 10) on phrenology and antebellum reform culture. 
13 Tomlinson discusses how phrenology led both Spurzheim and Horace Mann to promote such 
curricular reforms (91-92; 244-245). 
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in accordance to phrenological principles, insanity could be alleviated by addressing its 
causes in unbalanced, under-developed, or over-stimulated faculties.14 In the United 
States, as well as abroad, Spurzheim’s theories legitimized and systematized the practices 
advocated for by reformers and asylum directors like Amariah Brigham: the provision of 
well-structured, soothing environments for patients tailored to their individual conditions. 
Over-stimulated faculties would be kept from their sources of stimulation (religious 
megalomaniacs might be kept away from books, for example); coercion would be 
minimized; and patients’ energies and attentions would be diverted into walking the 
pastoral grounds of the asylum and other activities (Tomlinson 87-89). 
Similarly, phrenology helped lead jurisprudence and penology in more humane 
directions. Because criminal tendencies resulted from under-developing the moral 
faculties, over-developing the animal propensities, or a most unfortunate combination of 
both, phrenologists argued for rehabilitation over retribution. Many phrenologists, 
including the Fowlers, stood against capital punishment as a result, not only because the 
criminal was not necessarily at fault, but because public executions degraded the moral 
faculties of observers. Instead of brutalizing treatment and corporal punishment in 
prisons, George Combe and others urged convicts be provided with education and well-
structured daily routines to effect their moral improvement. Lastly, American 
psychiatrists Brigham and Isaac Ray both presented versions of the insanity defense 
informed by phrenology, significantly contributing, writes Nicole Rafter, “to the 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
14 One common argument the Fowlers and other phrenologists cited in support of phrenology was 
how readily its theory of a compartmentalized brain explained cases of monomania and partial 
madness. 
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campaign for greater leniency of mentally ill offenders and to establishment of hospitals 
for the criminally insane” (56-58).   
With such broad applications, this mental philosophy could not but affect the arts 
as well. In antebellum America, phrenologists and visual artists often operated in what 
Charles Colbert has described as a “symbiotic relationship.” Phrenologists like the 
Fowlers hired sculptors and painters to make busts and portraits or learned such crafts 
themselves to stock their Phrenological Cabinets; from the other side artists like Hiram 
Powers became de facto phrenologists, incorporating its visual vocabulary into 
portraiture (Stern 24-25; Colbert 41-42). In the realm of the literary arts, phrenology 
appeared in the works of Melville, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Fanny Fern, and—overseas—
George Eliot and Charlotte Bronte to name only a very few authors (Davies 118-125).  
Like the phrenologically-inclined portrait artist, Whitman and other writers sometimes 
assumed a knowledge of phrenology’s terms—both verbal and visual.15 Others took a 
critical approach in line with Melville’s bitingly satirical phrenologizing of the sperm 
whale, or Twain’s caricature of the itinerant phrenologist later in the century. Much 
remains to be learned of the phrenologist as a literary figure and of the phrenological 
assumptions embedded in antebellum literary texts. As is the case with many of the 
writers dealt with in A Chant of Dilation, including Whitman, individual views on 
phrenology were often qualified and complicated. Edgar Allan Poe, for instance, is often 
seen as a supporter of phrenology (though, again, not of the Fowlers); how then do we 
read his story “The Imp of the Perverse,” which posits an irrational and self-destructive 
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15 Harold Aspiz, for example, demonstrates how Whitman’s poem “Faces” required readers to 
translate phrenological terms into corresponding images of physical appearance (Walt Whitman 
133-141). 
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faculty, completely antithetical to phrenology’s rationalistic millenarianism regarding 
human nature?  
That particular question and many others lie outside the scope of this project, 
which examines the impact of phrenology as a language—a discourse of the mind—on 
Walt Whitman. More remarkable than Emerson’s journal entry describing “the little 
plaster casts in every house” is his offhand remark on phrenology’s analogously 
pervasive linguistic impact (13: 162). He compares it to the previous influence of Kant’s 
philosophy, which “by its striking nomenclature had imprinted itself on the memory” (5: 
202; emphasis added). Anxious about the prevalence of its terminology, Harper’s 
Magazine faulted phrenology for infecting thought at its source in language (Davies 119). 
Whitman, too, saw phrenology’s linguistic significance, but in it recognized the potential 
for opening up and expressing parts of the self that had lacked a lexicon for proper 
articulation. He—and the other Romantic and post-Romantic writers I discuss in Chapter 
II—would be fascinated with the limits as well as the possibilities opened by this 










An Underlying Construction 
 
  The rise of the Fowlers’ publishing industry in the 1840s and 50s coincided with 
the transformation of Walt Whitman from itinerant journalist to self-proclaimed—though 
largely unrecognized—poet of the nation.16 Given phrenology’s popular appeal and the 
poet’s well-documented effort to absorb his nation as its representative bard, it is not 
surprising that Whitman’s professional career and poetry were directly shaped by this 
pseudoscience and its most prominent American practitioners, Orson and Lorenzo 
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16 Phrenology’s overall historical trajectory in terms of popularity and scientific support is 
difficult to sketch, varying from country to country, and to some extent requiring anachronistic 
impositions of what defines scientific legitimacy. Nicole Rafter’s summation is useful and fairly 
representative of other scholars, though it neglects phrenology’s relative longevity in the United 
States: “The movement occurred in two stages: a scientific phase, from about 1800 to 1830, when 
the phrenological system was developed, mainly by physicians and psychiatrists; and an 
overlapping popularizing stage, from about 1820 to 1850, during which phrenology became a fad, 
complete with social clubs, marketers, and hucksters” (42). (The recurrent designation as ‘fad’ 
implies an ephemeral quality I find at odds with phrenology’s decades-long span of popularity). 
John Van Wyhe specifies its various receptions in Europe: after a mixed, controversial, and 
ultimately negative reception in the early 1800s, phrenology spread from Britain, “mostly via 
itinerant lecturers, to America and France in the 1820s and 1830s, and in the late 1830s and 1840s 
it was introduced to Germany, where it remained a very minor phenomenon. Phrenology had 
almost disappeared from Britain by the 1850s, but a new movement was reintroduced to Britain 
by the American ‘phrenological Fowlers’ in the 1860s. Phrenology evolved into wider and wider 
cultural niches over time. Coextensive with this diversification of phrenology and its availability 
to a greater proportion of the population was a decline in any of the elite status or acceptability it 
ever enjoyed” (57).  
As clarifying as these narratives may be, polarizing phrenology’s ‘scientific-ness’ versus 
its popularity tends to obscure the complexity of its reception and to underestimate the cultural 
authority it did retain even as it was popularized (particularly in the late 40s and 50s in the United 
States). For some proponents of phrenology, the science followed a trajectory the reverse of that 
described by Rafter and Van Wyhe. A writer for the abolitionist National Era would reflect in 
1849 how, “only eleven or twelve years ago, the very name of this science was so unintelligible 
to the great mass of our population, as rarely to excite anything but a smile of incredulous 
contempt.” Apart from a few exceptions like the Fowlers, continues the National Era 
correspondent, phrenologists were at that time largely profiteering itinerants, but Combe’s arrival 
in 1838 gave to phrenology a “new and most favorable impulse,” which by 1849 had resulted in 
widespread appreciation and the success of the Fowlers (“Phrenology”). In 1854, the publication 
Flag for Our Union would pronounce, “Phrenology is now so firmly established and favorably 
regarded, that there is no more need of arguing its truth than of arguing that the world is round” 
(“Phrenology in New England”). 
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Fowler.17 Although Whitman would have been aware of phrenology much earlier, the 
first documented evidence of his engagement with it dates from 1846, when he began 
reviewing phrenology books and lectures and clipping and annotating articles on the 
subject.18 By 1849 his interest in the subject had grown enough for him to have his head 
read at the publishing firm and phrenological depot of Fowlers and Wells in Manhattan; 
six years later he would publish the results of this examination with the first edition of 
Leaves of Grass (he would do so with the second and third editions as well). Working as 
a stationer and bookseller from 1850 to 1851, he sold several Fowler titles, including 
Orson Fowler’s Love and Parentage, Applied to the Improvement of Offspring (1844), 
George Combe’s Lectures on Phrenology (1839), and various periodicals (Stern 106).  
Of particular significance to American literary history was the role Fowlers and 
Wells played in the publication of Leaves of Grass. They were advertised in the New 
York Tribune as sole seller of the 1855 edition and published the second edition 
anonymously, though they publicized both. The firm also employed Whitman as a writer 
for its general interest magazine Life Illustrated from November 1855 to August 1856; 
Whitman contributed essays on New York cultural life, covering the opera, the Egyptian 
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17 See David S. Reynolds’s Walt Whitman’s America for a thorough and wide-ranging account of 
Whitman’s immersion in and absorption of antebellum culture, including pseudoscientific reform 
movements like phrenology. Of course, a plethora of books focus on reading Whitman within a 
single cultural context, such as Harold Aspiz’s Walt Whitman and the Body Beautiful (nineteenth-
century physiology) and Betsy Erkkila’s Whitman the Political Poet (politics), which both 
include discussions of phrenology. 
18 A number of notices and reviews of phrenological works and lectures appeared in the Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle during Whitman’s editorship from March 1846 to January 1848: for reviews of 
Orson Fowler’s lectures see March 7, 1846 (“A Chance for Men of Bad Character”) and March 
11, 1846 (“City Intelligence”); for reviews of books by Spurzheim and the Fowlers, see 
November 16, 1846 (“Notices of New Books”), March 8, 1847 (“Lighting the Light”), March 10, 
1847 (“Something about Physiology and Phrenology”), and March 12, 1847 (“[Untitled]”).    
Stern discusses some of this material (100-101). 
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Museum, and July 4th celebrations.19 But as the prospect of a third edition of Leaves of 
Grass arose, both writer and publisher grew increasingly eager to be rid of each other.20 
Firm partner Samuel Wells demanded that Whitman censor certain passages of a sexual 
nature in Leaves of Grass that were then stirring controversy; the poet refused. Lackluster 
sales in addition to such editorial differences led to Whitman and the phrenologists soon 
ending their business relationship, which had ceased completely by the publication of the 
third edition of Leaves.21 The poet’s interest in phrenology, however, remained. Even 
toward the end of his life in 1888, the poet would admit to his friend Horace Traubel, “I 
probably have not got by the phrenology stage yet" (Traubel 385).  
The stories of Whitman and American phrenology during the 1840s and 50s 
intersect with a third narrative, that of the United States itself, which over the same 
period convulsed with the social and political tensions that would eventuate in the bloody 
crisis of national identity of the early 1860s.22 Though of seemingly very different scope, 
these three narratives are closely intertwined. Like the unifying, optimistic vision of the 
1855 Leaves, phrenology texts such as The Illustrated Self-Instructor by Orson Fowler 
presented a model of selfhood that attempted to unify the cultural divisions and 
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19 These articles are collected in New York Dissected. 
20 In June of 1857, Whitman wrote to Sarah Tyndale, “Fowler & Wells are bad persons for me. 
They retard my book very much. [. . .] they want the thing off their hands” (Correspondence 
1:44). 
21 Madeleine B. Stern’s chapter on Whitman in Heads & Headlines remains the fullest and most 
concise account of Whitman’s professional relationship with the Fowlers. Several other essays 
concerning Whitman and phrenology provide an overview of this relationship, but of particular 
usefulness are Gay Wilson Allen’s The Solitary Singer, Harold Aspiz’s Walt Whitman and the 
Body Beautiful, and Jerome Loving’s Walt Whitman: The Song of Himself. 
22 Between 1846 and 1856 (the period of Whitman’s relationship to the Fowlers), the Fugitive 
Slave Law was passed, Kansas bled, and Charles Sumner was caned in the Senate. 
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contradictions with which both citizen and nation were then rife. Thus the texts of 
Whitman and the Fowlers celebrated sexuality alongside moral purity in their cultural 
criticism, blurred the categories of spirit and matter in their philosophy, and relished 
finding examples of both racial stereotype and extraordinary individuality in their 
observations on humanity.  
Throughout his lifetime, Whitman turned to the language of phrenology to 
understand, describe, and create himself as both human being and poet.23 Phrenological 
terms like AMATIVENESS pervade his poetry and prose, sometimes glaring in their neo-
logistic idiosyncrasy, at other times invisibly implied by words of the most common 
usage—words like caution, friendship, love, destructive, and adhere. Perhaps most 
pervasive is the phrenological term for the capacity for friendship, ADHESIVENESS (and its 
cognates), the meaning of which Whitman alters slightly in taking it from phrenology. In 
works like the Calamus poems, scholars have noted how the term serves to contain and 
legitimize Whitman’s homoerotic urges as feelings of intense male friendship.24 
Elsewhere in Whitman’s poetry ADHESIVENESS begins to represent a natural force of 
attraction underlying being itself; and in Democratic Vistas it incorporates all of these 
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23 Edward Hungerford argues that Whitman’s phrenological examination was so impressive that it 
confirmed the poet in his new vocation and was therefore instrumental in Whitman’s 
transformation from “imitative hack-writer” to “firm and bold prophet” (366). Madeleine Stern 
likewise sees Whitman “fortified by Lorenzo’s insight” (105). Arthur Wrobel (Walt Whitman 
147) and Harold Aspiz (Body Beautiful) develop similar readings of Whitman’s chart as a self-
confirmation. 
24 Michael Lynch offers the most sustained account of ADHESIVENESS as a phrenological faculty 
in relation to Whitman and homosexuality in “’Here is Adhesiveness’: From Friendship to 
Homosexuality.” Lynch argues that Whitman actually redefines ADHESIVENESS: in the 
phrenological tradition, the faculty suggested friendship in general with an emphasis on that 
between women, but in Whitman’s hands it refers more restrictively to same-sex passion between 
men (90). Lynch thus makes a case for phrenology’s contribution “to the emergence of the 
modern homosexual,” in that it psychologized and pathologized the Friendship tradition (68). For 
further discussion see Chapter III (188). 
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meanings, becoming an idea through which to understand and feel the self, the cosmos, 
and the nation as integrated, both individually and with each other.25 
Several lines from the 1855 Preface, later transferred to poems in subsequent 
editions of Leaves, indicate Whitman viewed phrenology as part of the foundation of his 
poetry as well as psyche. As his early poetic manifesto explains:  
The sailor and traveler . . . . the anatomist chemist astronomer geologist 
phrenologist spiritualist mathematician historian and lexicographer are not poets, 
but they are the lawgivers of poets and their construction underlies the structure of 
every perfect poem. (15; emphasis added)26   
 
A variety of fields and activities provide the enigmatically phrased “constructions” that 
frame and support the “structure” of his poetry; and in one respect, Whitman appears to 
mean “structure” in the literal sense of poetic form and organization. In the 1860 Leaves, 
after a partial attempt in 1856 to tame the untitled disorder of the first edition, Whitman 
dramatically restructures the book into thematic clusters, two of which are framed around 
phrenological faculties. In a note on the Children of Adam cluster, Whitman projected a 
“Theory of a Cluster of Poems the same to the passion of Woman-Love as the Calamus-
Leaves are to adhesiveness, manly love” (Notes 124). Scholars have also identified single 
poems based on phrenological structures, such as “A Song of Joys,” which Edward 
Hungerford reads as a catalog of pleasures each deriving from a phrenological faculty 
(372).27 Others have identified in Whitman’s work not only specific phrenological terms, 
but a host of themes and interests the poet shared with the Fowlers in their mutual 
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25 See Erkkila on the role of ADHESIVENESS in Whitman’s politics. 
26 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations of Whitman’s poetry and prose are taken from 
Complete Poetry and Collected Prose. 
27 See also Aspiz on the phrenological theories of development framing Whitman’s poem “There 
Was a Child Went Forth” (“Educating the Kosmos”). 
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enthusiasm for antebellum reform movements: health, physiology, heredity, education, 
water-cure, temperance, and a belief in human perfectibility.28  
A Chant of Dilation takes seriously Whitman’s suggestion that for him the 
influence of phrenology was foundational, and thus at times submerged, inviting 
phrenologically-informed readings of his poetry that press beyond the direct reference or 
allusion. The claim he makes for phrenology’s importance in the Preface was one he 
would repeat in every edition of Leaves, though in tellingly revised forms. After 1855, he 
imports the lines into a poem that would later evolve into one part of “Song of the 
Answerer.” Over the course of different versions, the catalogue of craftsmen swells to 
include a “melodist,” a “language-searcher,” and several other professions. Subsequent 
revisions then pare down the list to its most minimal final version in “Song of the 
Answerer”: “The sailor and traveler underlie the makers of poems, the Answerer, / The 
builder, geometer, chemist, anatomist, phrenologist, artist, all these underlie the maker of 
poems, the Answerer” (318). Throughout all the changes leading to this text of 1881, 
“phrenologist” remains. 
In addition to stripping down the catalogue of occupations in “Song of the 
Answerer,” Whitman alters his claim that phrenology underlay the structure of his poetry. 
His remark about the “construction” of these professions underlying the “structure” of his 
poems is changed to the professions underlying the “maker of poems” himself. Not only 
are the lines stylistically more immediate and direct, thematically they suggest that 
Whitman’s relationship to phrenology had become more immediate: phrenology had been 
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28 On the shared interests of Whitman and the Fowlers in health, self-improvement, and reform 
see especially Aspiz (Body Beautiful), Reynolds (chapters 7 and 8), and Wrobel (Walt Whitman 
116-122; 136-141). 
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internalized. It is no longer the construction of the phrenologist, but the phrenologist 
himself that underlies; and it is no longer the poem that is underlain, but the poet. Given 
its importance to Whitman, phrenology as an interpretive lens can and should be used to 
read his work well beyond identifying the particular allusion, term, or theme; and the 




















A Chant of Dilation 
 
 Fowlerian phrenology’s effort to integrate scientific materialism with a tradition 
of spiritual idealism—the subject of Chapter I—is typical of much antebellum-Romantic 
discourse.29 Transcendentalist forerunner Sampson Reed, British Romantic Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, and Emerson, a reader of both, emphasized the role of feeling and 
religion in scientific pursuits.  As Eric Wilson points out, Emerson would find the 
Romantic’s intuition of the dynamism and unity of all things confirmed by Humphry 
Davy and Michael Faraday, who provided the scientific demonstration that matter was 
but energy (76-97). In the first half of the 19th century, scientist Alexander von Humboldt 
and poet and fiction-writer Edgar Allan Poe would both attempt the aesthetic 
representation in literature of the whole of nature, Humboldt in Kosmos and Poe in 
Eureka. The writings of mystic and scientist Emanuel Swedenborg would be read with 
religious fervor, Emerson praising him for seeking “to put science and the soul, long 
estranged from each other, at one again” (Essays 671). And, of course, the visionary 
Whitman would characteristically declare, “Hurrah for positive science! Long live exact 
demonstration!” (49). All of these writers—and their readers—strove to synthesize 
science and religion, feeling and reason, spirit and matter, finding a unity in aspects of 
experience Descartes and other currents of Enlightenment thought had torn asunder.  
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29 Alan Richardson has characterized phrenology as a “Romantic psychology,” grouping Gall’s 
theory of mind alongside those of Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis, Erasmus Darwin, and Charles 
Bell: all located the mind in the brain, posited “biological rather than mechanistic” explanations 
of “mental functioning,” and emphasized the brain’s complexity, “often envisioning it as a 
collection of ‘organs’” (6). 
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Chapter I of A Chant of Dilation examines how phrenological writing in the 
United States performed similar cultural work by negotiating the contradictory demands 
of such binaries (or, more precisely, by creating a feeling of this negotiation, if not 
achieving it in some more objective sense). The texts written or published by the Fowlers 
exhibit a preoccupation with proving the ‘harmony’ of science and religion as a way of 
countering charges that phrenology tended towards atheism. In this first section, I analyze 
how the Fowlers adapt both phrenological theory of mind and phrenological language in 
order to process and render palatable some of phrenology’s more reductively materialist 
and deterministic implications—the implications that posed the greatest threat to 
conceptions of individual agency and the soul. For example, the names of faculties such 
as WONDER and SPIRITUALITY were revised repeatedly to this end. By delving into the 
philosophically knotty details of mental materialism, phrenologists produced texts rich in 
contradiction, equivocation, and syntactical transgressions. Rather than view such aspects 
of phrenological writing as merely the result of lax reasoning, I read them as indices of 
the ideological and linguistic strain phrenology’s materialism exerted on prevailing habits 
of thought and expression. Like Whitman’s poetry, then, American phrenological 
discourse needs to be understood in aesthetic terms: it imagined the interrelated syntheses 
of soul and body and of religion and scientific materialism, often by consciously 
manipulating language, and sometimes at the expense of logic and more formal rules of 
expression. With respect to its materialism or, as Colbert has described it, its ‘physical 
metaphysics,’ phrenology did not offer a final conclusion: instead it represented a 
discursive space in which the limits of orthodoxy and scientific materialism were 
explored and contested.30  
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30 My account of phrenology largely fits Reed’s view that modern psychology developed as a 
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What is most striking about Whitman’s response to phrenology—and the core of 
my analysis of phrenology’s significance for him as a poet—is how very far he accepts 
even its more reductive, materialist, and deterministic tendencies without completely 
submitting to them. For Whitman, phrenology tells the truth, but not the whole truth, of 
the self. That whole truth ultimately remains in the hands of the poet and each individual, 
precisely because phrenology remains a matter of language and as such a “construction,” 
as Whitman hints in the 1855 Preface. Like the phrenologists themselves, Whitman uses 
phrenology to work through—and in his case supersede—the thornier questions relating 
to the materiality of the mind and the self. As I discuss in Chapter II, Whitman’s “Faces” 
illustrates how his poetry both accepts and transcends the limits phrenology could place 
on the self’s improvement by focusing on the disruptive, liberating potential of individual 
actions. Read through the lens of Hegel’s critique of phrenology in The Phenomenology 
of Spirit, according to which I argue the poem is structured, “Faces” also demonstrates 
Whitman’s sense of what we would call today the discursive nature of science as 
represented by phrenology. Several Romantic and post-Romantic writers Whitman either 
read or was read by were likewise fascinated by the language of phrenology: for some it 
raised philosophical questions about the relationship between science and language; for 
others it offered a rich, flexible, secular new vocabulary with which to understand the 
complexities of human behavior. I thus place Whitman’s engagements with phrenology 
alongside those of Hegel, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., and 
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“secular theology”: our modern assumption that “the late-nineteenth-century propensity for 
placing the mind in the brain” was a “stepping stone to a secular materialist worldview” 
overlooks how emergent psychology continued to “reinforce important religious beliefs” (3-5). 
However, I differ from Reed in what I consider his underestimation of the threat phrenology 
posed to ‘traditional metaphysics’ even as it reincorporated many of its concepts (44).  
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William James—as well as phrenologists themselves, who, as I noted earlier, repeatedly 
revised their own lexicon of faculties and developed literary theories based on 
phrenological principles. 
 In Chapter III I argue that Whitman took it upon himself to revise the results of 
the phrenological exam given him at the Fowlers’ in 1849 before publishing them in or 
alongside the first three editions of Leaves of Grass. This act of revision realizes on a 
practical level what “Faces” only theorizes: that one’s phrenology—one’s material 
being—can be altered to a limited degree through deliberate, individual action. Here I 
depart from past scholarship on Whitman and phrenology, which has tended to 
overemphasize the extent of individual self-improvement possible in phrenology as well 
as Whitman’s willingness to change phrenology’s determinations and terms according to 
his whims.31 Though the Fowlers certainly made self-improvement more available than 
Gall, it was an idea that remained fraught by phrenology’s materialism, especially when 
phrenological discourse is considered as a whole. Whitman’s changes to his chart are 
very few and very strategic, confirming his poetic self-portrait in the 1855 Leaves as one 
of the “roughs,” a personality combining mystic, poet, and working-class American, 
“Disorderly fleshy and sensual” (50). Whitman’s chart thus demonstrates the importance 
of phrenological language in the construction of his contradictory, expansive poetic self; 
while the faculties Whitman alters point to the phrenological concepts key to this self-
construction. Reading his phrenological chart alongside Fowler’s Practical Phrenology, 
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31 Stern, for example, describes phrenology as a “science rooted in the doctrine of man’s 
improvability and man’s perfectibility” (108). Aspiz asserts that Whitman “invents 
[phrenological] terms as he needs them,” citing the poet’s positing of a faculty of Prudence (Body 
Beautiful 128). Rather than as an original creation of Whitman, I view Whitman’s Prudence as his 
Emersonian-inflected synonym for the faculty of CAUTION (Allen makes a similar suggestion; see 
135, 140-141). 
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Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied, and The Illustrated Self-Instructor in 
Phrenology and Physiology, I excavate some of the phrenological meanings essential to 
understanding the poem “Song of Myself.” 
 Repeated experience has led me to expect reactions of surprise whenever I begin 
to explain that Whitman had an interest in phrenology, especially to those outside of 
academia (but certainly not exclusively those). On one occasion I’ve even met with 
outright resistance, a curator of a Whitman-related public exhibit insisting phrenology 
had only minimal impact on the poet early in life. That an icon of such cultural authority 
espoused ideas that historical hindsight judges so harshly is understandably surprising, 
even if it only confirms the undeniable fact that historical context determines beliefs, 
even of those figures of the past we most desire to imbue with lasting, transcendent 
significance. For many of the readers that love him, Whitman establishes a sense of 
intimacy in his poems, reaching across the centuries to address us directly, in the moment 
of reading. When he asks in “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry,” “What is the count of the scores 
or hundreds of years between us?” nothing is the unspoken answer (310). His 
phrenological interests potentially disrupt this sense of nearness, dragging the poet back 
to a cultural phenomenon almost indecipherably native to its time. The analogies 
sometimes drawn to make contemporary sense of this discourse of the mind—that it’s 
like astrology, or Freudianism at the beginning of the twentieth century—only go so far: 
phrenology was variegated and complex, and the Fowlers as fitted to their own era as 
foreign to our own. Whitman’s contemporary meaningfulness might therefore seem 
tarnished by his association with them. 
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 But I would argue the very opposite. Whitman’s interest in phrenology makes him 
all the more relevant in the context of contemporary neuroscience, particularly as its 
emergent and contestable facts are sorted out, debated, and processed in popular 
discourse. The past year has seen a continuous procession of books by neuroscientists, 
philosophers, and psychologists either touting the new age being ushered in by brain 
science, or skeptically checking the millenarian enthusiasm of its prophets. Adrian 
Raine’s treatment of the connections between biology and psychology in The Anatomy of 
Violence (2013) concludes by looking forward to a future in which brain scans and DNA 
tests will be used to identify and manage those predisposed to violence—much like the 
phrenologist reformers had hoped phrenology would accomplish. Brainwashed (2013), 
on the other hand, stresses the limits of current brain imaging techniques and argues 
against the notion that crime and addiction are issues only of biology and not choice. 
Neuroscientist Kathleen Taylor, author of The Brain Supremacy (2013), was recently 
criticized in the press for allegedly suggesting radical Islam and other extreme ideologies 
may one day prove curable conditions of the brain.32 The Fowlers, following Combe and 
others, made precisely the same kinds of claims respecting religion (which I discuss in 
Chapter I). The overarching principles remain uncannily similar, even if the details are 
completely different (and in the case of phrenology, wrong). Thus, vis a vis phrenology, 
Whitman in effect confronts questions of materialism as old as Lucretius, and as recent as 
the last hour’s neuroscience blog post. 
 And he answers them as a poet, through poetry. For Whitman and the other 
writers I examine, phrenology highlighted the role of language in science, demonstrating 
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32 See Raymond Tallis for critical commentary on Taylor’s alleged remarks, which had been 
previously reported by The Huffington Post (Bennett-Smith) and The Times (de Bruxelles). 
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how a more nuanced scientific (or pseudoscientific) vocabulary could disclose a more 
nuanced natural world. Consequently, it also raised the question of scientific fact being 
always mediated by language, rather than objectively self-evident. Both implications 
inform Whitman’s poetic self-representation: phrenological language would help him 
understand and celebrate himself, but neither phrenology nor the phrenologist who 
evaluated him would be entrusted with the final say. As the revisions to his chart make 
clear, the poet ultimately remains his own author. 
When I began this project, I had thought Melville more sophisticated in his 
satirical response to phrenology than Whitman, who naively embraced it. I now think 
very differently. As “Faces,” “Song of Myself,” and Whitman’s phrenological chart 
demonstrate, Whitman rejects neither materialism for the sake of metaphysics, nor 
individual agency for the sake of science. In contemporary terms, he appears to adopt a 
substantially materialist view allowing for plasticity of the brain, while remaining 
attentive to the discursively mediated nature of science as a counter to scientific 
reductionism. It is a well-balanced point of view, not submissive, but rather actively open 
to the interpretations science offers of human nature. From the unsettling, determinist 
conclusions suggested by a purely material mind and self, he creates texts in which he 
speaks and acts as an individual. Rather than relegate him to the past, Walt Whitman’s 















 An early pop psychology, phrenology promised personal balance, offering to 
diagnose and regulate unhealthy deficiencies and excesses in particular aspects of the 
personality. This was especially the case with the practical phrenology of Orson and 
Lorenzo Fowler. As they explain in the preface of their first book, Phrenology Proved, 
Illustrated, and Applied, one of the most characteristic features of their new, 
Americanized version of phrenology is its exhaustive accounting of “the modifications 
produced by the combined action of the several organs” ([1837] v). According to the 
Fowlers, this focus on the interactions between the mental organs set them apart from 
their predecessors, who they said had only explained how the faculties functioned 
individually, in theoretical—but not actual—isolation from each other.   
Indeed, the balance between the various mental faculties can be read as the 
governing theme of Walt Whitman’s own phrenological chart (the focus of Chapter III), 
which portrays a well-rounded personality as animal as it is intellectual, as bodily as it is 
spiritual, and as inherited as it is self-created. This capacity of the poet’s personality to 
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contain such seemingly opposite qualities would serve, of course, as a central theme of 
“Song of Myself,” in which the speaker of the poem figures national unity as well as 
personal wholeness. The Fowlers identified a similar parallel between mind and nation. 
Their brand of phrenology especially, given its relative emphasis on self-improvement 
compared to forerunners like Gall, was greatly shaped by a tension both psychological 
and cultural: that between science and religion. Consequently, their phrenological 
conception of mind expresses a careful and often precarious balance between describing 
the self as an embodied aggregate of faculties and drives on the one hand, and as the 
transcendent agent of pervading religious beliefs on the other. 
Similar to Whitman in “Song of Myself,” the Fowlers connected individual 
psychology—or rather character—to national, racial, and other group identities 
(sometimes leading them to racist conclusions).33 Enmeshed as they were in reform 
movements like temperance, water-cure, and mesmerism, they also saw social and 
cultural consequences in reforming individual minds. They did not, however, posit a 
definitive, ideal character type. When asked what constituted a “perfect head,” one 
correspondent in the American Phrenological Journal wrote that the question was 
impossible to answer, as “heads should be differently formed, to insure success in 
different callings and pursuits” (J.L.C. 33). The phrenology of the Fowlers thus 
encompassed and legitimized the teeming variety of American labor, a (pseudo)scientific 
version of Whitman’s famous declaration, “I am large . . . . I contain multitudes” (87).   
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33 In marshaling an array of ‘proofs’ of phrenology in Phrenology Proved, the Fowlers cite how 
phrenological analysis of Native American and African-American heads corroborated what was 
already ‘known’ of racial character: “Indians” were largely defined by their savage degree of 
DESTRUCTIVENESS, African Americans by the smallness of their reasoning organs. The Fowlers 
make the same argument regarding gender differences, using phrenology’s confirmation of 
prevailing stereotypes as proof of its veracity (29-34). 
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Given the themes they share with “Song of Myself,” the self-help phrenology 
books and journals of Orson and Lorenzo Fowler need to be read as aesthetic texts. Like 
the sweeping panoramas so popular at the time, or like Edgar Allan Poe’s much less 
popular Eureka, or like any number of literary or visual texts celebrating the vista or 
prospect, these works can be read as conveying a feeling of totalizing unity unavailable to 
the limited, everyday perspectives of individual human beings. More specifically, the 
works of the Fowlers need to be considered in the same terms as pre-Civil War versions 
of Whitman’s “Song of Myself”: as texts projecting a balanced synthesis of competing 
social interests and cultural tensions. Moreover, this projected synthesis is pursued 
through—or creates as a byproduct of its pursuit—language that could be described as 
“literary,” attaining a semantic richness and instability comparable to the poetry of 
Whitman and other Romantics engaged in similar investigations of mind and materiality. 
  For a nation that was a tumult of reform movements, revivals, riots, rapid 
industrialization, population booms, and fitfully emergent market economics, it is easy to 
imagine the appeal of visions of unity, but also the difficulty of establishing them on 
credible or even coherent grounds. Whitman attempted to do so by constructing a poetic 
“I” expansive enough to embody the country’s vast plurality. In “Song of Myself,” for 
instance, he declares himself “the poet of the body” as well as “of the soul,” “of the 
woman same as the man” (46). He is “of wickedness” as much as “goodness” (48), of 
“old and young,” a “southerner as soon as a northerner” (42). The mid-century decades 
that would see the rise of an organized woman’s suffrage movement from Seneca Falls, 
of a popular literature both lurid and pious, of the contrary forces of secession and union, 
were given full voice in such lines.  
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But as important as his famous declaration, “I am large . . . . I contain multitudes,” 
is the question that precedes it: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well then . . . . I 
contradict myself” (87). Whitman could not always resolve his or his nation’s 
contradictions: sometimes he had to embrace them, accept them, or simply express them. 
At times his poetry even registers the interrelated anguish of mind and nation being 
pulled apart. The poem “The Sleepers” begins on such a note, with the dreaming speaker 
“Wandering and confused . . . . lost to myself . . . . ill-assorted . . . . contradictory” (107). 
By the poem’s end a reconciliation or reintegration of self is achieved through the images 
of night and sleep, symbols of death, transcendence, and the tranquility of the soul set 
apart from the world, rather than a full bodied embrace of American reality (107).  
 The books and pamphlets of the Fowlers constituted a discursive field, like 
Whitman’s poetry, in which the fragmented ideologies and values of the nineteenth 
century and the fragmented selves they produced could be recognized instead of 
repressed, restoring a sense of wholeness to the psyche. Also like Whitman’s poetry, their 
works exhibit tensions and contradictions resulting from the challenge of that task, 
especially when dealing with controversies of identity, sex, and religion. Their texts as 
frequently profile exceptionally developed individuals as cite stereotypical examples of 
racial and national character. While largely reifying contemporary racism and misogyny, 
the Fowlers at times complicate such notions, as when promoting the value of natural 
diversity, or recognizing the role of education and culture in shaping the mind.34 A 
similar contradictoriness emerges in their treatment of sexuality. The publishing firm 
Fowlers and Wells represented both the prudery of the age and the adventurousness of its 
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free love communes and similar movements. While on the one hand readers of the 
Fowlers’ publications were frequently reminded of the properly dominant role of the 
intellectual and moral faculties over the animal propensities, on the other hand Orson and 
others wrote of the essentialness of exercising the AMATIVE faculty (albeit within 
marriage) to the happiness of the individual as well as to the continuation of the species. 
Orson penned several books on the laws of reproduction; he wrote only a single pamphlet 
on the evils of excessive AMATIVENESS. Such contrary tendencies seem symptomatic of 
an age whose prevalent reform literature admonished against drunken licentiousness 
while simultaneously indulging such impulses in lurid cautionary tales.35 But while 
temperance pamphlets careened between extremes of moralizing and sensationalizing, 
Fowlers and Wells maintained a precarious balance with respect to what the firm and the 
public deemed respectable: Orson himself appears to have been pressured out of the firm 
(at about the same time as Whitman) for either his increasing candor about sex or the 
firm’s increasing reticence (Stern 121-122, 125-126). 
But it was another dichotomy that most directly destabilized the texts of the 
Fowlers: the ideological antagonism between science and religion. For American 
phrenologists and their reading public, the uncertain relationship between these 
discourses takes on special urgency, representing questions not only about traditional 
sources of cultural authority, but also about the possibility of individual freedom and 
moral agency. As an examination of the Fowlers’ discussions of religious issues will 
reveal, this antagonism is embedded within phrenology’s conceptual structure, which 
attempts to accommodate notions of soul and agency within a materialist framework. In 
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35 See Reynolds’ Beneath the American Renaissance, especially chapter 2, “The Reform Impulse 
and the Paradox of Immoral Didacticism.” 
Borst& 36&
fact, the system of faculties phrenology elaborates can be read as an attempt to manage 
this ideological rift, like Whitman’s poetic “I” serving as a trope with which to figure a 
synthesis of science and religion, as well as these discourses’ concomitant conceptions of 
selfhood. Like the poetry of Whitman, the texts of the Fowlers perform such syntheses by 
accepting (unconsciously in their case) contradiction, by employing the analogical 
reasoning of Romantic organicism, and by relying on a multifaceted model of mind to 
explain contrary aspects of self and society. And also like Whitman’s poetry, these texts 
at times crack under the great strain of maintaining simultaneously such contrary 
perspectives. 
It would be limiting, however, to view such moments of strain only as moments 
of breakage and not also of adaptation. What these texts exhibit—or what they are driven 
to exhibit by the urgency and complexity of their subject—is language rich in rhetorical 
slippages, ambiguities, contradictions, revisions, elisions, and evasions. Take, for 
instance, Orson Fowler’s description of the faculty of MARVELLOUSNESS and its 
connection to religion, its central thought spinning with qualifications: “It is by no means 
certain that this faculty is not adapted, among other things, to a belief in those portions of 
Revelation which are attributed to a supernatural agency” (Phrenology Proved [1837] 
141). The material and multifaceted nature of the phrenological mind constantly threatens 
to lead its phrenologist expositors into heresies, requiring of them careful equivocations 
so as to avoid absolute statements of either materialism or transcendence. This unmapped 
conceptual terrain placed demands on language that existing forms of expression, logic, 
and even grammar were not prepared to meet. Instead, in struggling to express solutions 
to the philosophical problems they had stumbled upon, phrenologist writers 
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unconsciously resort to ambiguities and aporias, which erupt in their texts as they direct 
their descriptions of mind closer and closer to the line separating brain from soul. 
Phrenology’s reductive and naive attempt to decipher the “natural language” of all things 
undoes itself when the spirit is at stake, and in ways that resemble poetic usages of 
language.  
Following an overview of how the Fowlers’ American Phrenological Journal 
frequently addressed the issue of religion, I will closely examine several instances of the 
Fowlers’ engagement with Christianity in their books and periodicals. An essay from the 
American Phrenological Journal and a pamphlet entitled “The Christian Phrenologist” 
provide examples of how phrenology attempted to synthesize the discourses of science 
and religion and how this issue is embedded within the phrenological conception of the 
brain. Three other case studies—the American Phrenological Journal’s treatment of 
conversion, the changing definitions of the faculty of MARVELLOUSNESS, and the strange, 
subjectless syntax in some descriptions of the phrenological faculties—illustrate the 
straining of phrenological language under the pressure of preserving notions of agency 











Phrenologists like the Fowlers explained that physiology determined human 
character and behavior, while maintaining their system was entirely consistent with 
Christianity’s metaphysical premises, including the existence of the soul and free will. 
This ambiguity led to their being accused of fatalism and materialism by some, but also 
embraced by clergymen as prominent as Henry Ward Beecher. As the American 
Phrenological Journal shows, the cultural work of phrenology involved not only 
promoting the ‘scientific’ doctrines of Gall’s material mind, but also blending and 
harmonizing science and religion. In this respect, the Fowlers were engaged in a project 
similar to that of Whitman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Samuel Taylor Coleridge or any of 
the many transatlantic Romantic writers attempting to bridge the secular and the sacred in 
the early nineteenth century.  
Published by Fowlers and Wells from 1838 to 1911, the American Phrenological 
Journal was one of the major mouthpieces for phrenology in America (Stern 26). The 
very first issue, edited by a Reverend J. A. Warne, made evident both the criticism and 
support phrenology received from religious quarters. In addition to the primary goals of 
exposing the errors of critics, promoting knowledge of phrenology’s history, and 
popularizing its basic principles, the journal’s “Introductory Statement” made clear its 
intent “to disabuse conscientious religious men” of the notion that phrenology was 
unfriendly to “revealed religion” (8). Although Rev. Warne left the position of editor 
after only one issue (to be replaced for a couple of years by Nathan Allen until Orson 
Fowler took the reins), phrenology’s harmony with Christianity remained a frequent 
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theme throughout the journal’s antebellum run. The editors eagerly showcased 
contributions from sympathetic clergymen as well as articles that analyzed Christian 
doctrine in phrenological terms and countered common religious criticisms. In the April 
issue of 1847, for example, Orson included two letters from clergyman, apparently in 
response to recent attacks by “Messrs. Observer & Co.” that phrenology was anti-
religious. The first, headlined “Phrenology a Helpmate to Religion,” relates the 
correspondent’s conversion to phrenology after having his head “examined,” as well as 
its usefulness for both parents and ministers in understanding how “to best manage 
minds” of children and congregants (126). As editor, Orson comments on the letter being 
written by a clergymen, recalling that he himself had been studying for the same 
profession when he turned to phrenology. The second letter, titled “Another Ministerial 
Advocate,” appears to be a subscription request from “A Methodist missionary on Lake 
Huron, laboring among the Indians” (127). Regardless of whether the author intended it 
for publication, Fowler seized the opportunity to present another poster-boy for 
phrenology from the clergy.  
More substantively, the American Phrenological Journal included many articles 
that explained how phrenology not only did not undermine Christianity, but was in fact 
its “Helpmate.” The Rev. Warne remained a contributor after leaving as editor, supplying 
the journal with one of many articles that tackle the question of phrenology’s fatalistic—
and therefore anti-Christian—tendencies. In “Phrenology in Relation to Fatalism, 
Necessity, and Human Responsibility,” Warne argues that phrenology recognizes “an 
infinite creating intelligence” behind the material design of the world, rather than the 
mindless operation of physical necessity or the detached clock-maker of deism, and is 
Borst& 40&
therefore no more or less fatalistic than Christianity itself (a common stance in 
phrenology apologetics) (347). In “The Necessity of Revealed Religion, Phrenologically 
Illustrated,” James Shannon assures readers that because even the more religiously 
oriented faculties like VENERATION are neutral or “blind” and can therefore be applied to 
any creed, Christianity still requires the revelation of the Bible (78). The general import 
of such articles as “On the Harmony Between Phrenology and Revelation” (E.C.B.), “On 
the Harmony Between Philosophy and Religion,” and “On the Harmony Between 
Phrenology and the Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration” requires little explanation. As 
the latter title suggests, the journal often demonstrates this harmony by explaining 
specific points of doctrine or religious practice in phrenological terms. Likewise, “A 
Phrenological Analysis of Conversion,” “The Sabbath Proved, By Phrenology, to be an 
Ordinance of Nature,” and “The Fall of Man” all reconcile essential features of 
Christianity to phrenological theory. 
But with respect to religion, the journal’s position was not merely that it did no 
harm. At times it assumed an active and even determining role, claiming to provide 
scientific support for Christianity and offering to reform doctrine and practice along 
scientific lines. Phrenologists often asserted that the existence of a particular mental 
organ or function presupposed the existence of its object in what was assumed to be an 
orderly, God-governed universe. Therefore, they argued, organs like VENERATION or 
MARVELLOUSNESS (sometimes referred to as SPIRITUALITY) implied the existence of the 
divine and spiritual. In effect, phrenology naturalized religion, making it an inborn, 
universal fact of the human body, rather than a cultural construct.36 Furthermore, 
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36 For examples see Shannon (77), Sawyer (433-434), and “Conversion; the Operations of the 
Holy Ghost” (111).  
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religious practices could be improved by following the natural laws inferable from the 
organization of the brain, a topic discussed in such articles as “The Sabbath: How Shall It 
Be Observed?” This piece advises exciting as many of the faculties as possible in 
conjunction with VENERATION to achieve the fullest and most effective experience of 
worship. The author not only recommends that the church service be orderly and timely 
(thus stimulating the areas of ORDER and TIME), but also that worshippers take a brisk 
outdoor walk beforehand, thereby invigorating the body as well as the mind in 
preparation for the sermon (280-281). Even more assertive over the authority of religion 
was “On the Abuse or Perversion of Certain Faculties in Religion,” which analyzes the 
character of religious corruption in terms of the phrenological faculties. According to the 
author, while the “leading faculties” of man’s “moral and religious nature” should be 
“Conscientiousness, Benevolence, and Veneration,” too often contemporary religion 
appealed to more self-interested faculties like SELF-ESTEEM and COMBATIVENESS, 
promoting persecution and intolerance, among other tendencies detrimental to the true 
spirit of religion (517, 521). “The Sabbath” and “On the Abuse [. . .] of Certain Faculties” 
thus typify phrenology’s recursive Romantic logic, the former tracing correspondences 
between the physical and the spiritual, the latter between the personal and the cultural, 







On the Harmony Between Science and Religion, Mind and Culture 
 
Such demonstrations of phrenology’s capacity to be a “helpmate” to religion did 
not, however, address the proverbial devil that emerged in the details. As a philosophy of 
mind, this pseudoscience was embroiled in philosophical questions of materiality, 
causation, free will, and dualism in ways that threatened those notions of moral agency 
upon which Christian theology appeared to be based. Many of the Fowlers’ texts 
(including texts they reprinted by others) work to harmonize phrenology’s materialist and 
determinist implications with more psychologically palatable and comforting notions of 
individual autonomy.  For the Fowlers, the contradictions between these two views were 
resolvable through an understanding of individual psychology and the cultural opposition 
between science and religion with which that psychology was organically intertwined.  
One of the more elaborate efforts of such conceptual harmonizing occurs in the 
unsigned article “On the Harmony Between Philosophy and Religion,” which was 
reprinted in an 1840 issue of the American Phrenological Journal having originally 
appeared in the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal. The piece begins by discussing 
Providence as amounting to nothing more than the order of nature: special Providence, 
miracles, or anything purporting to disrupt the universal natural laws set down by the 
Creator are consequently impossible. While the present impossibility of the miraculous is 
a theme to which the American Phrenological Journal returns on several occasions 
(miracles during Biblical times were another matter), here the issue is considered 
specifically in relation to praying for recovery from consumption.37 Because sickness was 
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understood to be a result of disobeying the natural laws of physiology, praying for an 
immediate recovery would be tantamount to praying for a miracle and therefore futile. 
However, prayer remains efficacious if performed in accordance with general laws of 
causation. For instance, a realistic prayer could be for “the patient and his advisors” to 
“so study and obey the Divine laws as to discover and apply the established means for 
bringing back his lungs into a prosperous state” (500). Religious feelings and character, 
even if they do not allow one to transcend or counteract the laws of nature, can also 
indirectly affect circumstances. “A pious, submissive, and enlightened frame of mind,” 
for instance, “promotes recovery from all diseases, by exciting that kind of action in the 
animal economy which is favourable to health” (506). Similarly, a sailor who recognizes 
and accepts the ultimate benevolence of Providence would better weather a storm than 
one who does not, being of clearer mind and of greater willingness to understand and 
work with the orderly operations of nature (507). While the religious sentiments, 
springing primarily from VENERATION, HOPE, and WONDER, do not directly change 
circumstances or conditions, they do vivify the individual and his or her ability to choose 
and act within the bounds of the naturally possible.  
The writer attributes the trickiness of the issue of Providence to the contrary 
psychological needs of the faculties of CAUSALITY and VENERATION, which by the end of 
the essay are described as analogous to the disciplines of science and religion. CAUSALITY 
“instinctively demands regulated order in all objects and events”; VENERATION loves a 
God who acts “according to his good pleasure” (499). The object of the former faculty is 
the apparently mechanistic world, and that of the latter the invisible, dynamic, creative 
intelligence behind it all. While CAUSALITY and the intellectual and perceptive faculties 
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reveal the truths of nature and human nature, VENERATION and the religious sentiments 
retain a refined if limited function as a vitalizing principle, revealing not nature or its 
workings, but a sense of its divinity. This is precisely the relationship that, according to 
the phrenologist, can and should hold true at a cultural level between science and 
religion, the ultimate products of these faculties. If religion allowed science always to 
further its investigations into nature, it would not be supplanted but supported by science, 
and its role refined: “science and philosophy would become the pioneers of religion, and 
religion would constitute the vivifying and presiding spirit of human undertakings” (508). 
Science, then, would also benefit, receiving a divine imperative—at once humbling and 
energizing—to understand and obey the text of Providence in nature.  
Given the obscurity of the text, this anonymous phrenologist’s achievement is 
startling. Similar to the best works of the Transcendentalists, the author here works out a 
grand synthesis of a range of perspectives and ontological categories, but he does so by 
working out the relationship between two phrenological faculties. CAUSALITY and 
VENERATION not only represent psychological and physiological facts; they also have 
philosophical and cultural implications. They relate directly to questions of nature and 
soul, matter and spirit, law and agency, as well as originate the disciplines of science and 
religion. Through phrenology the individual becomes whole, a process which generates a 
spectrum of parallel syntheses within the broader contexts of society and cosmology. As 
much as phrenology may succeed (or fail) in bridging particular points of view, it is in 
such demonstrations of explanatory power that this pseudoscience as a theory conveys a 
promise or vision of totalizing unity.38 
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editors, “to many of the journal’s readers phrenology was much more than an abstract science of 
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Orson Fowler himself wrote at length on the subject of phrenology’s relationship 
to religion in a pamphlet entitled The Christian Phrenologist (1843). Like “On the 
Harmony Between Philosophy and Religion,” this text relies on Romantic organicism and 
the faculty of VENERATION to harmonize scientific and religious perspectives; it also uses 
phrenology to analyze both culture and individual psychology. However, to prove 
phrenology’s harmony with religion, Fowler relies more on literary or dramatic rhetorical 
practices in giving both the Christian phrenologist and the scientific phrenologist full 
voice. What is achieved in this text is not so much a seamless synthesis of opposing 
positions, but a balanced expression of juxtaposed extremes. And it does not remain a 
settled balance, as later revisions of the text indicate.  
The Christian Phrenologist appears to have formed the nucleus of Fowler’s later 
book, Religion; Natural and Revealed (1844), covering most of the same topics and 
including identical passages. In both, Fowler asserts the primacy of natural law and 
empirical fact over any practiced religion, including Christianity, though the The 
Christian Phrenologist is slightly more pugnacious in tone, and not quite as polished or 
developed in phrasing or content. In the “Preface” to the latter, Fowler declares that so 
great is the “power” of phrenology: 
that with whatever form of religion it may conflict, be it even Christianity, it will 
prostrate and ride over; for, Phrenology is truth, and will prevail. It is a 
demonstrative science. It is a science built upon FACTS and consisting in facts—in 
facts of every kind and infinite in number. It develops and evolves those laws in 
harmony with which “God created man,” and also the whole range of animated 
nature. Every living creature that now inhabits air, earth or water, is a living 
incontestable truth, as are all the animals that ever have existed, and will be all 
that ever may inhabit our globe. (3) 
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character analysis . . . A number of adherents found phrenology appealing as a worldview, an all-
purpose approach to life that inspired a deep sense of commitment” (75). 
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Fowler’s certainty reaches a fanatic pitch with the refrain of “facts” and the phrase “it is,” 
boiling over into the tortured syntax of the final “will be all that ever may” (both the 
refrain and the awkwardness are smoothed out of a similar passage in Natural 
Religion).39 Soon after this passage he concludes that if phrenology and religion conflict, 
“Revelation must go by the board.”40 But as resolute and brazen as he first appears, 
Fowler hesitates as the full implications of rejecting the word of God dawn on him: “My 
pen falters. Shall I proceed?” To comfort himself, he proceeds to consider how religious 
belief is currently “in a very unsettled condition” for a “very many good men,” and that 
by illuminating man’s true moral nature phrenology might in fact provide religion with a 
new foundation (3).41 As incontrovertible as it is, phrenology would provide undeniable 
support for Christianity if found to corroborate its claims and principles. Ultimately, 
despite the strident skepticism with which he began, Fowler goes on to show that 
phrenology can indeed bolster one’s belief, though not without serious qualifications: the 
hypocritical Christianity he sees practiced in America bears no relation to the Christianity 
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39 In Religion; Natural and Revealed, the same passage reads:  
“Phrenology is also now everywhere becoming a subject of all-absorbing interest; and 
well it may, for it is founded in Truth. It must, it will prevail. It is a demonstrative 
science. It is built upon FACTS, infinite in both variety and number. It develops and 
evolves those laws in harmony with which God created both man and the whole range of 
animated nature. Every living creature that now inhabits earth, air, or water, is a living, 
incontestable evidence of its truth, as are all all that ever lived, or that will ever inhabit 
our globe” (vii). 
40 Compare the same line in Religion; Natural and Revealed: “If even the Bible could be found to 
clash therewith, then would the Bible go by the board” (viii). Here Fowler’s use of the 
conditional appears to take for granted the ultimate truth of Christianity. 
41&Citing Henry Ward Beecher as one among several examples, White has shown how 
phrenology did in fact appeal to many nineteenth-century believers who found themselves 
uncomfortably ‘unsettled’ with respected to religion, either frustrated by Calvinism’s seemingly 
impossible demands or bewildered by the current profusion of metaphysical systems and religions 
(232-235, 238-239).&
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that phrenology would prove or elucidate. According to Fowler, phrenology was here to 
reform and purify a corrupt faith as well as to prove Christianity.42 
 And so within the span of only two pages, Fowler transforms himself from 
vituperative philosophe to American Jermiah, decrying the worldliness of the current 
church and demanding a new commitment to religious principles clarified by phrenology: 
Ye religious bigots; ye narrow minded sectarians; ye whited sepulchers, who have 
the form of Godliness without its power, ye Sunday, go-to-meeting, I-am-better-
than-thou religionists; ye fashionable Christians, (if, indeed, a fashionable can be 
a Christian,) stand up and receive your sentence; for ye are weighed in the balance 
of truth and found wanting. Modern Christianity, the religion of the day, the isms, 
the church and creed piety, the hollow, worldly-minded, money-seeking, animal 
Christianity of the nineteenth century, deserves severe rebuke, and will receive 
merited castigation. (4) 
 
A lyric hybrid of genres and voices, Fowler’s “Preface” dramatizes the dialectical process 
of thinking, moving from empiricism to jeremiad and boldly exploring and transforming 
the limits of his scientific and religious allegiances. In this it resembles the classic essay 
form as initiated by Montaigne, but more immediately as inherited by Emerson, who 
attempted to capture the dynamic nature of thought in his essays by giving full expression 
to the passing, limited perspectives of each day, moment, or mood despite the 
















paragraphs. The guiding faith of such a practice was that a truer, fuller picture of the 
subject would in the end emerge from the text as a whole. Fowler’s brief narrative shocks 
and entertains, proclaiming the authority of fact over faith while reassuring readers that 
the two will match up in the end: a provocative and clever rhetorical achievement. 
Though the archaic “ye” Fowler adopts at the height of his religious fervor does not 
appear in the passage trumpeting his worship of fact, elements of his voice remain 
consistent across both sections, indicating the same persona in each: heated assertions of 
certitude, text that bristles with italics, and a disregard for the niceties of syntax and 
diction out of a righteous passion for common truth. As the frequent use of italics 
suggest, simple words were not enough: they had to be typographically shouted, or 
wrought out of colloquial speech into folksy, multiply hyphenated neologisms.  
While starkly juxtaposed here in these prefatory paragraphs, the scientific and 
religious sides of Fowler’s beliefs coincide throughout much of “The Christian 
Phrenologist,” as he sets forth materialist explanations of religion that support rather than 
undermine Christianity. According to Fowler, phrenology will address two increasing 
threats to religion in America: skepticism and sectarianism. Regarding the former, he 
explains how phrenology naturalizes religion as an essential part of human nature: it 
springs from the moral and religious organs, such as VENERATION, which is here 
described as creating “an awe of God, a sense of the Divine presence, a feeling of 
nearness to him.” Consequently, unlike even the Bible itself, phrenology conclusively 
proves the existence of God. “The primordial function of every organ,” explains Fowler, 
“is adapted to some one law of nature or want of man.” For instance, “Causality adapts 
man to a world governed by causes and effects,” while “Cautiousness is adapted to a 
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world of danger.” From this he infers that VENERATION too has its “adaptation or 
counterpart in the nature of things,” just as the “stomach, and its adaptation to food, pre-
suppose” the existence of food (8). The same kind of reasoning settles other philosophical 
questions, using the rhetoric of science and rationality to prove metaphysical concepts. 
Because the existence of a faculty assumes the actual existence of its object, 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, for example, proves the objective existence of right and wrong. 
“Some things are right, and others wrong in themselves,” explains Fowler, not merely in 
their effects as “Deists and others maintain” (23). Once again phrenology projects a 
vision of unity in portraying itself as a system of wide-ranging explanatory power.  
In addition to converting skeptics to faith, phrenology promised to solve the 
problem of increasing sectarianism, against which Fowler rails throughout the pamphlet. 
Phrenology would ground Christianity on the universal principles of a natural theology 
that would cut through the petty differences of dogma (17). Essentially Fowler uses 
phrenology to analyze and diagnose such divisions, revealing how particular religions 
and denominations result from particular personality types. In other words, the values 
emphasized by different faiths correspond to the dominant character traits of their 
followers. The ancient Greeks and Romans worshipped Venus because their populations 
had tended to develop large VENERATION and very large AMATIVENESS. More recently: 
Universalists almost invariably have large Veneration, combined with 
predominant Benevolence and Adhesiveness, and moderate Destructiveness, and 
hence adore God for his goodness mainly, and dwell in glowing colors on his 
love; while the old-fashioned Calvinists usually have large Veneration, with 
predominant Self-Esteem and Firmness, and large Conscientiousness, and 
accordingly adore the Sovereignty and unbending justice of God. (13) 
 
For Fowler, all of these dogmas and doctrines cloud true religion, thought, and 
perception, emphasizing as they do the development of only a few organs to the neglect 
Borst& 50&
of others. He compares the organs to a set of differently colored lenses through which to 
view the world: if only one or a few predominate, then vision will be distorted. Having all 
the organs fully developed, on the other hand, allows for the clearest, most 
comprehensive judgment and forms the basis for the best possible religion (12-14). Such 
a personality will “entertain consistent and correct religious opinions, and view the 
character and attributes of the Deity as they are” (14).  
In their many practical guides to phrenology, the Fowlers similarly recommend 
the full and balanced development of all types of temperament, citing George 
Washington as exemplary.43 But elsewhere they suggest no such perfect head or character 
exists, that nature is productively variegated in form and function, an idea implicit in their 
marriage and professional guides and explicit in articles like “A Model Head,” which 
explains that different heads may be ideal in different times and places (J.L.C.). Not at all 
obvious from reading “The Christian Phrenologist” alone, this contradiction is in a sense 
mitigated by the discourse of phrenology as a whole—or at least the body of the Fowlers’ 
texts as a whole. The Fowlers’ publications en masse function as a synthesizing field, 
encompassing even the twin but potentially opposing American ideals of equality and 
individualism. Within the specific context of “The Christian Phrenologist,” of course, 
Fowler posits an ideal religious type instead of celebrating variety, but he does so to serve 
a unifying purpose, providing a much-needed common ground for a culture split by 
revival, schism, and upstart faiths. 
Although “The Christian Phrenologist” suggests that phrenology’s natural 
theology will ultimately endorse Christianity, it also stays faithful to the idea that 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
43 In The Illustrated Self-Instructor, Washington’s portrait appears under the heading “A WELL-
BALANCED ORGANIZATION” (26). 
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phrenology is the final arbiter of truth. Fowler is not afraid to assert his authority as a 
phrenologist over conventional understandings of scripture and worship, articulating 
surprisingly specific reforms and phrenology-inspired interpretations of doctrine. Every 
aspect of phrenology potentially carries religious significance. The Sabbath, for instance, 
comes under fire for relegating devotion to one day each week, promoting “week-day 
worldly-mindedness.” In contrast, phrenology reveals that the mental organs require 
regular exercise like any other muscle and that the key to happiness is in fact the “right 
exercise of every faculty” (10). Therefore Fowler recommends maintaining a habitual 
spirit of worship on both biological and moral grounds. The location of the moral 
faculties, especially VENERATION, forms another set of phrenological facts rich in 
religious implications. Just as parts of the body increase in importance moving up from 
the feet to the head, so too the mental organs, the animal propensities arranged around the 
base of the brain, the moral faculties like CONSCIENTIOUSNESS and BENEVOLENCE around 
its top. This placement also reflects their authority in relation to one another, with 
VENERATION occupying the center of the powerful moral organs, “where it can unite and 
control, in no small degree, the action of the others” (15).  
Despite the insistence of many phrenological texts (including Fowler’s own) to 
the contrary, Fowler here smuggles in the idea of a centralized subject, as if the tensions 
and paradoxes surrounding the topic of religion and materialism inherently lent 
themselves to—or required—such flexible thinking. In addition to allegorizing the mental 
organs’ placement, Fowler offers an even more detailed physiological account, which 
again splinters into contradictions as it attempts to incorporate (literally) some comforting 
myths of a transcendental and unified self. He explains that the moral organs reside at the 
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top of the head, “thus removed as far as possible from the body, so that their bland, mild, 
harmonious action, may be interrupted and retarded as little as possible by those causes 
which disorder the body” (7). Even as he claims the bodily nature of morality and 
religion, Fowler rehearses the old Christian-dualist bias against the flesh. Logic breaks 
down as he tries to distance these elevated faculties from the debasement of the body by 
placing them in one particular part of it. 
As much as this may represent a failure in philosophical reasoning, it suggests a 
success of another sort: the working out through writing a synthesis of competing, 
contradictory, necessary, and variously useful ideas, values, and beliefs—in other words, 
cultural work.44 That Fowler preserves some of the metaphysical concepts many found 
(and find) psychologically comforting in a discourse whose materialism was in many 
respects inimical to such ideas, can be viewed as an achievement of expression if not of 
logic or empirical observation. Though he does revert to Puritanical notions of the fallen 
body, the upshot of applying phrenology to Christianity is a softening and liberalizing of 
Calvinist stances, quite in line with some major trends occurring within the revivals of 
the Second Great Awakening. Fowler’s analyses of certain personality types implicitly 
critique severe religious sensibilities; someone with Combativeness and 
Conscientiousness” predominating over “Benevolence” would possess overly “austere 
and orthodox” notions of “the character and government of God” (15). He also challenges 
conventional understandings of heaven, hell, and sin, the latter consisting of actions not 
against God, but “against ourselves or our fellow-men” and the natural laws that govern 
our human constitutions. Consequently, punishment is not deferred until a terrifying and 
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44 I am indebted to Jane Tompkins’ application of this concept in Sensational Designs: The 
Cultural Work of American Fiction. 
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endless afterlife, but is “self-acting” and instantaneous, according to how much 
individuals fulfill or fail to fulfill the laws of their being. Heaven and hell are “conditions, 
not places,” explains Fowler (30). Phrenology’s engagement with Christian theology 
resembles the cultural work of revivalist or New Light preachers in other ways as well. 
The ministry of Charles Grandison Finney, for instance, relied very much on a rationalist 
perspective, particularly traditions of sensationalist and associationist thought. For 
Finney, revivals were almost mechanistic procedures: preachers had to identify 
communities in the proper condition, ripe for spiritual awakening, and then employ 
proven methods of firing religious repentance and fervor, like the anxious seat, prolonged 
prayer, and tent meetings.45 
The preceding two cases, “On the Harmony Between Philosophy and Religion” 
and “The Christian Phrenologist,” have focused on the conscious efforts of phrenologists 
to resolve the philosophical tensions subsisting between the discourses of religion and 
science. Fowler and the Scottish phrenologist whose work he reprints employ coherent 
rhetorical and conceptual arguments to perform this cultural work. But as Fowler’s 
occasionally tangled syntax and reasoning in “The Christian Phrenologist” suggests, such 
work was as difficult as it was urgent, placing increasing demands on language and logic 
the more directly it addressed the relationship between the material brain and the 
immaterial spirit. The semantic disruptions and aporias resulting from such 
confrontations provide the focus of the following three case studies of phrenology’s 
engagement with religion: discussions of conversion in the American Phrenological 
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45 See chapter 5, “The Anxious Seat,” of Hambrick-Stowe’s biography of Finney (101-130); for 
an excellent and expansive discussion of phrenology’s appeal to anti-Calvinist religious liberals 
see White’s “Minds Intensely Unsettled.” 
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Journal, the oft-revised explanations for the faculty of MARVELLOUSNESS in the Fowlers’ 
phrenology guides, and the sometimes transgressive syntax of their descriptions of 






















A Crisis of Expression: Phrenology and Conversion 
 
Despite their insistence on harmony, phrenological texts like the American 
Phrenological Journal often sound discordant notes when striving to maintain the claims 
of both materialism and transcendence at once. As a result, the publications of the 
Fowlers exhibit frequent revisions, rhetorical accidents, evasions, and obscurities. Indeed, 
the more material aspects of the Fowler’s publications—how they were composed, 
edited, and published—lent themselves to such accidents, Freudian slips of the pen and 
the press, making them sensitive registers of the anxieties and desires of author and 
audience alike. The American Phrenological Journal as a periodical could be 
immediately responsive to its readership, its editors replying to current criticism in other 
periodicals and accepting submissions from interested readers on a monthly basis. The 
journal also cobbled together articles from the books and lectures of other phrenologists, 
European and American, including those of the Fowlers themselves, rendering it an 
international repository of phrenological views and theories, a space for exploration and 
discussion more than for rigid agreement.  
But just as the American Phrenological Journal did not conform to a single, 
conscious authorial intention, neither did the book-length publications of the Fowlers. 
Indeed, tracing the genealogy of one of Orson Fowler’s works proves as difficult as 
tracing that of one of Whitman’s poems. Typically, each of Fowler’s many volumes went 
through multiple editions, sometimes substantially revised, sometimes not. Passages in 
one work were recycled in another, occasionally with slight alterations. Orson’s prose 
itself at times seems rough-and-ready and almost slapdash, pieced together from various 
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sources, careless of the niceties of style and grammar, as liable to cite a scientific source 
as to erupt into homely colloquialisms. The writing of Orson or other phrenologists 
should not be dismissed as sloppy, plagiaristic, or self-cannibalizing, however. It was 
crafted for a purpose practical and exhortatory, not belletristic, and the casualness of its 
composition exposes its authors’ aims and limitations in writing. 
The semantic disruptions to which I have been alluding in a sense signify the 
confluence of their authors’ desire and failure in a crisis of expression, specifically their 
desire and failure to retain the psychological comforts of a soul within a theory that 
tended towards materialism and that rested on a radically different notion of self and 
subjectivity. One consequence of Gall’s and Spurzheim’s understanding of the brain as 
consisting of multiple organs is a radical redistribution of the mental categories 
established by previous forms of faculty psychology. Will, imagination, judgment, and 
reason do not appear in their taxonomy of sentiments, propensities, and faculties, 
although some of the capacities with which they were conventionally associated 
reemerge under new headings. IDEALITY, for instance, encompasses much of what is 
commonly associated with imagination.46 Memory undergoes perhaps the most dramatic 
metamorphosis: no longer a single entity, it is dispersed across multiple phrenological 
faculties. Specific types of memory accompany specific modes of cognition or 
perception. Someone strong in LANGUAGE or EVENTUALITY, for instance, would have a 
strong memory for words or events respectively, and the same principle applied to other 
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46 Spurzheim describes IDEALITY as the faculty of poetry: “A plain, unadorned description of 
things as they are, cannot be called poetry; vividness, glow, exaltation, imagination, inspiration, 
rapture, and warmth in the expressions, are requisite to constitute compositions worthy of the 
name; all is represented in exaggerated terms, in a state of perfection, such as it ought to be. Poets 
picture forth a factitious and imaginary world. Thus I admit a sentiment which vivifies the other 
faculties, and impresses a peculiar character called poetical or ideal” (2: 238). 
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faculties to which memory could be related. As the brain becomes a collection of drives, 
desires, and modes of cognition, the “soul” or “mind” itself ceases to function as a single 
entity. Even if, as the Fowlers maintained, the soul remains something other than the 
brain or the body, which were its physical organs, it would prove difficult to explain 
exactly what practical relationship it could have with such a decentralized mental 
organization as phrenology presented. 
As evident in “On the Harmony Between Philosophy and Religion” and “The 
Christian Phrenologist,” much of the work of harmonizing science and religion in 
phrenology, and of bridging the worlds of matter and spirit, involves the faculties of 
VENERATION and MARVELLOUSNESS (also referred to as WONDER or SPIRITUALITY). 
Unsurprisingly, it is when forced to scrutinize the nature of these faculties that the texts 
of the phrenologists become particularly unstable, as when explaining the mechanism of 
conversion. The tension proceeds primarily from the danger of making either of these 
faculties the explicit point of contact with the spiritual. To do so threatens on the one 
hand to materialize absolutely the spiritual (undermining religion), and on the other to 
reintroduce the idea of the mind as a centralized unified agent (undermining phrenology). 
Instead, what is sought is a careful balance between these two narratives of self. 
Given the importance of VENERATION and MARVELLOUSNESS in many arguments 
defending phrenology from accusations of atheism, these religiously-oriented faculties 
could be expected to loom large in phrenological discussions of conversion. However, in 
several articles on conversion in the American Phrenological Journal, the central role of 
this pair of faculties is emphatically de-emphasized. “On the Harmony Between 
Phrenology and the Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration” does not mention either faculty 
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at all, instead using the concept of faith to explain how individuals can repent and change 
even though character is so largely determined by the makeup of the brain. It should be 
noted that this article, taken from the fourth number of the Edinburgh Review, differs 
markedly from much of Fowlerian phrenology in at least two respects: it severely limits 
how much the actual brain (as opposed to only behavior and habits) can change; and it 
states that religious character cannot be predicted from the shape of the skull, a position 
Fowler clearly contradicts in The Christian Phrenologist (13-15). In fact, the main 
strategy the author of “On the Harmony Between Phrenology and . . . Regeneration” 
adopts in addressing the accusation of fatalism is to restore invisibility to certain aspects 
of mental life and function, whereas the thrust of much phrenological discourse is the 
precise opposite. He begins with a discussion of how phrenology can only identify “a 
man’s capabilities and tendencies, but not the extent and manner to which these may 
have been fostered, controlled, and regulated, or neglected, crushed, and perverted.” 
Circumstances, education, and the disciplined contemplation of maxims or rules are 
among the things that can so manage the brain’s unalterable “natural endowments,” but 
their effects do not reveal themselves in the shape of the head (401-402). The stage has 
now been set for the author’s discussion of the invisible yet material mechanics of 
conversion, which allow for both biological determinism and a kind of spiritual agency. 
A disembodied and at times vaguely defined concept of faith is what allows the 
author to bridge the material and the spiritual within the mind. Citing the Apostle Paul, 
the phrenologist defines faith as “evidence of things not seen” and as “an abiding and 
realizing belief of the whole truths of revealed religion.” With faith “you have placed 
man in a new world,” made him concerned with higher objects and purposes, and in 
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effect situated him among “new circumstances”—namely the kind that can foster and 
control an individual’s natural propensities in accordance with Christianity (405-406). A 
person’s natural endowments and their embodiment in the brain itself are therefore not 
essentially altered by conversion but repurposed—restrained or stimulated—according to 
new objects of thought. Conversion remains a divinely inspired process as a gift of grace, 
but entirely natural as well, and consistent with phrenology’s understanding of the 
mechanics of the brain.  
But while the effects of faith are clearly if too cleverly spelled out in the essay, 
what—and where—faith actually is remains obscure. If we consider its function as 
establishing a set of “new circumstances” in the mind (406), faith closely resembles two 
specific faculties: the imagination of other faculty psychologies, picturing to the mind the 
otherworldly objects of Christianity, and phrenology’s MARVELLOUSNESS, which some 
phrenologists described as the faculty of believing in the unseen. But not only does the 
author not link faith to any particular faculty, he explicitly rejects any attempt to do so, 
including one prominent phrenologist’s apparently egregious claim that faith is associated 
with HOPE. On the contrary, “Christianity,” through the medium of faith, addresses itself 
to many aspects of the believer’s mind, including his “Cautiousness, his Adhesiveness, 
his Conscientiousness, his Firmness, his Veneration, his Ideality, and even his 
Combativeness,” as well as to hope in the future afterlife. In short, the truth of 
Christianity impressed upon the mind “by genuine Christian faith, [. . .] raises the whole 
man, and gives ample scope for the exercise of all his natural sentiments and powers” 
(emphasis added). In this discussion, faith—the lynchpin of the spiritual life of the 
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psyche—is diffused, decentralized, and dematerialized, at the same time becoming a 
unifying principle of the personality (406).  
Instead of as a faculty, the author describes faith repeatedly as a “principle,” 
presumably in the sense of an actualizing force, “implanted in his [man’s] breast, for 
regulating controlling, and directing all the principles of his nature.” Given the context of 
this passage in an article on phrenology, the metaphorical import of “implanted in his 
breast” warrants scrutiny. The phrase casually displaces faith from the brain altogether, 
but its figurative usage seems confusing and illegitimate in a discourse dedicated to 
concretizing mental life in the brain. The term “principle” also displaces faith, at first 
appearing to distinguish it from the brain organs as a catalyst from its object. Roughly, 
“principle” appears to refer to the function of faith in making the brain attend to, fixate 
on, and believe the scriptures and doctrines of Christianity, all of which serve to reorient 
the faculties. However, the author explains that faith directs “all the principles of his 
nature” (emphasis added). A page later the faculties are even more explicitly referred to 
as principles. Suddenly “principle” no longer distinguishes faith from faculty, but 
includes them both in the same category of mental facts (405-406).  
Leaving its definition only partially explained, the author deploys the word “faith” 
in subtly incongruous ways corresponding to shifts in its grammatical implications.  
Quoting the book of Hebrews’ definition of faith as “EVIDENCE of things NOT SEEN,” he 
casts faith as a noun and as an object of consciousness—a something thought about—
rather than as a mode of thinking or aspect of the mind itself. As an “abiding and 
realising belief” and “conviction” in the teachings of Christianity, however, it becomes an 
act of the mind (or at least of the self) rather than its object. A slightly different meaning 
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emerges later, when the author explains how “this system of truth [Christianity] is 
‘evidenced’ to his [man’s] mind by faith. It is thereby made present to his mind; it 
occupies his mind and fills it” (405). While the earlier allusion to Hebrews remains the 
same, the grammar of “evidence” has changed, now operating as a verb. The grammatical 
change here accompanies a semantic one, as faith becomes either the medium or mode of 
perception through which the object (i.e. Christian teaching) is apprehended. Neither the 
object of apprehension nor the act of apprehension, faith now appears to be the vehicle 
through which the object can be apprehended—the thing that apprehends or makes 
apprehension possible. In this sense, it even resembles a faculty, presuming that “to 
evidence” is the equivalent of “to make present.”  
This presumption, however, is not necessarily the case. If “to evidence” is read as 
“to prove,” faith again becomes a matter of belief or conviction. But, once again, a 
caveat: in this context it does not appear to be the same as an act of belief. Rather, the 
passive verb construction “evidenced by” suggests that faith causes or necessitates belief, 
the “mind” being the indirect object of faith as it evidences its direct object, Christianity. 
Another passage bears out this reading: “But if the truths [of Christianity] are admitted 
into the mind, and impressed upon it by genuine Christian faith, it seems obvious that it 
raises the whole man” (406). While faith may at first appear to act primarily on the mind, 
literally speaking it also acts on the truths in question, “evidencing” or “impressing” the 
truths as if it were an extension of the mind. Deeply etching facts already admitted into 
consciousness, faith is neither act nor object of perception, but something else—perhaps 
something in between, operating from the mind as well as upon it. As such, it allows the 
mind to function as both subject and object.   
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In eluding a single definition and in operating along multiple logical and 
grammatical lines, the concept of faith in this obscure and anonymous essay on 
phrenology bridges categorical divides at the heart of many a religious and philosophical 
quandary. Not only does it blur the boundaries between subject and object, the internal 
and the external, it also muddles the ontological distinctions between nature and self, 
knowledge and action, quality, mode, God, mind, and thought. The spiritual and the 
material are both allowed their due, as are the disciplines of religion and science, faith’s 
Protean transformations allowing it to pass freely between them. At times partaking of 
the nature of spirit and at other times of matter, it operates closely with the bodily brain, 
but in ways that seem to vaporize—or sublime—when closely scrutinized. If it were 
otherwise, if its point of contact with the body were pinpointed, faith and religion would 
be made completely a matter of physical causes, instead of only partially so. For 
example, if faith were located as a phrenological faculty, Christianity would be 
biologically determined. If faith were simply an object of thought, or an experience 
(albeit one given by God), religion would be mechanically determined by causes outside 
of oneself. If it were neither of these things but instead a matter of action, spiritual 
inspiration, or free will, faith would have no comprehensible connection to those aspects 
of existence phrenology was so invested in acknowledging: the operations of natural 
forces both inside and out of the self. But by flitting through all three of these conceptual 
positions, faith softens the theological problems that separated sects and dogmas, hard-
line Calvinists from Perfectionist-tending evangelicals, notions of God-given grace from 
those emphasizing individual repentance. It also softens the basic philosophical problems 
splitting believers in free will from determinists. By including the operations of the 
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undefined “faith” in his account of human action, the phrenologist at least leaves room 
for the possibility of something other than material causes determining human behavior. 
Furthermore, the grammatical inconsistencies involved in the solution to such problems 
hint that grammatical consistencies may have been involved in creating the problems to 
begin with. 
 In “On the Harmony Between Phrenology and . . . Regeneration,” man’s spirit or 
soul is not discussed, only the “mind,” ambiguously standing in for the brain or for a 
slightly more metaphysical notion of a unified consciousness. Yet in the qualities the 
article assigns to faith—its immateriality and its being given by the grace of God—
conventional notions of spirit clearly remain. In another American Phrenological Journal 
article, “Phrenology Vindicated Against the Charges of Fatalism,” Charles Caldwell also 
manages to retain the conventions of Christianity while promoting an even more 
materialist version of the mind. But rather than offer a disembodied element like faith 
into his psychological calculus, Caldwell argues for an unabashedly material explanation 
of virtue, vice, and conversion. In doing so, he almost cannot help but revert to a 
moralizing vision of the human mind inflected by notions of original sin. Similar to “On 
the Harmony Between Harmony and . . . Regeneration,” this reversion coincides with 
moments of rhetorical slippage, inconsistency, and contradiction in his prose. 
 North Carolina-born Charles Caldwell claimed to have “introduced into the 
United States the science of phrenology” (Autobiography 304), lecturing on the subject at 
Kentucky’s Transylvania University’s medical school after returning from a stay in 
Europe in 1821 (“Labours of Dr. Caldwell” 452). A medical doctor and teacher, Caldwell 
wrote and lectured on a broad range of subjects in addition to medicine, publishing 
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several books, pamphlets, and articles explaining and defending phrenology. “Phrenology 
Vindicated Against the Charges of Fatalism” concluded a two-part series in the American 
Phrenological Journal, the first being devoted to charges of materialism. In this second 
part, Caldwell addresses the criticism that phrenology does away with free will and is 
therefore incompatible with Christian ideas of redemption and ethical accountability. He 
argues that—contrary to one common misconception—phrenologists do not posit such 
things as a “material organ of crime” that would inescapably force individuals to commit 
criminal acts. Instead, following Spurzheim’s reforms of Gall’s system, he says that only 
some organs could lead to crime and then only when abused or “misapplied.” “The 
natural action of every organ,” he explains, “when under due regulation, is useful and 
necessary.” Furthermore, because the organs “are susceptible to great alteration by 
training,” education and exercise, any tendency to “misapply” or abuse them is quite 
correctible (99-101). 
 As Caldwell elaborates on his basic argument, he avails himself of two aspects of 
phrenology’s model of the brain: its de-centering of the subject in dispersing the self 
across multiple mental organs; and its compartmentalization of personality traits and 
faculties. Because phrenology roots vice in the abuse of particular faculties, it is actually 
less fatalistic than “any other scheme of mental philosophy” as well as many Christian 
understandings of sin. While phrenologists locate vice in the brain, anti-phrenologists 
locate it in the mind or the spirit. Having “neither separate portions nor distinct 
localities,” the mind or spirit “is held to be perfectly simple and indivisible.” Therefore if 
this metaphysical entity is to be changed, “it must be changed in toto,” not in part. Such a 
total change is no different than “annihilation,” requiring the “absolute extinguishment” 
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of such an entity’s original identity (101). Moreover, because it is a metaphysical entity 
beyond our sphere of observation and activity, such a spiritual change would require 
nothing short of a miracle (103). By localizing sin and attributing personal growth to 
education, phrenology’s account of the mind is consequently more reasonable, provable, 
observable, and possible than that of the anti-phrenologists. 
  Caldwell further argues that if the mind according to phrenology is liable to 
fatalism, “it must be to a fatalism of virtue, rather than of vice.” He repeats that none of 
the faculties “in their natural and well-regulated condition” lead to evil. Five and only 
five, however, can be abused or misapplied, all of them belonging to “the animal 
compartment of the brain”: AMATIVENESS, DESTRUCTIVENESS, COMBATIVENESS, 
ACQUISITIVENESS, and SECRETIVENESS. Eight faculties including BENEVOLENCE and 
VENERATION, on the other hand, actively and inherently promote virtue, along with four 
others that frequently cooperate with them to the same end. “Thus,” Caldwell explains, 
“may the balance in favor of virtue be made greatly to preponderate” (104-105). 
However, as assured as Caldwell may sound, this sentence begins to reveal the tensions 
with which his argument is fraught, many of them emanating from the idea of “mental 
balance,” which in this case is alluded to but passed over in favor of a “preponderance.”  
Caldwell’s explanation of the commonly held phrenological doctrine that all the 
faculties are inherently morally neutral largely rests on the idea of mental balance. 
Vicious propensities are due to a natural system of checks and balances being overthrown 
by excess or perversion of one or more faculties, not because any of the faculties are 
inherently evil. Therefore, Caldwell claims, God is absolved of all charges of creating a 
faulty creation (104). And yet by setting up an opposition between faculties that naturally 
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tend toward good and faculties that have the potential, if not quite the natural tendency, 
for evil, he reinserts a moralizing strain into his materialist account of the brain. If not 
outright vices, several faculties certainly resemble vices and require restraint. The 
equivocation becomes most apparent when Caldwell writes, “By this antagonism of 
mental powers, the mind can be held in a state of equilibrium, as relates to vice and 
virtue; or, rather, as will presently appear, a preponderance toward the latter may be 
easily imparted to it” (105). The neutrally described “mental powers” in effect translate 
into “vice and virtue” by the end of the first clause. Their relationship vacillates between 
being an “antagonism,” “a state of equilibrium,” and finally a “preponderance” of one 
over the other. It is as if Caldwell cannot end his sentence on a note of cool balance, but 
must continue despite himself, privileging the pious virtues embodied in certain faculties 















Phrenologists frequently cited MARVELLOUSNESS (along with VENERATION) as 
evidence of how their materialist account of the mind actually benefited religion, 
providing it with physical proof of man’s timeless religious instinct and of the God that 
instilled it. The faculty functioned as a conceptual bridge between the scientific and the 
religious, the material and the spiritual, and as such became a sensitive register of how 
difficult and important a task it was for the Fowlers to synthesize these perspectives. In 
bridging them, MARVELLOUSNESS was renamed, redefined, and re-conceptualized 
frequently over the course of the antebellum period by the Fowlers, who were themselves 
revising the already varied accounts of Spurzheim and Gall. Each incarnation solved 
different philosophical problems reflecting the changing interests of phrenology’s authors 
and readership. 
From the beginning, the nature as well as name of this organ was contested: 
Spurzheim called it MARVELLOUSNESS and George Combe (Spurzheim-convert and major 
phrenology apologist) WONDER. According to an early issue of the American 
Phrenological Journal, Spurzheim viewed the faculty as the capacity to believe in the 
supernatural and miraculous, Combe as an instinctive attraction to novelty that could 
stimulate creativity (202-203). (Both definitions would surface with varying degrees of 
emphasis in later accounts by the Fowlers). The article, attributed to an M. B. Sampson, 
attempts to distinguish the faculty from credulity, an association based largely on 
Spurzheim’s definition. Some of phrenology’s critics had apparently mocked the science 
on account of this particular faculty, suggesting that the pseudoscience had a vested 
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interest in identifying and promoting a faculty that resembled gullibility (207). Whitman 
himself did so in one of his early more skeptical reviews of Orson Fowler’s lectures, 
wryly observing that the “professor appears to think that the bump of marvellousness is 
very fully developed in his audiences” (“Chance” 2). Sampson addresses this criticism 
and resolves the differences between Spurzheim and Combe by keeping Combe’s 
terminology, Spurzheim’s definition, but carefully explaining that when properly 
developed, WONDER is best understood as something like faith rather than credulity, and 
specifically faith in such metaphysical truths as the existence of the soul and its 
transcendent nature (204-207). The Journal’s editors, however, are careful to clarify that 
they do not consider the question settled with Sampson’s account and that “the real 
functions of this organ are more imperfectly understood than those of any other organ 
which is considered as established” (201). They appear reluctant to align this faculty with 
a specific theological concept, perhaps because it would materialize the very concept 
needed for transcending the material. Conversely, it could also have been because of 
phrenology’s roots in secular Enlightenment scientific rationalism, however complicated 
such a relationship may have been. Or it may have been a strange combination of both 
reasons, reflecting phrenology’s ambivalent position between the discourses of science 
and religion. 
 Despite their differences, both Spurzheim and Combe consider the faculty in 
secular terms. While Spurzheim recognized MARVELLOUSNESS as “essential to the belief 
in the doctrines of refined religion,” the “fact that accounts of supernatural agency prove 
so generally false,” he advised, “is a reason for looking upon them with distrust” 
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(Phrenology 235-236).47 Combe far more explicitly delegitimized belief in the 
miraculous, asserting, “Philosophy does not recognize the ‘supernatural.’” According to 
Combe, such beliefs result from an over-developed WONDER “not directed by reflection” 
(System 299), whereas WONDER’s legitimate function “is to inspire the mind with a 
longing after novelty in everything,” thus stimulating “invention and improvement” 
(System 296). The MARVELLOUSNESS of Orson and Lorenzo Fowler in their early 
phrenology books of the 1830s draws from both Spurzheim and Combe—much more so 
than the explicitly Christian accounts by Sampson and others.48 Like Spurzheim, they see 
MARVELLOUSNESS as the root of beliefs in the supernatural, but cast these beliefs in even 
more ambiguous terms. From Combe they also include the idea of MARVELLOUSNESS as 
simply a fascination with the fantastic and novel, citing repeatedly—as Combe does—
interest in such fictions as the “Arabian Nights’ Entertainments” and Sir Walter Scott’s 
“Waverley Novels” (System 295). Later renaming the faculty SPIRITUALITY, the Fowlers 
grow to embrace it, using it to contain the epistemological crisis suggested by the organ’s 
association with credulity. Through their explanation of SPRITUALITY, the Fowlers are 
able to explain superstition as error, while at the same time validating intuitive or 
spiritual forms of knowledge. In its later more positive incarnations of the late 1840s and 
50s, SPIRITUALITY is aligned more with spiritualism than Christianity. 
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47 Spurzheim also more cautiously applied the idea of a faculty proving the existence of its object 
in the case of spiritual matters. He clarifies that REVERENCE (his term for VENERATION) was a 
sentiment, not a perceptive faculty, and was therefore “blind,” being applicable to human beings 
and nature as well as the divine (Phrenology 221). 
48 See, for example, Reverend G.S. Weaver on SPIRITUALITY in Lectures on Mental Science (216-
217). 
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 MARVELLOUSNESS, as the Fowlers at first called it, is a slippery concept, much 
more so than either Spurzheim’s or Combe’s version of the same faculty. It equivocates 
between functioning in perceptive and aesthetic modes, between being an organ of sight 
and being a feeling or sentiment. Furthermore the line between its use and abuse seems 
incredibly thin; whether it even has a purely positive function at all is at times uncertain. 
In an early edition of Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied, the explanation of the 
faculty begins with this general definition:  
Wonder—credulity—disposition to believe what is not proved, or what are 
considered supernatural manifestations, &c.—to regard with wonder and 
astonishment that which is somewhat strange or singular. ([1837] 141)  
 
The faculty equates—or at least suggests a continuum between—the capacity to believe 
and to feel wonder, a result perhaps of drawing from both Combe and Spurzheim. While 
filling life with wonder might indeed serve a clearly beneficial purpose, the overall 
balance of the definition appears negative: MARVELLOUSNESS amounts to credulity rather 
than wonder, to believing in things without proof and falling into superstition.  
But as the Fowlers proceed with their discussion of MARVELLOUSNESS, they also 
attribute to the faculty a positive power of perception. As they explain, MARVELLOUSNESS 
functions as the door through which “such truths as are beyond the reach of reason or of 
observation, can be admitted to the mind.” In this respect, it is essential to the education 
of children, who otherwise could only be instructed as far as their “extremely limited 
observation” and “still feebler reasoning faculties” could take them. The faculty not only 
allows them to take their teachers at their word, but rivets their attention as they “listen 
with delightful astonishment to tales of wonder.” Along similar lines it aids religion, 
allowing the mind to receive those “doctrines in the Bible” that “reason does not teach,” 
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as well as those elements of religion dealing with “supernatural agency.” In religion as in 
education, it has an aesthetic as well as more purely perceptual function, reinforcing the 
acceptance of religious truths by increasing “religious zeal and fervour.” In serving 
purposes so fundamental to culture, MARVELLOUSNESS appears in an unambiguously 
positive light. And yet even as the Fowlers describe its essential value to Christianity, 
qualification and doubt wracks their very syntax: “It is by no means certain that this 
faculty is not adapted, among other things, to a belief in those portions of Revelation 
which are attributed to a supernatural agency” (141). 
Throughout the rest of this section on MARVELLOUSNESS, the faculty is described 
in increasingly ambiguous terms. While the Fowlers frequently describe overdeveloped 
faculties as leading to perverse personality traits, in the case of MARVELLOUSNESS the 
potential for abuse or misuse appears to exist at every degree of strength, so much so in 
fact that even its religious function at times becomes doubtful. Possessing a large 
MARVELLOUSNESS combined with a large VENERATION, an individual “will readily 
believe in special providences,” but whether or not this is desirable is left unclear. The 
neutral phrasing and the fact that frequently “large” faculties are ideal suggest such belief 
might benefit the possessor, but given the number of articles in the American 
Phrenological Journal that specifically argue against the idea of special providence, it 
could be read as a species of superstitious error as well. Furthermore the passage goes on 
to include under this class of belief the regarding of “many things as providential which 
can be readily accounted for upon other principles” (142).  
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As the Fowlers catalog the various religious functions of MARVELLOUSNESS, the 
line between legitimate use and abuse disappears completely. With large or very large 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS and VENERATION, an individual with a large MARVELLOUSNESS:  
will be naturally inclined to believe in supernatural manifestations, in dreams, 
signs, lucky and unlucky days, &c.; place implicit confidence in every part of 
Revelation, and in what is told him by his religious teachers; will contemplate the 
character and the works of the Creator with mingled emotions of awe and 
astonishment; be zealous and enthusiastick in his religious belief and practice, if 
he is not bordering upon religious enthusiasm and extravagance; and with the 
addition of large cautious., will be afraid of ghosts, of staying in houses said to be 
haunted, &c.; may even fancy that he has seen supernatural appearances. (142)  
 
The effects of MARVELLOUSNESS are here described in purely subjective terms. Despite 
the previous suggestion that the faculty functions as a perceptive organ, nothing is said 
about whether or not the objects revealed by the organ exist. To some extent, the question 
is made moot by the fact that much of the entry frames these objects precisely as objects 
of belief, which by definition lack empirical proof. The passage quoted above goes even 
further, describing the supernatural as mere “fancy” and undermining even potentially 
legitimate religious functions by placing them within a catalog of potential abuses. 
However appropriate it may be for a Christian to “place implicit confidence in every part 
of Revelation,” to put the same unquestioning faith “in what is told him by his religious 
teachers” seems excessive, and contrary to the Fowlers’ mantra of observing nature as the 
first and foremost source of truth. And while viewing creation with “mingled emotions of 
awe and astonishment” would also seem perfectly appropriate for a rational Christian, the 
sentiment becomes exaggerated over the course of the subsequent clauses, moving from 
zeal to enthusiasm to extravagance, only to end with superstitious dread. However 
legitimate or at least innocent some of these functions of MARVELLOUSNESS might seem, 
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they are sandwiched between and implicitly equated to cases of clear excess: 
overabundant credulity and superstitious fancy.  
As the Fowlers move on to discuss the properties of the faculty at lower degrees 
of strength, they do not describe how it works to the benefit of its possessor so much as 
how it no longer interferes with rational thought when properly held in check. With full 
or moderate MARVELLOUSNESS, individuals require more proof, reason, and observation 
to believe, though they are still capable of religion. With MARVELLOUSNESS small or very 
small, religious belief may become impossible, the possessor’s skepticism extending even 
to the evidence of the five senses. The ideal degree of strength would therefore seem to 
be 4 or 5 with the faculty in general being more prone to abuse than use, despite being 
assigned a fundamental role in education and religion. Overall, the Fowlers’ version 
retains much of the secularism of Combe and Spurzheim. This is even more so the case in 
Orson Fowler’s Fowler’s Practical Phrenology (1840), a thin volume often bound with 
Phrenology Proved that provided a concise overview of the latter’s contents. There the 
prefatory definition of MARVELLOUSNESS reads simply, “Belief in the supernatural; 
credulity” (46). 
The publications that followed in the 1840s, however, treat MARVELLOUSNESS in 
much more positive terms than the first editions of Phrenology Proved. In Orson 
Fowler’s Religion; Natural and Revealed (1844), Self-Culture and Perfection of 
Character (1847), and The Illustrated Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology 
(1849), the faculty is renamed SPIRITUALITY (with MARVELLOUSNESS sometimes 
suggested as an alternate name), and is more spiritualistic, more explicitly Christian, and 
more clearly an organ of actual perception than its previous incarnation. According to 
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Self-Culture (in a passage largely reproduced in The Illustrated Self-Instructor), 
SPIRITUALITY is: 
INTUITION; FAITH; PRESCIENCE; spiritual perception of TRUTH, what is BEST, what 
is about to TRANSPIRE, etc.; the “inner LIGHT;” perception and feeling of the 
SPIRITUAL; CREDULITY; belief in the SUPERHUMAN; and trust in divine GUIDINGS. 
(253)  
 
The definition encompasses religious concepts like faith and the inner light as well as 
Spiritualist notions like clairvoyance. With well-known mediums and spirit rappers such 
as the Fox sisters, Spiritualism was rising to cultural prominence at the same time the 
Fowlers were publishing these phrenology primers, infusing other pseudoscientific 
movements like mesmerism in addition to phrenology. The Fowlers frame these new 
Christian and Spiritualist aspects of SPIRITUALITY much less as matters of belief than as 
matters of perception and intuition. 
As a faculty of perception and intuition, SPIRITUALITY plays a much more 
substantial and well-defined role as a philosophical and theological concept. “LARGE 
Spirituality perceives and knows things independently of the senses or intellectual 
faculties, or, as it were, by spiritual intuition,” Orson explains. In effect transcending time 
and space, the faculty makes possible not only clairvoyance and prophecy, but ideas of 
the spiritual fundamental to Christian theology: “But for some such faculty, man could 
form no more conception or idea of anything not material, or of anything spiritual, than 
the blind of colors.” Without it, ideas about God as spirit and about the soul as immortal 
and immaterial would be impossible to conceive. While its religious function here may 
appear only subjective, enabling the mind to grasp certain metaphysical concepts and 
beliefs, it imperceptibly slips into an objectively perceptive mode. While cataloging the 
effects of a large SPIRITUALITY, Fowler mentions that the faculty “experiences an internal 
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consciousness of what is best, and that spiritual communion with God which constitutes 
the essence of true piety.” The first clause here resembles a Kantian ideal, a notion of 
perfection derived from the mind itself, not from experience, and therefore purely 
subjective. While such notions might form the basis for conceptions of God, Kant urged 
that they not be taken as necessarily representing anything outside of the mind itself. The 
second clause suggests something quite different, a direct and actual communion with 
God. Because semi-colons separate all the other items in this catalog of effects, the two 
clauses appear to constitute one item, the second clause following as a consequence of 
the first. The “best” is God, and to think it is to be with it. However, some ambiguity 
remains as to whether the two clauses are causally related or are simply two separate 
types of “experiences” this faculty produces, a register perhaps of the uncertain 
legitimacy of the categorical leap being made between object of thought and object itself 
(253).  
Unlike Fowlers’ MARVELLOUSNESS, which violently yoked together modes of 
function that were on the one hand perceptive and on the other merely subjective, 
SPIRITUALITY almost seamlessly combines them, sometimes by collapsing belief and 
perception into the concept of intuition, other times by identifying thought with its object 
(at least in the case of contemplating the transcendent—a notion circulating through 
many Romantic, Swedenborgian, and Transcendentalist discourses of the time). As we 
will see with Whitman’s use of phrenology in Chapters II and III, Self-Culture and 
Perfection of Character further erodes or evades the distinction between the objective 
and the subjective by adopting a performative mode of address, namely as what J.L. 
Austin might call a series of perlocutionary speech acts: acts of speech (or writing) meant 
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to produce real effects (as in persuading or moving an audience to action). In dealing with 
the various faculties, the Fowlers often leave behind description for exhortation, the aim 
of the text being as much to stimulate and inspire the faculty being described to greater 
power as to analyze it. And Self-Culture—unlike Phrenology Proved—heartily 
encourages SPIRITUALITY’s full development, while clearly demarcating when it crosses 
over into abuse (namely with belief in “ghosts, witches, and other supernatural things”) 
(262). “O little do we realize how happy it is possible for us to become on earth, by the 
due exercise of this faculty, in communing with our own souls and with our God!” 
exclaims Orson. “Heaven is around and WITHIN those who duly exercise this heaven-
constituting faculty” (255). Accuracy in representation to some extent becomes beside the 
point: rather than provide a record ex post facto of what this faculty is, language creates 
or realizes what it describes in the very act of description, just as the faculty of 
SPIRITUALITY “constitutes heaven” in the act of thinking it. 
Compared to Phrenology Proved, Self-Culture elevates the role of SPIRITUALITY 
considerably. Gone is the trivial fascination with the fantastic, novel, and fictional; the 
mental organ emerges as an unqualified conduit to the metaphysical. SPIRITUALITY 
becomes a kind of centralizing and morally energizing force within the personality, 
resurrecting the unified subjectivity phrenology’s fragmented brain had seemingly 
diffused. The faculty properly exercised stimulates feelings of religious exaltation and 
joy, infusing and uplifting the operations of all other faculties. It “so purifies the soul,” 
Orson explains, “as to redouble many times over, every pleasure, even of earth; so exalts 
the mind and all its appetites and passions, as to dispose and enable us to see God and 
love him, in all the works of his hands” (255). Under its influence, the joys of exercising 
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AMATIVENESS intensify as a mingling of souls as well as of bodies; the pleasures of 
exercising CAUSALITY become transcendent in the contemplation of moral and divine 
laws (257).  
Somewhat ambiguously, SPIRITUALITY also figures centrally in Fowler’s account 
of religious conversion, being the primary cause of the “indescribable rapture of love and 
‘joy in the Holy Ghost’” that accompanies conversion, a feeling to which the other moral 
faculties merely contribute, and which Fowler asserts “is an experimental and observable 
fact” in an attempt to maintain a scientific tone (256). He does not, however, go so far as 
to name SPIRITUALITY as the primary cause of conversion, perhaps for the same reason 
that the anonymous author of “On the Harmony Between Phrenology and . . . 
Regeneration” left “faith” disembodied in his own account of conversion. To name a 
specific part of the brain the principal catalyst of conversion would be to materialize the 
soul and its salvation, rendering them matters of mechanical cause and effect. Given the 
significance of conversion to spiritual development, personal redemption, and self-
definition, locating conversion in the organ of SPIRITUALITY would also in a sense locate 
agency and selfhood in a single faculty, thus undermining phrenology’s core belief in the 
mind operating through, but ultimately apart from, multiple organs. The Fowlers’ 
SPRITUALITY thus gestures towards without fully achieving the perfect wedding of the 
materiality of the phrenological mind to the unified and transcendent subjectivity of the 
soul. It also indicates how actually achieving the merger would, paradoxically, have 




Phrenology’s Syntax of Self 
 
The tension between phrenology’s materialist account of the self and the remains 
of a spiritual self—the Christian self, the self of free will—thus shape the Fowlers’ 
discussions of religion, conversion, and SPIRITUALITY.  Maintaining both narratives 
precipitates a crisis of expression that results in contradictions, equivocations, and 
revisions. But beyond these overt attempts to harmonize phrenology and religion, a 
related crisis of expression manifests—in a subtler, more intimate fashion—in the very 
syntax of the Fowlers. In describing the operations of the faculties in The Illustrated Self-
Instructor and other phrenology primers, the Fowlers precariously balance between 
defining the self as an embodied collection of faculties and as a unified, transcendent 
agent. The demands this balancing places on language strains the most basic of 
grammatical conventions: the subject of the sentence, which is at times omitted or 
obscured in the Fowlers’ descriptions of the faculties.  
Entries describing each phrenological faculty make up a large portion of the 
Fowlers’ phrenology guides, cataloging the many ways the mental organs manifest 
themselves according to different possible degrees of strength. The Fowlers also provide 
many examples of how each organ works in combination with others, which again varies 
according to the degree of development of each organ involved. Take for instance 
ADHESIVENESS, when large, in The Illustrated Self-Instructor: 
Is a warm, cordial, ardent friend; readily forms friendships, and attracts friendly 
regards in return; must have society of some kind; with Benevolence large, is 
hospitable, and delights to entertain friends; with Alimentiveness large, loves the 
social banquet, and sets the best before friends; with Approbativeness large, sets 
the world by their commendation, but is terribly cut by their rebukes; with the 
moral faculties large, seeks the society of the moral and elevated, and can enjoy 
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the friendship of no others; with the intellectual faculties large, seeks the 
friendship of the intelligent. (57) 
 
After explaining another seven hypothetical combinations, the description of large 
ADHESIVENESS ends with a page reference for an even fuller explanation in another 
phrenology book. Comparable descriptions follow for ADHESIVENESS very large, full, 
average, etc.  
Other phrenology overviews like Phrenology Proved and Fowler’s Practical 
Phrenology follow the same format and use much of the same language as The Illustrated 
Self-Instructor. It is in the latter, however, in which a greater equivocation around the 
question of agency manifests itself in grammar and syntax. As its name suggests, the Self-
Instructor is a practical guide to phrenology, which, at 134 pages, may have provided a 
more accessible introduction to phrenology than either of these earlier texts (the 
pamphlet-like Fowler’s Practical Phrenology was often bound with the more 
comprehensive two-hundred-fifty-plus-page Phrenology Proved, serving as its overview 
and index). The Self-Instructor does not appear to have been meant to replace either of 
the other two guides as all three continued to be republished and revised throughout the 
19th century. Compared to Fowler’s Practical Phrenology and Phrenology Proved, the 
Self-Instructor is not only the most grammatically transgressive, but in some ways more 
candid about the physicality and de-centeredness of the phrenological self. Although both 
of these qualities surface in the descriptions of many of the faculties, they do so 
particularly clearly in the case of AMATIVENESS, perhaps owing to that faculty’s natural 
connection to issues of sexuality, embodiment, sociality, and intersubjectivity. While 
accounts of the faculty vary from book to book in emphasizing either phrenology’s 
composite, material self or the notion of a more unified, single subject, the Self-Instructor 
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achieves a compressed expression of both ideas by pushing beyond the conceptual limits 
embedded in basic habits of expression, even of grammar itself. 
 In all the Fowlers’ phrenology primers, the entries describing each faculty 
typically open with a descriptive heading and short overview before describing the 
functions of the faculty in detail, according to its several degrees of development and 
including examples of how it works in combination with other faculties. In Phrenology 
Proved, first copyrighted in 1836, the Fowlers open their entry on AMATIVENESS stiffly: 
“This faculty prompts many of those kind attentions and obliging manners which the 
sexes are accustomed to show to each other; greatly increases their mutual attachment 
and tenderness” (56). All primers describe AMATIVENESS as the source of qualities useful 
in polite courtship rituals (noble courtesy in men and charming grace in women) and also 
as the source of romantic passion or sexual desire. But in Phrenology Proved, the topic of 
polite courtship is developed nearly to the exclusion of sexual desire. After the general 
description of the faculty, the Fowlers move on to describe its effects at different degrees 
of development, beginning with “LARGE.—One in whom amat. is large, is extremely 
fond of the other sex, and of their company, and alive to their charms; is a favourite with 
them” (57). The subsequent degrees of strength described begin with the same verbal 
construction: “One having amat.” very large, full, moderate, etc. (57-60). Throughout this 
entry, AMATIVENESS is clearly a faculty within an individual that stimulates a specific 
kind of interest or attachment and the behaviors that accompany that interest or 
attachment. It is an organ that influences or encourages a human agent in a specific 
course of action, but is not itself the agent. 
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 The Fowlers even suggest that the faculty merely amplifies tendencies already 
existing in the individual. It is the agent who ultimately chooses to love; the faculty 
simply encourages the feeling. According to Phrenology Proved, AMATIVENESS “prompts 
many of those kind attentions” towards the opposite sex, it “greatly increases their mutual 
attachment,” and it “gives correct reciprocal ideas” regarding propriety in dealing with 
one’s beloved (56). The phrasing suggests that the effects of AMATIVENESS are 
supplementary rather than essential: it prompts many but not all of the attentions we may 
tender a lover; it increases attachments that presumably already exist; and it gives ideas 
about interacting with the opposite sex that regulate desire rather than cause it. In these 
ways, the faculty supplements whatever desires or attachments an individual may feel or 
choose to pursue; and it supplements those heterosexual bonds already holding society 
together by stimulating and regulating them. In Phrenology Proved, the faculty of 
AMATIVENESS works with or on love and the lover; it does not constitute them. 
In 1840, Fowler’s Practical Phrenology frames the different degrees of 
AMATIVENESS in the same grammatical terms: “One having amativeness full” or “One 
who has amativeness large” (36-37). The conceptual implication that the faculty is an 
organ acting upon and to some extent separate from the individual also remains—at least 
in the body of the entry. A slightly different implication emerges in the introductory 
overview of the faculty, which casts the powers of AMATIVENESS in much bolder terms, 
even though much of the content and even some of the phrasing is essentially the same as 
in Phrenology Proved. AMATIVENESS begins to become love and the lover, and the 
Fowlers emphasize its sexual nature instead of how it contributes to politeness in 
courting. Under “ADAPTATION,” Orson explains, “To prevent the extinction of our race, 
Borst& 82&
some provision for its continuance became necessary,” namely “propagation” (36). 
Rather than a mere aid in cementing bonds between the sexes, the faculty appears to be 
the exclusive source of those bonds essential to human life and society: “It creates all 
those relations and reciprocal feelings existing between the sexes as such, and results in 
marriage and offspring. It originates those reciprocal kind offices and tender feelings 
which each sex manifests towards the other” (36; emphasis added). Though somewhat at 
odds with the “One having amativeness full” constructions later in the entry, in the 
general description AMATIVENESS does not simply influence individual attachments to the 
opposite sex, it becomes the necessary psychological condition for those attachments to 
exist at all. Moreover, the general description foregrounds the faculty as a social force 
beyond the life of any single individual in that it is responsible for perpetuating the 
human species. The entry complicates the concept of a single, unified agent not only by 
explaining its actions in terms of one, compartmentalized instinct, but also by defining 
that drive’s function in terms of collective rather than individual interests. 
 These questions concerning the identity, location, and boundaries of an 
autonomous self are amplified by the ambiguous syntax of The Illustrated Self-Instructor, 
first published in 1849. As the Fowlers here more directly state AMATIVENESS’s role in 
reproduction than they had in either Phrenology Proved or Fowler’s Practical 
Phrenology, the grammatical subjects of their sentences become more inconsistent and 
obscure. In the faculty descriptions under consideration, the grammatical subject should 
serve to define who or what is the ultimate agent of the behavior being described. Instead 
this part of the sentence is often omitted, implied rather than explicitly stated. 
Consequently, the faculty alternates between appearing as supplement, agent, and social 
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force. And unlike either of the volumes that preceded it, the Self-Instructor defines 
AMATIVENESS not only in terms of causing certain effects, but also in terms of the effects 
themselves, undermining the categorical distinction between self and world.  
As typically the case in the Fowlers’ works, the faculty’s entry begins with its 
general description: “Conjugal love; attachment to the opposite sex; desire to love, be 
loved, and marry; adapted to perpetuate the race. It causes those mutual attractions which 
exist between the sexes; creates love; induces marriage; eventuates in offspring” (51). 
Despite occasional attempts at parallelism, the profile is rife with inconsistencies. The 
first two sets of terms describe AMATIVENESS as an emotion, but in two different contexts: 
in a reciprocal relationship and within a single individual. While the two definitions are 
not mutually exclusive, they occur as part of a pattern of inconsistencies that reflect the 
wide-range of conceptual work AMATIVENESS has been assigned, conceptual work 
relating to the nature and location of the self and agency. If at the beginning of the 
description AMATIVENESS is love, by the third set of terms it becomes the desire to 
possess love, as if love was some object of interest apart from the faculty itself. While the 
intersubjective definition of amativeness as “conjugal love” effaces the self’s boundary, 
defining the faculty as the “desire to love” safely restores it by externalizing this 
conjugality. The second sentence of the general description also reasserts this boundary, 
but in a different location. Instead of around a central subject or individual that may or 
may not desire love, the boundary falls around AMATIVENESS itself as a kind of agent. “It 
causes those mutual attractions,” it “creates love,” it “induces marriage,” it even 
“eventuates in offspring” (51; emphasis added). As the “it” in question, AMATIVENESS 
assumes a life of its own to the point of being directly responsible for procreation.  
Borst& 84&
The dislocation of a central intelligent agent continues throughout the rest of the 
entry on AMATIVENESS. As the second sentence of the general description proceeds, it 
adopts a universalizing perspective, portraying the faculty more as a disembodied 
abstraction than as an instinct or organ residing within particular individuals. It “renders 
woman winning, persuasive, urbane,” and “makes man noble in feeling and bearing” (51; 
emphasis added). In the description of AMATIVENESS subjectivity can be read in terms of 
the individual person, as relational, as residing in particular brain organs, or as existing in 
the abstract. This shifting of subjectivity across multiple ontological categories is well 
suited for the expression of the composite and material phrenological self, which itself 
represented a diffusion of subjectivity across different parts of a brain continuous with 
the physical world. At the same time, this shifting—here and across the several books—
also serves to accommodate trace expressions of centralized agency. 
These differing conceptions of selfhood are expressed in a much more 
compressed fashion in The Illustrated Self-Instructor in the passages describing 
AMATIVENESS at different degrees of strength. Each of the seven sections (corresponding 
to the seven possible degrees of strength) consists of a catalogue of sentence fragments 
frequently lacking grammatical subjects. When they do include a subject, it is an “it” 
without explicit referent. From context, the referent can sometimes be inferred as being 
either the faculty itself or the individual possessing the faculty, but not always. Despite 
the initial absence of a grammatical subject, the following passage on large AMATIVENESS 
at first seems clearly to refer its description to an individual. Several lines on, however, 
the subject is revealed to be the faculty itself: 
LARGE.—Is strongly attracted toward the opposite sex; admires and loves their 
beauty and excellencies; easily wins their affectionate regards, or kindles their 
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love; has many warm friends, if not admirers, among them; loves young and 
powerfully, and wields a potent influence for good or evil over the destinies of its 
subject, according as it is well or ill placed; with Adhesiveness and Union for Life 
large, will mingle pure friendship with devoted love; cannot flourish alone, but 
must have its matrimonial mate, with whom it will be capable of becoming 
perfectly identified, and whom it will invest with almost superhuman perfections, 
by magnifying their charms and overlooking their defects; in the sunshine of 
whose love it will be perfectly happy, but proportionally miserable without it; 
with Ideality and the mental temperament large, will experience a fervor and 
intensity of first love, amounting almost to ecstacy or romance; can marry those 
only who combine refinement of manners with correspondingly strong 
attachments; with Philoprogenitiveness and Benevolence also large, will be 
eminently qualified to enjoy the domestic relations. (52) 
 
The corresponding sections for every other faculty begin like the above: with a dash, 
rather than a “One having. . .” or “One with. . .” This could be for the sake of concision, 
foregoing the need to repeat either of those expressions over and over again, yet if so, it 
would likely have been employed in the briefest of Fowler primers, Practical 
Phrenology. Regardless of whatever practical purposes the cipher-like dash may have 
initially served, its conceptual implications reverberate throughout the rest of the passage, 
the subject of which becomes increasingly ambiguous: is the faculty of AMATIVENESS 
being described? Or the individual possessing the faculty? Despite the elliptical dash, 
logic appears to dictate that the first three lines be read as describing an individual, as if 
following from an implied “One having AMATIVENESS large. . .” In the fourth and fifth 
lines an “it” emerges vaguely enough to be ignored, but after the sixth line its disorienting 
implications become undeniable in the phrase “its matrimonial mate.” Though “the 
matrimonial mate of one having AMATIVENESS large” makes the most immediate sense, 
the “its” demands to be read as AMATIVENESS itself, the faculty possessing the mate and 
doing the marrying. The implicit “I” has been eclipsed by an “it.”  
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The “it” here could be thought of as non-referential or as signifying an absence—
just as the word “it” is actually absent throughout much of the passage. As we have seen, 
phrenological discourse will often posit a spiritual self that it refuses to locate, but that 
provides a kind of conceptual placeholder for a governing or transcendent agent. In this 
sense, the “it” reflects phrenology’s implication that the self is the sum of various 
impersonal psychological and biological forces, of the thirty-seven faculties operating 
independently, giving the appearance of a self but being really only the average of the 
faculties’ operations. Though a summation of forces rather than a purely deliberate 
reasoning being, the “it” can still be regarded as a kind of self as much as an absent one: 
it is a self that has been depersonalized. In this sense, the “it” might refer not to the 
AMATIVE faculty, but to the self AMATIVENESS constitutes in combination with the other 
faculties.  
The “it-ness” of the phrenological subject becomes more apparent in the Fowlers’ 
description of the “order” of mental faculties to which AMATIVENESS belongs: the 
“Affective Faculties, or Feelings,” which express propensities, desires, and sentiments as 
opposed to the “Intellectual Faculties,” which perceive and reason. In Phrenology 
Proved, the Fowlers explain that the affective faculties “constitute by far the largest, most 
vivid, and most powerful class of the mental operations.” When presented with their 
“legitimate stimuli” they “rush into involuntary activity” often without waiting for “the 
mandate of reason” (45, 49). Though the actual expression of these feelings if not their 
mere being felt could be controlled, and though the Fowlers’ urge the development of the 
intellectual organs to guide these propensities, their emphasis on feeling and instinct in 
mental life suggests a self made up mostly of competing, counter-balancing, involuntary 
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drives (though indeed, some of these drives might be considered quite “human,” 
including instincts of kindness and religion).  
There is no reason to take this “it,” however, as the final word on the self in the 
Self-Instructor. The location of agency shifts and dissolves throughout discussions of 
AMATIVENESS, moving from self to faculty, soul to body, individual to species, at times 
avoiding or obfuscating the question altogether. As if to control some of the more 
materialist implications of their ambiguous syntax, the Fowlers correct much of their 
inconsistent parallelism in the revised New Illustrated Self-Instructor of 1859. In its 
description of AMATIVENESS, for example, the implied subject is clearly and consistently 
“Those having amativeness large.” What the original Self-Instructor achieves through its 
transgressive syntax and its use of the pronoun “it” is a compressed yet full expression of 
the phrenological self, including the brain’s materiality and complexity; the interwoven 
nature of psychology and society; and the consequent overall suggestion—even if overtly 
denied—that the self is not reducible to a unitary soul, even as a notion of the soul is 
given space to subsist. However unconscious may seem the Fowlers’ adoption of such an 
unconventional syntax, the implications remain: that this model of the mind—in many 
ways a very modern model of the mind despite phrenology’s absurdities—is limited in its 
expression by language itself. The grammatical “subject” may in fact shape our 
understanding of the “subject” philosophically considered, as faulty parallelism and 
syntactical incompletion here result in a broader conceptualization of the self. 
In the United States, phrenology was more than a fad, more than a spectacle of 
charts and head graphs and public readings, and more than a source of 19th-century 
scientific racism, though it was indeed all these things. It was also importantly a body of 
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writing, much of which was published by Fowlers and Wells, Publishers. Like many 
Romantic writers, including Whitman, the Fowlers and other phrenologists strove to 
bridge the material and the immaterial and the categories of object and subject, 
oppositions at the heart of the divide between science and religion, as well as 
determinism and free will. They did this through the concepts and doctrines of 
phrenology; they also did this through a peculiarly rich style of writing. Combining 
scientific and religious rhetoric, crafting subtly equivocating statements, repeatedly 
redefining concepts like SPIRITUALITY, trading the representational pretenses of language 
for the performative, and even straining against syntactical convention, phrenologists like 
the Fowlers expressed a sense of solution to many of the philosophical quandaries 
haunting the 19th-century American mind, even if they did not actually logically resolve 
them. Their arguments rested more on rhetoric than observation, but rather than mere 
sophistry, resulted in an attempt to develop a new language for a new, more modern, 
material self that did not abandon the psychological comforts of its antecedents. As much 
as the Fowlers claimed to objectively present the lessons of nature, their phrenology 
texts, like Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” imagined for American readers harmonies of 













Whitman’s Answer:  




 Walt Whitman’s frequent allusions to phrenology, his extended professional 
relationship with Fowlers and Wells, and the publication of his phrenological chart on 
multiple occasions, prove that his interest in phrenology significantly shaped his thought 
and work. Yet a question remains: why did he embrace phrenology when Emerson, 
Melville, and Poe did not?49 Although he shared many philosophical and social concerns 
with the Fowlers, he shared just as many if not more with the Transcendentalists and 
other American Romantics. So why didn’t Whitman, like Emerson, also find 
phrenology’s vocabulary too rigid to do justice to the soul’s inexhaustible dynamism?  
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49 As discussed in the Introduction, Poe’s enthusiasm for the subject was qualified, while his use 
of phrenology in his fiction tended to deconstruct its principles; Melville’s treatment of 
phrenology in Moby-Dick is openly satirical. Emerson was highly critical of what he considered 
its crudely reductive methodology:  
Phrenology too, I hate. C. adapts his conversation to the form of the head of the man he 
talks with! Alas! I dreamed that the value of life lay in its inscrutable possibilities: that I 
never know in addressing myself to a new individual what may befall me. (Journals 9: 
120)      
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The short answer is that he did and that his acceptance of phrenology had its 
limits. But a more complicated answer acknowledges that phrenologists themselves saw 
their vocabulary as provisional. Spurzheim had already modified Gall’s faculties, the 
nature and names of which continued to be debated in the pages of the American 
Phrenological Journal by the mid-nineteenth century. This new lexicon of the personality 
was flexible, multifaceted, and explained human behavior in terms of a complex set of 
instincts, feelings, and drives. For this reason it appealed not only to Whitman, but also to 
later nineteenth-century intellectuals Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. and William James, 
whose commentary on phrenology will be examined toward the end of Chapter II. In the 
process of developing the right language for this new self, phrenology also unwittingly 
highlighted what might be called the linguistic or semantic problems underlying beliefs 
about the mind. These problems had drawn the attention earlier in the century of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for whom phrenology served as a 
case study of the role of language in science and of the limits of materialism. Moreover, 
Hegel’s engagement with phrenology directly shaped Whitman’s approach to the 
pseudoscience.  
Examining the limits of Whitman’s acceptance of phrenology thus clarifies the 
position phrenology held in prominent poetic and philosophical nineteenth-century 
minds. For Hegel and Coleridge earlier in the century, it implied the intimate ways in 
which language shaped and limited our conceptions of the mind, demonstrated the limits 
of materialism, and highlighted the philosophical problems involved in representing or 
otherwise making claims about a supposedly “inner” self. For Holmes and James later in 
the century, phrenology promoted a new language for understanding feeling and instinct 
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in greater complexity. Both sets of views point towards understanding the self as 
constructed by language and both sets of views overlap and clarify Whitman’s own 
























In “Song of Myself,” Whitman asserts on several occasions that the soul can 
never be reduced to words. He himself is “untranslatable,” “never will be measured,” and 
has within him that which “is without name” (87, 82, 86).50 Elsewhere he suggests that 
this irreducibility is not to be taken for granted, but must be actively achieved. In 
declaring his refusal to verbalize himself, Whitman signals the existence of a paralingual 
identity beyond society and culture: 
My final merit I refuse you . . . . I refuse putting from me the best I am. 
 
Encompass worlds but never try to encompass me, 
I crowd your noisiest talk by looking toward you. 
 
Writing and talk do not prove me, 
I carry the plenum of proof and every thing else in my face, 
With the hush of my lips I confound the topmost skeptic. (53) 
 
His successful resistance in this passage appears to involve three things: his gaze, his 
face, and his silence. By refusing to enter the noisy talk of the crowd Whitman avoids 
subjecting his identity to the mob’s terms. His silence signifies a surety of self unmoved 
by doubt or argument, as suggested in the last line. Responding instead with his gaze, 
Whitman manifests a kind of pure subjectivity: he is witness, observer, apart from but 
visible to the crowd, not only unswayed by its numbers, but potentially constituting a 
majority of his own from a position of perfect self-reliance. In one respect, this silent 
assumption of being demands a rejection of phrenology as just another form of “talk and 
writing.” But in another respect, the status of phrenology as a system of discourse is 
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50 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “Song of Myself” are to the 1855 version of the 
poem, which was untitled. 
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ambiguous. Whitman’s reference to his “face” as “proof” suggests both physiognomy and 
by association phrenology—both theories of the body itself as sign. As such, these 
pseudosciences have the potential to function as natural languages (a term the Fowlers 
themselves frequently employed) and therefore as more authentic alternatives to 
artificially constructed discourse.  
But while Whitman here may invoke the idea of body as sign, he does not 
explicitly endorse either phrenology or physiognomy, and thematically the rest of the 
passage runs counter to any theory that would speak for—or in place of—the individual 
(even if the only alternative is not speaking at all). Alongside the phrase “plenum of 
proof,” the word “face” suggests that Whitman has in mind the body as self-evidence, as 
a solid mass, a filled space, not a surface to be read for what lies beneath. Thus the 
passage implies that phrenology might occupy a liminal position between the ideal of 
natural language, derived directly from the body, and an artificially constructed system of 
discourse. In these lines, Whitman seems to be invoking an ideal of natural language over 
any artificial construction, but it is an ideal that partially presses beyond the idea of 
language itself. It points towards an immediacy of meaning, one sidestepping 
representation and signification: the body is stating the fact of itself with a silent gaze, 
secure in the fact that its existence is self-justifying. As we shall see, Hegel suggests the 
desire for this kind of ultimate, concrete signifier (if it can still be called a signifier) lies 
at the heart of phrenology and its flaws. 
 Whitman’s notion that some final reserve of the self resists articulation does not 
necessarily imply a metaphysical self separate from the material word. One of the 
primary aims of his poetry was to collapse such artificial distinctions. But even as it does 
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so, Whitman preserves a sense of divine mystery in the physical world itself. Nature is an 
inexhaustible, ever lengthening text, and in “Song of Myself” Whitman sees this 
exemplified in the human brain. “If I worship any particular thing it shall be some of the 
spread of my body,” he writes, introducing a catalog of body parts, “My brain it shall be 
your occult convolutions” (51). The pulpy “brain”—not the mind—remains inscrutable 
not as the seat of the soul, but because of the physical intricacy of its coiling folds. In a 
stanza full of puns and double-entendres, it is difficult not to recognize a second meaning 
in “convolutions,” as in the sense of “convoluted arguments” over the nature of the mind, 
of which philosophy by the nineteenth century had a surfeit.  
Fittingly, the stanza in which this line appears exhibits its own convoluted 
intricacies of language, as the metaphorical and the literal become indistinguishably 
folded together:  
 If I worship any particular thing it shall be some of the spread of my body 
Translucent mould of me it shall be you, 
 Shaded ledges and rests, firm masculine coulter, it shall be you, 
 Whatever goes to the tilth of me it shall be you, 
 You my rich blood, your milky stream pale strippings of my life; 
 Breast that presses against other breasts it shall be you, 
 My brain it shall be your occult convolutions, 
 Root of washed sweet-flag, timorous pond-snipe, nest of the guarded  
duplicate eggs, it shall be you,  
 Mixed tussled hay of head and beard and brawn it shall be you, 
 Trickling sap of maple, fibre of manly wheat, it shall be you; 
 Sun so generous it shall be you, 
 Vapors lighting and shading my face it shall be you, 
 You sweaty brooks and dews it shall be you, 
 Winds whose soft-tickling genitals rub against me it shall be you, 
 Broad muscular fields, branches of liveoak, loving lounger in my winding  
paths, it shall be you (51) 
 
Through much of the passage, Whitman clearly uses agricultural images as metaphors for 
describing his own body—his “stream” of blood, the “pond-snipe” and “duplicate eggs” 
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figuring his genitalia, his hair cast as “hay.” As the passage progresses, however, nature 
also presents objects of worship (the “sun,” “vapors”), unsettling the theme of 
worshipping the human body stated at the outset. When Whitman returns to images of the 
human body, they now appear as metaphors for describing the natural world: “brooks” 
are described as “sweaty”, “winds” are given “genitals.” This reversal of the literal and 
the metaphorical is itself ambiguous, especially in the final line, where the “loving 
lounger” could as likely be a Thoreauvian walker in the woods as a lover tracing the 
curves and crevices of his beloved’s muscled limbs. Regardless of which, “winding 
paths” have returned us to the notion of “convolution.” The already occult properties of 
nature have been complicated by the occult properties of language: Is the body the 
subject? Or is the body merely a sign signifying something else? As the passage unifies 
self and nature through a lush interweaving of metaphors, it also raises the question of 
how we view the body as sign, and whether the “subject” we see reflected there is 
nothing but another sign. The silent plenum of proof asserted in Whitman’s face has 
dissolved into the play of language. 
 Hegel probes similar questions in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), a section 
of which is devoted to a critique of phrenology and physiognomy. His discussion raises 
two issues also raised by Whitman’s “occult convolutions” passage: first, whether and 
how our signifiers—be they words or bodies—can ever reliably represent an “inside” 
beyond themselves; and, second, the inexhaustible nature of the material world. The 
parallels are not coincidental: Hegel appears to have shaped Whitman’s ideas on 
phrenology, not determining specific conclusions, but directing the questions on which 
the poet focused. An examination of Hegel’s critique sheds light not only on this line of 
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influence, but also on the philosophical significance phrenology held for Romantic-era 
thinkers, particularly with respect to the relationship between language and conceptions 
of the mind. For Hegel, confusion over the body’s function as sign contributes to the 
ultimate logical failure of phrenology’s concepts. But even though it fails as a science, it 
served Hegel by providing a theoretical space for thinking about the limits of materialism 
and for considering the possibility of representing an “interior” self. 
 The most direct evidence of Whitman’s familiarity with Hegel’s writing on 
phrenology appears in a conversation recorded by Horace Traubel in With Walt Whitman 
in Camden. While proudly remembering the high score in CAUTION he had received from 
phrenologists much earlier in his life, Whitman becomes defensive about phrenology:  
I know what Holmes said about phrenology—that you might as easily tell how 
much money is in a safe feeling the knob on the door as tell how much brain a 
man has by feeling the bumps on his head: and I guess most of my friends distrust 
it. (385) 
 
He then says something quite curious: that he has probably “not got by the phrenology 
stage yet.” From the perspective of 1888, the time Traubel dates the conversation, 
phrenology has not really developed or progressed other than to become less popular, 
more closely associated with spiritualism than established science, and more likely to be 
encountered as a sideshow. Whatever tinkering the Fowlers and others had done with the 
names and nature of the faculties over the years, the same basic concepts and cranial 
cartography were in play. In retrospect, scholars have noted Gall’s contributions to brain 
dissection (he was the first to tease out the neural fibers better to reveal the brain’s 
structure) and theorized about how phrenology’s one-time pervasiveness might have 
better paved the way for Darwin’s brand of materialism later in the century.51 But such 
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51 See Introduction (10-11). 
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things would not have factored into Whitman’s thinking. What does, however, make 
complete sense of the phrase “phrenology stage” is the discussion of phrenology in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 It is generally agreed that much of Whitman’s knowledge of Hegel came 
secondhand, through Frederic H. Hedge’s Prose Writers of Germany (1847) and Joseph 
Gostick’s German Literature (1854). He also undoubtedly learned much from 
conversations with friend, educator, and prominent American Hegelian, William Torrey 
Harris. Discussions of the philosopher’s influence on Whitman have frequently had a 
political and historical focus, illustrating in Whitman’s work the ideas of history making 
manifest transcendent spirit, of the individual self representing this spirit, and of the 
teleology implied by both notions: a progressive view of history that rationalizes evil as a 
temporary but necessary part of its gradual development.52 Most recently, Brian 
Brodhead Glaser has drawn parallels between Whitman’s poetry and the Phenomenology 
specifically, namely with regards to an idea of freedom as socially instantiated, 
predicated on mutual recognition rather than on a transcendent, individual self.  
Like Glaser, I think the Phenomenology sheds particular light on Whitman’s 
work, but furthermore, I think it also suggests Whitman’s engagements with Hegel’s 
ideas may have been considerably more substantial than the digests of Hedge and 
Gostick. Either through his conversations with Harris or through a more extensive 
reading of Hegel than remains a matter of record, I will demonstrate that the 
Phenomenology directly shaped Whitman’s ideas on phrenology by at least 1888, when 
he speaks of his “phrenology stage.” But as I will discuss shortly, Whitman’s much 
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52 See Reynolds (Walt 449-450, 480-481) and Glaser (19). 
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earlier poem “Faces” also bears the mark of Hegel’s particular concern with phrenology, 
presenting phrenology as a stage in the mind’s attempt to find a reliable signifier for the 
soul. Indeed, Whitman’s friend Harris, a lexicographer, may have been involved in a very 
early English translation of the work, produced in 1861 in shorthand in Missouri by a 
fellow cofounder of the St. Louis Hegelians, Henry Conrad Brokmeyer.53 Whitman spent 
considerable time with Harris in St. Louis in 1879 and met him again in 1881 in Concord, 
Massachusetts, after Harris moved back east.54 An earlier period of intense study of 
Hegel occurred in the late 60s and early 70s, contributing to Democratic Vistas. And 
although the extent of his engagement with Hegel in the 50s can only be conjectured, the 
Phenomenology serves as a provocative lens for viewing Whitman’s references to 
phrenology in the poem “Faces,” as well as the revisions he made to his phrenological 
chart to be discussed in Chapter III.  
  Hegel’s Phenomenology, the prelude to his philosophical system, does not map 
out his actual beliefs so much as it brings the reader along a train of thought, the outcome 
of which is his system, which in turn includes its own evolution as part of its content. 
Having been compared to a bildungsroman, the book is written from the point of view of 
‘thought’ in the abstract as it proceeds through higher and higher states of consciousness 
(Redding). For instance, Hegel begins by examining the position that consciousness is 
determined only by immediate sense experience. By fully articulating the logic of this 
position he exposes its logical flaws, leading him to a seemingly inescapable awareness 
of the mediated nature of sense experience and, in turn, a consciousness of the mediating 
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53 J.B. Baillie’s 1910 translation is otherwise generally regarded as the earliest published in 
English.  
54 See Allen (489) and Whitman’s Specimen Days (Complete 914). 
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self. Contradiction—or negation—is a primary engine of the dialectical progression of his 
thought. In this context, errors are not cast off as false ideas but instead moved through to 
reach fuller realizations. In the preface he compares the “progressive unfolding of truth” 
to the stages of growth in a plant, the blossom supplanting the bud and the fruit refuting 
the blossom, yet all together still forming one set of “moments of organic unity in which 
they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other” (2). 
 Any part of the Phenomenology needs to be understood in terms of such a 
trajectory. That Whitman took Hegel’s works on similar terms appears clear from the title 
of one of his poems, “Roaming in Thought (After Reading Hegel)” (a title which also 
suggests the looseness with which he may have interpreted the philosopher). Though 
Hegel makes his disdain for phrenology and physiognomy clear, they remain situated as 
logical stages on the way to full self-realization in the context of the Phenomenology. 
Prior to these stages, Hegel examines the mind’s approach to inorganic nature in 
determining natural laws through observation. He then explains how the mind turns to 
organic nature with the same expectations, but is confounded (in Hegel’s time) by 
science’s inability to arrive at laws as precise and necessary as those it imposed upon 
inorganic nature. As Michael Emerson succinctly explains, at this point in ‘thought’s’ 
journey:  
The laws of reason mistakenly confuse the contingent circumstances of organic 
nature for necessary laws which state the general and pervasive ‘influence’ of the 
environment upon organic nature. Given the inherent fluidity of organic nature, 
the laws of reason can provide only a very general and schematic characterization 
of its natural conditions. (135) 
 
This predicament leads reason to view organic nature in terms of an inner and an outer, 
the category of the inner accounting for the as of yet indefinable essence of organic 
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nature, which reason asserts must be expressed by its outer. It is this state of 
consciousness from which arise beliefs like physiognomy and phrenology that Hegel then 
investigates.55    
When considering self-conscious individuals from the point of view of this state 
of consciousness, ‘thought’ turns first to the most obvious means for seeing “inner being” 
in an outward shape: speech and action. Words and deeds, however, suffer from an 
inherent ambiguity. In one respect they can be viewed as the direct expression of the self, 
so that there is no antithesis between inner and outer. In another respect, the “inner turns 
itself into something else” when so expressed, becoming a sign of the “inner” that is 
external to that “inner” and thus subject to accident, change, and deceit. We are therefore 
left looking “around for the inner as it still is within the individual himself, but in a 
visible or external shape” (Hegel 187). This shape would have to function as a “passive 
whole” that “passively received the inner as an alien element” and that had no meaning of 
its own. Unlike speech or gesture, it would remain imbued in the body (188). This 
shape—clearly distinguishable from what it represents and in itself inert—could then be 
read as sign of the inner. It is from this position that thought tends towards views like 
palmistry, physiognomy, and phrenology, all of which consider some part of the body as 
a passive object and sign. Hegel presents these modes of thought in sequence, each 
emerging from the previous mode’s ultimate logical failure. 
Palmistry, like astrology, takes this condition of an “alien element” to an extreme: 
one’s fate is found inscribed in the hand and in the stars, signs completely external and 
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55 See Emerson’s article for a fuller explication of how Hegel’s critique of phrenology and 
physiognomy fits into the Phenomenlogy. Emerson’s analysis centers on Hegel’s undermining of 
the distinction between inner and outer in a way that anticipates later positions held by 
Wittgenstein. 
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alien to the inner self. Ignoring their claims to any kind of insight into character, Hegel 
insists that what is being related in such “sciences” is not the inner and the outer, but 
externals with externals, the fortune revealed by the palm or the heavens constituting 
what befalls an individual, not the individual’s essence. In contrast to such external 
factors lacking any real relation, physiognomy, John Casper Lavater’s formal study of 
facial shape and feature, “considers specific individuality in the necessary antithesis of an 
inner and an outer, or character as a conscious disposition, and this again as an existent 
shape” (188). Lavater asserted that general character could be read through the face by 
attending to the aesthetic response elicited by a particular set of eyes or curve of nose or 
breadth of jaw; his work strove to assert the universality of such responses.56 Reason, at 
this point in the Phenomenology, gravitates to physiognomy because physiognomy posits 
an inner and outer with respect to self-conscious individuals while appearing to conform 
to the idea that action and word constitute an “unessential outer” (in that they are subject 
to accident). What physiognomy and what Reason want to identify at this point is the 
“essential inner”: intention rather than deed; an “existence which is only ‘meant’” rather 
than an actuality (191-192). 
This desire for the merely “meant” leads ‘thought’ into a contradiction that 
unravels physiognomy: what is only meant considered qua meant is inexpressible, just as 
intention purely considered as intention is not actual. From the physiognomical 
perspective then, the nature of the inner rests on pure presumption. The emptiness of this 
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56 While phrenology and physiognomy demonstrate a great deal of overlap, physiognomy did not 
posit a system of mental organs in the brain, the powers of which could be quantified though the 
shape of the skull. Lavater’s approach tended to be holistic and aesthetic, based on his intuitive 
reactions to faces and particular facial features, which he believed expressed general traits of 
character rather than reflected the size of mental organs. See Lavater’s Essays on Physiognomy.  
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presumed object contributes to the difficulty of delineating the precise qualities that make 
up “the infinitely determinate” individual, however many capacities physiognomy might 
propose. Physiognomists provide nothing—other than opinion—on which to hang 
abstract qualities of character, or to define them to begin with. Likewise the “delineations 
of the bodily shape” they suppose to express such qualities are just as “inadequate,” 
failing to go beyond such terms as “flat forehead” and “long nose.” The failure of 
physiognomy to read the inner in the outer rests on the basic conundrum of signifying an 
essentially presumed object as actual, but it also appears to involve the semantic 
inexhaustibility of both body and spirit. Like Whitman, Hegel here suggests that the 
physical is describable in an indeterminate if not endless number of ways—and certainly 
in subtler terms than “flat forehead” (192).  
From here Hegel is led to pronounce “deed” as the true and only actual indicator 
of the self—act is, in fact, the self itself. His prose in this section correspondingly takes 
on a more “active” tone, Hegel humorously suggesting a blow to the head as the proper 
response to the stubborn physiognomist. This action, he writes, would demonstrate that 
“the face or outward appearance is not the individual’s in-itself but, on the contrary, can 
be an object for handling” (195). A similar but qualified privileging of action arises in 
Whitman’s use of phrenology in “Faces” and in the revisions he makes to his 
phrenological chart upon the occasion of its publication. Some of the revisions, for 
example, appear based on the very act of altering the chart, such as his increasing his 
score in SELF-ESTEEM, but overall Whitman changes very little, remaining largely true to 
what the examining phrenologist had originally seen in the shape of his head.57 
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57 See Chapter III (192). 
Borst&103&
Whitman’s privileging of action over what appeared already “given” in a body was 
therefore not absolute, helping to explain the passages in his writing where he 
complicates the notion of the human body’s “natural language” (as when he asserts the 
inarticulable and impenetrable “plenum of proof in his face”). 
After rhetorically striking the physiognomist, Hegel returns to the train of thought 
that had first led to considering the logic of physiognomy. ‘Thought’ had previously 
determined that physiognomy lacks an actual object in the self that it sees signified by 
outer shape. Even if this shape had had an actual object, as an “expression” of the self it 
would be subject to the same contingencies as speech and action. Furthermore, several 
times Hegel also suggests that physiognomy looks at the more expressive, mobile aspects 
of facial expression in addition to the more passive and permanent characteristics of the 
face, which would make physiognomical data even more unreliable.58 Phrenology now 
enters the discussion as an answer to these problems, and as perhaps the most extreme 
example of what thought had set out to do after giving up on speech and action: to find a 
“passive whole” that “passively received the inner as an alien element.” According to 
Hegel, traditional “psychology” posits a dualism between the “Spirit” and the “external 
reality of things.” In physiognomy, this dualism is softened and loosened, as through the 
face and outer form “Spirit is supposed to be known in its own outer aspect.” Individual 
bodies are thus “utterances” of spirit, not entirely separate from it. In phrenology, the 
relationship between spirit and matter is even closer, immediate in fact, with 
“individuality” expressing “its essence in its immediate, firmly established, and purely 
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58 Hegel appears to neglect or refuse to take seriously Lavater’s claim to distinguish between 
physiognomy and pathognomy, the “knowledge of character at rest” and “in motion” 
respectively, though Lavater himself explains that both are “to the friend of truth inseparable” 
(12). 
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existent actuality.” The skull appeals to the phrenologist as such a “purely existent 
actuality” and therefore as a more stable signifier. It is a “wholly immobile reality which 
is not in its own self a speaking sign but, separated from self-conscious movement, 
presents itself on its own account and is a mere Thing” (195). 
Though Hegel follows several threads of argument in unraveling phrenology, the 
main one appears to be this: that the ideas of phrenology have not been determined by 
observation and data, but by the quest for a particular type of signifier, a signifier that 
would be stable, concrete, visible, physical, unambiguous, immediate, and actual, in a 
sense not a sign at all, but “a mere Thing.” Being dead in itself, and immediately present, 
it would not be subject to interpretation or be susceptible to self-conscious movement 
(and thus manipulation). The skull fulfills these conditions, so naturally the phrenologist 
gravitates towards it. Consequently, from the phrenological point of view, it is so 
determined that “the actuality and existence of a man is his skull-bone” (200). While it 
could be argued that the skull is merely a reflection of the brain, which serves as a more 
fluid and immediate embodiment of self-conscious individuality, Hegel maintains the 
distinction is meaningless because the skull is still being considered as the “outer being of 
Spirit,” and the “outer is just that reality which merely is” (205). To see the character of 
self-conscious individuality revealed in the skull requires “paltry” and inert conceptions 
of Spirit: the “mental properties” themselves become “ossified” (202). Phrenology 
becomes an example of reason self-alienated, projected onto a dead form. Observing 
thought’s movement through beliefs like physiognomy and phrenology thus reveals 
problems underlying any kind of reductionist materialism. Conversely, these problems 
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also underlie misconceptions of Spirit as having being in the same sense as physical 
entities.  
It is by its own power, then, that Reason is made bone. As the logical product of 
the mind’s demand for a rigid certainty projected onto organic life, phrenology illustrates 
the mind’s active—and potentially distortive—role in predetermining our perceptions. If 
seeing the mind in the skull requires ossified conceptions of the mental faculties, it also 
implicitly requires an ossification of the observing thinker’s own mental powers in order 
to believe such a ‘paltry’ idea of itself. In Hegel’s critique of phrenology, the mind’s 
active role in constructing ideas of spirit and mind appears intimately linked to a similar 
role played by language and signs generally. Signs are not innocent conveyors of that 
which they signify—or rather they are more innocent than we might suspect. To say the 
skull is the sign of the inner is actually to say the skull is the inner according to Hegel: 
the sign in this case simply constructs its object. Hegel’s critique of physiognomy for 
positing an insubstantial—because merely intentional—mental object thus extends to 
language. What someone might insist is really meant in speaking a word—the word’s 
inner meaning—is insubstantial compared to that word’s surface or received meaning. As 
Hegel writes much earlier in the Phenomenology, “language [. . .] is the more truthful; in 
it, we ourselves directly refute what we mean to say” (60).  
Hegel’s treatment of palmistry and physiognomy likewise suggests that the 
endeavor to represent the “inner” inevitably results in a literalist conflation of sign and 
object. Their language (or the language Hegel attributes to them) reveals that their 
attentions are predetermined by a demand for a particular kind of signifier, not by the 
inner they presume to be ‘reading.’ He repeatedly describes palmist and physiognomist as 
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fixated on the “lines and lineaments” of hands and faces respectively (186, 189, 191). 
The repetition of the phrase implies that both palm- and face-reader are unwittingly after 
the same thing, that the lines on the hand amount to the lines on the face, and that 
therefore both are simply after “lines and lineaments”: markers, indicators, signifiers qua 
signifiers. Though not fully explicated, emergent in Hegel’s critique of these efforts to 
read the inner is the idea that signs—or rather the very idea of signification—shape, 
construct, or even replace the inner self they were meant to indicate. 
In light of Hegel’s critical investigation of attempts to signify the inner self, the 
contradictions surrounding Whitman’s “plenum of proof” passage make more sense. His 
“silence” is the key: the body is speaking without speaking, being held separate from or 
prior to what can be said about it. To verbalize the self renders it susceptible to the 
contingencies of social discourse, in the same way Hegel describes how speech and 
gesture made the “inner” susceptible to external contingencies. To assert a signifier that 
somehow remains within itself appears to be the aim of the “plenum of proof” passage, 
like the aim Hegel ascribes to the palmist, physiognomist, and phrenologist. That 
Whitman’s face remains silent suggests this requires something beyond phrenology or 
any other discourse: a subjective assertion of identity withheld within the self. This would 
seem to follow closely the terms of Hegel’s critique, but to a very different conclusion: 
phrenology’s search for an inert “passive whole” as a signifier is not inherently flawed, 
but to be fulfilled through silence, through oblique poetic expression, and through the 
bald fact of the face, its bare being left un-theorized, unarticulated.  
Both the extent and the limits of Whitman’s acceptance of phrenology are on 
display in “Faces,” and in ways that recall key points of Hegel’s critique. The poem has 
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been frequently discussed for the heavy use it makes of terms, images, and concepts from 
phrenology and physiognomy. The first three lines alone declare, “Sauntering the 
pavement or riding the country by-road, lo, such faces! / Faces of friendship, precision, 
caution, suavity, ideality, / The spiritual-prescient face, the always welcome common 
benevolent face,” each face listed directly corresponding to a faculty (576). Previous 
scholarship has generally emphasized the positive use of these terms: Whitman believes 
in them, and because of phrenology’s popularity, he can rely on them to conjure up 
appropriate images in his readers’ minds.59 Informed by Hegel’s critique, I’d like to 
suggest a more complex reading of how the poem develops along phrenological lines, but 
then moves beyond them. Although it has been argued that Whitman is expressing doubt 
about phrenology in this poem, “Faces” begins from the assumption that this ‘science’ is 
foundational for understanding and cultivating the self.60 The poem’s very structure 
suggests that the body and brain are indeed the basis for the self, but not its ultimate limit, 
an idea that also legitimizes the revisions Whitman makes to his published phrenology 
chart, examined in Chapter III of this dissertation. Structurally, “Faces” moves from 
portraying embodied selves to prophetic selves to a visionary mixture of both. 
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59 Such is the view of Harold Aspiz:  
Each figure in the preceding [fifteen lines] is clothed with a visual presence and a set of 
attributes that may be recognized by specific verbal clues derived from the pseudo-
sciences. Whitman apparently expected the reader to translate these clues into the 
appropriate phrenological or physiognomic archetypes and then to conjure up the 
appearance and bearing appropriate to each. (The technique of furnishing fragmentary 
hints which the reader must flesh out in his own imagination is the usual method in 
Whitman’s verse catalogs.) (136) 
60 Falkoff has argued the poem actually represents a “crisis in [Whitman’s] faith in phrenology as 
a way of adequately bridging the material and spiritual divide” (92). 
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Like all later versions of Whitman’s poems originally published in 1855, the final 
1881 version of “Faces” had long since been broken down into numbered sections, which 
in this case emphasize fairly stark thematic stages in the poem. The first section begins 
with the above quoted catalogue of faces, which are characterized by prominent and 
healthy phrenological traits. Towards the end of the section, however, the health and 
transparency of the faces becomes less certain. “The ugly face of some beautiful soul, the 
handsome detested or despised face,” writes Whitman halfway through, as if questioning 
the idea of direct correspondence between soul and body, though not the ultimate 
readability of the soul. In a subsequent line, he juxtaposes a “face as of a dream” with 
another “of an immobile rock.” These qualities could be read as the faculties of IDEALITY 
and FIRMNESS, but they could also be read as different kinds of obscurity, the one vague, 
the other solidly impenetrable. The catalogue of faces darkens at the section’s close with 
a “face withdrawn of its good and bad, a castrated face.” The final line then sums up the 
speaker’s feelings about them all: “I see them, and complain not, and am content with 
all” (576). While somewhat removed from the joyful faces that begin the poem, the final 
face of the poet is not the emasculated blank of the earlier line, but a face able to accept 
the good and the bad. The “bad” is the subject of the second section. 
To “complain not” and be “content” is to damn with faint praise, a point 
confirmed by the first line of the second section: “Do you suppose I could be content with 
all if I thought them their own finale?” The faces that follow are all suffering, faces that 
one would hope would not be “their own finale.” Some of the faces are compared to 
animals, others show the effects of drugs (“laudanum”), disease (“epilepsy”), and death 
(“This face owes to the sexton his dismalest fee”) (576-577). None of this is inconsistent 
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with reform era American pseudoscience. The Fowlers and other popular physiologists 
often wrote about the effects of drugs, intemperance, and unhealthy living on physical 
appearance and offspring (they were influenced by Lamarck in this regard). Aspiz has 
rightly noted the influence of physiognomy in the comparisons Whitman makes between 
human and animal faces (Walt 138). In light of Hegel’s critique, however, an important 
difference emerges between the descriptions of faces in the first and second sections of 
the poem. The first section finds the self grounded as a passive whole, in the body, face, 
and character, while the second finds the self expressed in gesture, expression, and 
circumstance—those factors that Hegel suggests phrenology found unreliable as 
signifiers, because they are ultimately external to the self. 
The first section includes the “Faces of friendship, precision, caution,” as well as 
more developed descriptions like, “faces of hunters and fishers bulged at the brows,” the 
bulge corresponding to the organs of perception. Similarly, “the grand faces of natural 
lawyers and judges” are “broad at the back-top.” These are generalized character traits, 
described in the abstract or as embodied in unchanging physical traits, such as the shape 
of the brow. In contrast, the descriptions in the second section of the poem are much 
more viscerally described and focus on specific actions and expressions. A “too 
lamentable” face is ascribed to a “man, / Some abject louse asking leave to be, cringing 
for it, / Some milk-nosed maggot blessing what lets it wrig to its hole.” The next face 
mentioned “is a dog’s snout sniffing for garbage, / Snakes nest in that mouth, I hear the 
sibilant threat.” The shift in perspective from general to particular is as striking as the 
shift in tone and subject matter. The faces of “singing” and “veneration” give way to 
faces tragic and threatening, which instead of being merely listed are described in 
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grotesque detail. With the third face the detail becomes opaquely surreal: “This face is a 
haze more chill than the arctic sea, / Its sleepy and wobbling icebergs crunch as they go” 
(576-577).  
What is to be made of this turn? It is as if the moral degradation of these 
individual cases disrupts not only the natural order, but also the speaker’s ability to see 
and order what he sees, his vision breaking down into a “haze” and incongruous images 
of crunching icebergs. On one level, phrenology’s neat categories are failing him not 
because they are wrong, but because mental and spiritual disease corrupts the rightful 
harmony of the mind—of both perceiver and perceived. But on another level they fail 
because we are no longer looking at the general character, at the skull, at the “passive 
whole,” but at individual expressions, at “sniffing” and “cringing” creatures—or, more 
precisely, at the “sniffing” and “cringing.” As in Hegel’s critique, speech and gesture and 
other externalizations can break down as signifiers of the inner: the faces in section two 
cannot be “their own finale.” Towards the end of section two appears a stark instance of 
this idea of externalization: “This face is bitten by vermin and worms, / And this is some 
murderer’s knife with a half-pull’d scabbard” (577). Whether the second line refers to a 
face is slightly ambiguous; the knife could be part of the description of the dead man in 
the first line. But the rhythm and structure of the entire rest of the poem drives against 
such a reading. “This,” like it has in every other line, refers to another face, a self that has 
been externalized not into an act, but even further into the tool of that act, a “murderer’s 
knife.” The temporal urgency of the line also contrasts sharply with the more general 
descriptions of faces that have preceded it. The knife is “half-pull’d.” We are literally on 
the knife’s edge of an instant, at the cusp of intention becoming action.  
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This moment of potential violence—this cutting through the body—may seem to 
undermine the more harmonious vision of nature and character established in the first 
section of the poem. But at the same time it opens up the possibility of liberation from the 
body and from biological determinism. Whitman is not rejecting phrenology, but finding 
a space beyond it in his focus on individual depravity, suffering, and action. A stanza 
describing an epileptic begins powerfully to suggest the separation of self and the body: 
“The man falls struggling and foaming to the ground, while he speculates well.” The 
mind and imagination function “well” apart from the body, which here sounds bleakly 
ironic. The word “speculate” reinforces the sense that the epileptic’s vision is useless, 
witness only to his own seizure. The section ends with the face of a dead man and 
without much hope that this speculative self lives on: it’s a face defined by death, whose 
final mark overshadows any phrenological bump: “An unceasing death-bell tolls there” 
(577).  
To the extent that in Hegel’s analysis phrenology found in the skull a more 
“passive whole” to signify the inner self than did physiognomy, and to the extent that 
physiognomy remained focused on less stable facial expressions, the first section of the 
poem takes a phrenological view and the second a physiognomical one. In Hegel’s 
critique, physiognomy failed because it viewed the face in aesthetic terms and, in 
choosing the face as its object, chose a more fluid surface than bone to read. In contrast, 
phrenology’s misguided virtue was in arriving at a fixed, unchanging signifier: an outer 
that was not an ‘expression’ of the inner, but its outer ‘actuality.’ Though reversing 
Hegel’s ordering, the sequence of Whitman’s poem does not imply a refutation of 
phrenology (or materialism), but a movement through it to its limits: the experiences and 
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actions that shape or change an individual’s basic character. For Hegel’s phrenologist 
individual actions and gestures were less reliable indexes of the self; for Whitman they 
are also less tethered to the foundations of character, but they are not therefore unreliable. 
They are where the dictates of the skull loosen, where the self becomes malleable, 
permeable. In the interstices between biological make-up and, in this poem, individual 
experience (here largely the experience of suffering), the soul thus begins to emerge. 
Compassion for these more tragic and horrific faces—wrought in striking, individualizing 
detail—leads the poet to feel for what lies beyond the bodily. 
The “speculative” self of the epileptic—this self beyond the body—comes to 
fruition in the third section. Having confronted death and suffering, Whitman writes, “I 
see ‘neath the rims of your haggard and mean disguises.” The section is pivotal for the 
poem as a whole, leading to the visionary hopes of the fourth and fifth sections. It centers 
on a description of Eddie, Whitman’s mentally disabled brother: 
I saw the face of the most smear’d and slobbering idiot they had at the asylum,  
And I knew for my consolation what they knew not, 
I knew of the agents that emptied and broke my brother, 
The same wait to clear the rubbish from the fallen tenement, 
And I shall look again in a score or two of ages, 
And I shall meet the real landlord perfect and unharm’d, every inch as good as  
myself. (577-578) 
 
The passage can be read as a response to phrenology, which was born and developed 
largely in asylums, Gall looking at extreme cases of various kinds of monomania in order 
to establish the nature and location of different organs. At the very least it can be read as 
a response to doctors who might view Eddie’s condition as essential to his being, as one 
that exhaustively defined him. Instead, Whitman knows the “agents” outside of Eddie 
that broke him; the real Eddie, the true landlord, is the perfect soul tenanted in a troubled 
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mind and body. While Eddie was in fact disabled from birth, the “brother” here could 
also have been a composite, with several other of Whitman’s siblings furnishing him 
examples of more gradual declines in mental health. 
 The fourth section begins with a vision of the “Lord” and a heavenly procession 
of “banners and horses,” which lead to a prophecy of renewed moral, mental, and 
physical health: “This face of a healthy honest boy is the programme of all good.” The 
final section then appears to realize this prophecy, or at least bring it closer to the reality 
of the present moment. Unlike the very fragmented images and subjects of the rest of the 
poem, the final section concentrates on one figure in one fully wrought scene: “The old 
face of the mother of many children.” Though the farmhouse setting retains traces of 
visionary mist from the previous section—“Lull’d and late is the smoke of the First-day 
morning”—its sustained description give it a concreteness lacking in the preceding parts 
of the poem. The grandmother embodies moral perfection, sexual health, and fecundity. 
She’s a Quaker, a pious free-thinker, on a farm attended by her grandchildren, who raised 
and spun the flax of her “ample gown.” She embodies the whole cycle of nature, the 
poem concluding with lines that simply name her, “The melodious character of the earth, 
/ The finish beyond which philosophy cannot go and does not wish to go, / The justified 
mother of men” (578-579).  
 “Faces” does not reject phrenology; nor does it simply promote phrenology or use 
its images to explain and describe human character. Instead the poem takes phrenology 
for granted and moves on to its primary concern of contending with a world in which 
phrenology is true: a world of suffering in which action and character is extensively 
limited and determined by biological and other material conditions. In a sense, then, the 
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presence of phrenology in the poem makes it more, not less, modern. Like many 
Romantics, Whitman adopts a visionary, imaginative mode in addressing the question of 
determinism, but he nevertheless remains deeply enmeshed in the vicissitudes of the 
material world. As in “Song of Myself,” he looks beyond phrenology for a “plenum of 
proof” in the grandmother’s face: it is a surface that is whole, not divided into or defined 
by or referring to particular faculties. It sits in silence but resonates with the whole of 
nature, the “melodious character of the earth.” (In Hegelian thought, the whole is that 
which refers only to itself). It is a surface at the limits of discourse, “beyond which 
philosophy cannot go and does not wish to go.” The visionary immediacy of the final 
face is meant to be perceived, not read, and the poem concludes with a being at once 
bodily and transcendent. 
The parallels between Whitman’s use and Hegel’s critique of phrenology seem 
much too close to be coincidental. Either Whitman was familiar with The 
Phenomenology of Spirit or Hegel indeed traced the logic underlying the beliefs of many 










Signa et Significata 
 
Hegel was not alone in taking phrenology seriously as a philosophical case study. 
For Samuel Taylor Coleridge, too, phrenology provided a theoretical space for 
considering the limits of materialism and the role of language in sciences of the mind. His 
conclusions tended to be more optimistic about the aims of phrenology than Hegel’s. The 
frequent emphasis that has been placed on Coleridge the metaphysician overlooks his 
ambivalent engagement with materialism later in life, long after the more radical and 
obviously materialist phase of his younger years subsided. His connection to Whitman is 
indirect but significant; while Whitman may not have been aware of Coleridge’s ideas on 
phrenology (many were unpublished), he certainly read Coleridge and was operating with 
a similar set of Romantic ideas and aesthetic principles. As a theorist of language in Aids 
to Reflection and other texts, Coleridge looms large over the American literary and 
religious scene. Vermont Transcendentalist and clergyman James Marsh had published 
an American edition of Aids with his own substantial Introduction in 1829; Coleridge’s 
concept of the symbolic subsequently revitalized Trinitarianism and inspired 
Transcendentalism.61 For his philosophical, poetic, and political principles he sought a 
basis in psychology, which for him consisted of elements of faculty psychology, 
especially from German Transcendentalism, as well as more current—and 
controversial—scientific approaches to the mind like David Hartley’s associationism (he 
even named his firstborn son Hartley). Coleridge is therefore essential for placing 
Whitman’s views on phrenology in a broader Romantic and philosophical context. 
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61 Gura traces this development of the symbolic mode in nineteenth-century American theology 
and literature in The Wisdom of Words (see especially chapters 2 and 3). 
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Indeed, his views on phrenology at points parallel the views of Whitman and Hegel: he, 
too, sees phrenology drawing a provocative distinction between the inner and the outer, 
one that distinguishes between facts on the one hand and the things we say about them on 
the other. His critique of phrenology thus centers on phrenology not acknowledging its 
mediated nature and the consequent limits to its claims. But rather than dismiss 
phrenology, he suggests a refinement of its terms.  
Like Whitman, Coleridge worked to articulate a common ground between the 
material and the spiritual that promoted the truths of both science and the soul.62 While 
such a synthesis might be carried off at a high level of theoretical abstraction in Aids to 
Reflection, or from a detached moralizing position as at the end of the poem “The Eolian 
Harp,” Coleridge often betrayed ambivalence and anxiety about his own predilection for 
materialism. He hesitated publishing the chemically induced poem “Kubla Khan.” He 
reversed and qualified his views on Hartley, spending a good portion of Biographia 
Literaria dissecting the flaws and excesses of associationism. More to the current point, 
Coleridge several times wrote on phrenology itself, reversing and qualifying his opinions 
on the subject similar to the way he had his views regarding Hartley. He was detached 
enough from phrenology, however, that as a topic it could serve as a kind of 
philosophical laboratory, in which to analyze the excesses and rightful limits of 
materialism, the relationship between mind and language, and the nature of science. 
References to phrenology can be found in Coleridge’s notebooks and marginalia, 
his letters, The Friend, Aids to Reflection, and Table Talk, a record of conversations 
edited by nephew and son-in-law Henry Nelson Coleridge. In 1815, he held nothing but 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
62 See Levere’s Poetry Realized in Nature and Wilson’s Emerson’s Sublime Science. 
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contempt for phrenology, describing The Physiognomical System of Gall and Spurzheim 
(1815) as “below criticism” and as almost impossible to take seriously (Collected Letters 
4: 613).63 But two years later his attitude towards phrenology changes drastically, 
becoming a mix of high praise, serious criticism, and light mockery that remains 
consistent to the end of his life. In an 1817 notebook entry he attributes the flaws of The 
Physiognomical System, the book he panned, to its editor rather than author, and 
sympathizes with Spurzheim for the harsh treatment he received from excessive critics; 
he also highly praises Spurzheim’s personal character, of which he writes that all who 
have known the phrenologist “speak of with love and honor.” He proclaims Spurzheim 
“beyond all comparison the greatest Physiognomist that has ever appeared,” citing the 
general accuracy of his readings of the intellectual faculties as a group, if not individually 
(Notebooks 3: 4355). Though in 1817 he doubts Spurzheim’s readings of the moral 
faculties, by 1830 his view had apparently changed. In Table Talk he mentions the 
phrenologist’s success in identifying “certain remarkable coincidences between the moral 
qualities and the configuration of the skull” (183). Elsewhere he specifies such 
“coincidences,” agreeing with Spurzheim that the “fore part of the head is generally given 
up to the higher and intellectual powers—the hinder part to the sensual” (76). He even 
takes for granted “the line across the forehead denoting [the faculty of] music” as 
generally recognized to be true (184). 
In his remarks on phrenology Coleridge several times refers to a humorous 
encounter with Spurzheim that occurred probably in 1825 (Walker 329). Not knowing 
Coleridge’s identity, the unsuspecting Spurzheim examined the poet-philosopher’s head 
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63 See also Coleridge’s Notebooks (3: 4269). 
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before a gathering and pronounced him markedly deficient in IDEALITY, the faculty of 
imagination and poetry, according to the notes of editor and amanuensis Henry Nelson 
Coleridge. The error was compounded by another equally egregious: Spurzheim asserted 
that the directionally challenged Coleridge possessed a prominent LOCALITY. (“He had 
much the geometrician about him,” states Henry simply, “but he could not find his way.”) 
As Henry also reports, Coleridge appreciated the “hearty good humour with which the 
Doctor bore” the party’s laughter, so much so that he defended Spurzheim’s blunder by 
referring to the nuances of Spurzheim’s own explanations of LOCALITY, which apparently 
accounted somewhat for the comical discrepancy.64  
Coleridge appears to have relished recounting this story, but more as a self-
deprecating account of his poor directional sense than as a send-up of phrenology. In one 
retelling in a letter of 1825, the mistake is Spurzheim’s, not phrenology’s, as Coleridge 
actually turns to phrenology to explain how his memory can be strong for certain things, 
but weak for others, citing the specific “idiocy of my preeminent Organ of Locality.” He 
further explains: 
But I am persuaded, that there is a division of Labor in the Factory of the 
Memory, and a dozen perhaps of Journeyman Memories, each clever, if clever, at 
it’s own trade exclusively—and that my Name, Number, place and way Memory 
is a natural fool! (5: 460-461) 
 
Given Coleridge’s belief in phrenology’s “coincidences,” and his recurring need to 
explain his deficient sense of place, the idea of memory’s “division of Labor” should be 
taken as more than a humorous aside. In Table Talk, he is reported to have observed—
this time in all seriousness—how he has “the perception of images very strong, but a dim 
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64 Henry surmises this encounter was the beginning of Coleridge’s liking for the man (Table Talk 
64). However, as is evident from his notes and letters, Coleridge expressed appreciation for the 
phrenologist as early as 1817.  
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one of the relation of place.” Not coincidentally, the very next topic he discusses in Table 
Talk is “Craniology” (64).  
 While LOCALITY helpfully isolates Coleridge’s problems with direction, Coleridge 
elsewhere criticizes the extent to which phrenology takes the notion of specialized 
faculties. In 1825 he writes that according to phrenology:  
Genius, Virtue, Piety are all results—nay, results of disproportion/The Man 
himself is no more— [. . .] The Man is nothing different from the constituent 
Faculties, neither Antecedent nor Consequent, neither Principle nor Product. (4: 
5291)  
 
The phrenological self lacks a center—lacks a self ultimately, either as cause or effect of 
the faculties’ interactions. The whole is simply equal to its parts, an implication that 
sidelines the soul at best—whatever the claims of phrenologists to the contrary—and 
which Coleridge appears in this extended entry to locate in the subjective experience of 
immediate thought, perception, and sensation. Ultimately, however, his criticism does not 
contradict what he elsewhere says in support of phrenology; rather it simply sets the limit 
to which he can logically follow all of phrenology’s implications. Thus here and in other 
notebook entries, phrenology—not quite a science, yet tending towards the extremes of 
materialism—provides a conceptual space in which Coleridge can demarcate the logical 
boundaries of both science and materialism. 
 Coleridge’s most consistent criticism of Spurzheim was that while he may have 
had the facts right, his attempts to theorize them failed utterly. He should have stopped at 
pointing out significant coincidences between head and character, for “when he began to 
map out the cranium, he fell into infinite absurdities” (Table Talk 183). In one extensive 
notebook entry, this disconnection between fact and theory becomes the focal point for a 
reflection on the nature of scientific knowledge. While granting that phrenology has 
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amassed “in the memory” a great number of observations, Coleridge explains it has left a 
“chasm” between these “Coincidents” by neglecting to explain their exact relationship to 
one another, as in terms of cause and effect (5: 6735). The shape of the head may 
predictably correspond to character, but not in any way expressive of a scientific law or 
theory. Nor, he implies, do these coincidences justify a cranial map that presumes to 
locate precisely specific mental functions in specific areas of the brain. General skull 
feature X generally accompanies general personality trait Y: that’s all that phrenology 
can be said to “know” at this point.  
However, this does not mean that phrenology will not one day know much more. 
The entry as a whole centers on the question of whether phrenology can ever attain the 
legitimacy and theoretical sophistication of one of “the mixed Sciences—i.e. those 
Knowledges, which have their root in a universal Truth, tho’ they embody themselves 
and derive their specific forms from Experience.” This leads him to a consideration of 
how such mixed sciences develop as an interplay of “frequent observation” and the laws 
of pure “science,” with “Legitimate significancy” a kind of “mid-point” partaking of 
both. Coleridge’s brisk and sometimes obscure personal notes, taking for granted as they 
do an intimate knowledge of German idealism and classical languages, do not always 
trace out all the steps of his logic; but what he seems to suggest here is that to the extent 
that observations begin to become “significant” they are partaking of science. Their 
“significancy” depends on “a long supercumulation of confirmative experience” and their 
standing in “evident dependency or interconnection,” though without insight “into the 
reason of the whole.” Such a rudimentary state of apprehension provides a practical sense 
of causality, rather than a necessary one as would be expressed in a fundamental 
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scientific law (we know and can predict that music ability is belied by the brow, but not 
why or with precision; gravity, however, is quantifiable and universal). Therefore, 
“Marks or Distinctions are often, nay most often, significant, long before they become 
intelligible” (5: 6735). 
Phrenology would seem to be at the rudimentary stages of becoming a practical or 
mixed science, its observations sometimes significant but currently unintelligible. In 
these passages Coleridge understands science as a signifying system, as the emergence of 
signification from observation, as the gradual and proper alignment of facts and meaning. 
The theoretical presumptions of phrenology therefore rest on a misunderstanding of how 
an observer’s relationship to the observed is not direct, but mediated by representation 
and interpretation, a process that this notebook entry suggests proceeds dialectically. The 
problems of phrenology are, in a sense, problems of language—of aesthetics, semiotics, 
and careless epistemology. Accordingly, Coleridge says that in order to develop as a 
science phrenology must refine its system of signification, its lexicon, its terms and their 
referents, such that the apparent evidence most closely and accurately corresponds to 
what it signifies. (Though this in itself may not make phrenology “intelligible,” but only 
practically more efficient). 
The case of phrenology presents a difficulty not found in all cases of observed 
coincidence in nature. When two facts occurring together are both objects of sense, their 
relationship is “physiognomic,” writes Coleridge, as when red eyes are observed to 
frequently accompany white hair. When one of the facts is not a direct object of sense, 
however, and is instead an emotion or quality of mind as in the case of a mental faculty 
or the embarrassment expressed by a blush, their relationship is “psychognomic,” which, 
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Coleridge implies, leaves one side of phrenology’s signifying equation not directly 
observable. Though he does not state so explicitly, this would seem to complicate though 
apparently not render impossible Coleridge’s recommendation for phrenology to refine 
its terms and signs. As he insists, “we must reduce the Signa et Significata, the Gnomonic 
and the Psychical to the most general conception of relative comparative Quantity as the 
index of relative comparative Quality.” The italicized article in “the Psychical” implies a 
very difficult aim: the reduction of the qualitative, of some aspect of the personality or 
mental life, to a discrete and quantifiable unit, measurable in terms of the most 
immediately corresponding physical signs. This concept brings to mind Hegel’s criticism 
of physiognomy for presuming to have categorized all aspects of mental life, and for 
reducing physical features to the crudest categories of quality. It also recalls Hegel’s final 
point about phrenology: that it originated in a misguided desire for just such a “discrete 
and quantifiable unit.” For Coleridge these problems are not insurmountable, even if 
phrenology in its current state did not succeed in surmounting them. Though the 
“Psychical” is not explicitly equated with the immaterial or the soul, Coleridge here 
imagines at least the possibility of articulating a connection between the physical world 
and interior life (5: 6735). This hope is particularly striking given the fact Coleridge was 
writing about it towards the end of his life, long after the materialist radical Coleridge is 
often thought to have been supplanted by the theological metaphysician. 
But how can Coleridge so confidently look forward to connecting mind with 
matter? His criticism of Hartley and of phrenology’s reduction of “Man” to a bundle of 
faculties suggest a very different sentiment, a suspicion of mind/body equations that 
ultimately deny the immmaterial. And Coleridge in fact criticizes phrenology in his 
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notebooks for allowing just this to happen. In one entry, phrenology provides him with an 
example of how commonly the “ordinary Antithesis of Soul and Body” leads to a veiled 
materialism, bringing together by necessity both body and soul “under the same Law of 
Cause and Effect.” He illustrates the point by tracing an elaborate chain of causation 
using the terms of phrenology, from “bumps” and organs to motives and actions. The 
implication of such reasoning, of finding more and more steps in the chain of causation, 
is that “Soul represents merely the unintelligible parts and stages of the process.” When 
the soul is inserted in such chains, its relationship to the body is always considered in 
physical terms like impact, impression, and causation. Ignored, says Coleridge, is the fact 
that this “Law of Cause and Effect” is a mode of conceiving, not of being. The soul 
manifests through a different, subjective category of apprehension, being the immediate 
experience of thought, perception, and sensation (4: 5291). In another entry, he criticizes 
the “Nerven-fluidum” of animal magnetism alongside phrenology as both theories that 
presume to account for the relationship between spirit and matter, but fail to do so in any 
other but materialist terms. “Now what can a fluid be conceived to effect,” he asks, “more 
than a horsewhip?” (5: 5675). 
The apparent contradiction between his critique of dualism and his assertion that 
one day the relationship between mind and body will be articulated is consistent with his 
general ambivalence over mental materialism. But it also may be just that: merely 
apparent. Coleridge’s hopes for phrenology are speculatively framed: “we must reduce 
the Signa et Significata, the Gnomonic and the Psychical to the most general conception 
of relative comparative Quantity as the index of relative comparative Quality.” First, this 
bridge between mind and matter is achieved in terms of a signifying rather than a causal 
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or ontological relationship, thus dodging the issues of determinism and materialism 
respectively (the brain signifies mental qualities, it does not cause or embody them). 
Second, and more important, Coleridge is not issuing a descriptive statement of how 
things in fact are, but of how they might or should be. It is in such a speculative and 
prospective mode that subjective life is expressed, and that, unlike definitive claims to 
have exhaustively understood—and therefore be limited by—the facts, the facts always 
have more to say, and their signs can always be more refined. “Science” ultimately 
remains and must remain ideal in its purest form for Coleridge; and the subjective life 
only realized as it is lived, experienced, and imagined, not as it is described, recorded, or 
represented after the fact. Coleridge’s prospectus for phrenology realizes this in its 
imaginative, prospective mode, rather than by falling back on metaphors like “nervous 
fluid” that re-inscribe the immaterial in material terms. 
As much as he scoffed at Spurzheim’s theoretical presumptions, Coleridge’s 
thoughts on phrenology were frequently careful and respectful, providing him occasion to 
reflect on the nature of science. The extreme claims of phrenology brought to the fore the 
need to examine science as mediated by language, to examine the signifying and 
interpretive nature of observations and facts in constructing theories, and to examine the 
relation between language and what it would represent. For both Hegel and Coleridge, 
phrenology crystallized questions about the relationship between the inner and the outer, 
the mind and the body, the spiritual and the physical. Their engagements with phrenology 
bring language to a crisis, creating an awareness of, on the one hand, the difference 
between language (or any sign) and what it would represent, and, on the other, the power 
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of language to shape or determine the object it might be naively thought simply to 
“show.”  
What the critiques of Hegel and Coleridge implicitly demand of phrenology is a 
more pragmatic view of language, one that understands language as provisional, one that 
will not confuse a word or a sign for the actual object it represents, one that understands 
science as a system of signs to be gradually aligned with the world it describes, and one 
that acknowledges the role of language in constructing and shaping the world. As 
justified as Hegel and Coleridge may have been for criticizing phrenologists’ unexamined 
sense of language, phrenologists themselves were actually aware of these very problems. 
From Gall onward, the establishment of phrenology depended not only on reading heads, 
collecting skulls, and visiting asylums, but also on the invention of new terms and 
concepts—of a new language. Later in the nineteenth century, the importance of 
phrenology’s linguistic work is noted not only by Whitman, but also by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Sr. and William James, all three of whom were directly or indirectly related to 
the development of pragmatism in America.65  
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65 Recent scholarship has located Whitman within the tradition of American pragmatism for a 
number of different reasons (and not for the first time: see Gay Wilson Allen for instance [390]). 
Allison, beginning with an analysis of James’s remarks on Whitman in Pragmatism, argues 
James finds in Whitman a model of socially-cohesive pragmatist aesthetics, a “pragmatic 
meliorism, the activity of finding continuity where there was none before” (27). With a focus on 
the poet’s political philosophy, Mack explores Whitman’s development of a quintessentially 
pragmatic understanding of democracy, the “notion that democracy is more than a political 
process, [. . .] it is a social and cultural process.” One of the reasons—of particular note in 
considering Whitman’s use of phrenology—that Mack provides for the efficacy of using James 
and other pragmatists as lenses for reading Whitman is that “like Whitman, pragmatism's major 
thinkers have been particularly interested in reconciling the material discoveries of science 
(however relative and contingent we understand those discoveries to be) with the deepest 
cultural—that is, political and moral—problems of the day.” Lastly, Malachuk, in examining 
James’s habit of referring to Whitman in lectures meant to persuade his auditors of the pluralist 
point of view, argues it was first “Whitman himself who had persuaded James to become a 
pragmatist.” Reading Richard Rorty’s similar deployment of references to Whitman leads 
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A Self-Adjusting Nomenclature 
 
Whitman’s belief in phrenology could not be dogmatic given his fundamentally 
un-dogmatic outlook, his free roving vision that held all “creeds and schools in abeyance” 
(188). Yet he never directly challenges the Fowlers’ (vociferous) claims of certainty, 
even as he employs terms like ADHESIVENESS throughout his career and expresses support 
for phrenology late into his life. What makes Whitman’s belief possible, however, is that 
it did not rest on the certainty of the Fowlers. Instead his belief involved two important 
qualifications. As discussed above, by the end of his life if not earlier, Whitman develops 
a more critical view of phrenology informed by Hegel: phrenology explained much about 
the material self, but not everything, and it would eventually be superseded. His poems 
“Song of Myself” and “Faces” gesture beyond its reductively materialist conclusions. 
Secondly, Whitman viewed language—even the language of science—as always subject 
to change with the progress of history, culture, and knowledge. 
 Tracing the limits of Whitman’s belief in phrenology brings out the complexity of 
phrenology’s position in the nineteenth-century imaginary. It remains a temptation to box 
this system of thought away as something people either believed or did not and to 
attribute its existence to the foolishness of individual adherents or the relative ignorance 
of the time. The reality is much stranger and the nuances of individual response much 
more difficult to categorize. While phrenology was sometimes criticized on 
methodological grounds that would hold today, its critics were not always “smarter” or 
“more scientific” than the phrenologists. One major set of criticisms—that phrenology 
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Malachuk to conclude the poet remains of “enduring importance to the culture of pragmatism” 
(60). 
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endorsed fatalism and materialism—would not occur to scientists today as the most 
pressing of its errors. And throughout the nineteenth century, in addition to supporters 
like Horace Mann and Whitman, there were other major cultural figures almost entirely 
critical of phrenology who nevertheless conceded some of its more provocative claims. 
As an examination of the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. and William James will 
shortly make clear, established scientific men could concede that head- and face-shape 
did reliably indicate some aspects of personality and intelligence, and that phrenology 
provided useful ways for understanding psychological make-up, if not for mapping the 
physical brain.  
In An American Primer, an unfinished work on language written mostly in the 
1850s, Whitman twice mentions phrenology as one of the many new realities in America 
to demand and bring forth a new vocabulary (9, 27). As a growing nation teeming with 
variety and unfettered by Old World strictures, America provides fertile soil for a 
language that is functional, natural, and free: “Words are a result” (8), he writes, in a 
sense presaging William James’s formulation, “Truth happens to an idea” (Pragmatism 
88). While much of this Primer (essentially a collection of notes) catalogs and celebrates 
the words brought forth by American geography and labor, Whitman spends as much 
time indicating the many regions of American experience still lacking a vocabulary. 
Notably, he writes that men now “have remarkably few words for the friendly 
sentiments” and “never give words to their most ardent friendships” (15). Though he does 
not mention ADHESIVENESS explicitly here, Whitman of course turns to phrenology in his 
poetry and in Democratic Vistas for just such a vocabulary of friendship.66  
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66 See Introduction (20-21). 
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 In examining Whitman’s interest in nineteenth-century medical practices, Harold 
Aspiz has argued that Whitman “was cautious about translating the terminology and 
concepts of the health sciences into the language of poetry” (54). He cites a note 
Whitman wrote to himself: “Remember in scientific and similar allusions that the theories 
of Geology, History, Language, &c., &c., are continually changing. Be careful to put in 
only what must be appropriate centuries hence” (55). On the one hand, this sentiment 
suggests how much faith Whitman must have had in phrenology to refer to it at all. On 
the other, it might explain why he did not incorporate even more phrenological terms into 
his work. While the note to some extent contradicts his wholehearted embrace of new 
words in An American Primer, it does not contradict his sense of language as vitally 
growing and changing. Phrenology could be exploited as a new verbal outgrowth of 
American soil, but only until its vocabulary was superseded by another theory possessing 
an equally provisional lexicon. Therefore Whitman could adhere ardently to phrenology 
without assuming that it exhaustively defined the self. The pseudoscience, like any other 
discourse, merely opened up possibilities for seeing and expressing more facets of the 
endlessly multifaceted American subject. 
 Whitman, therefore, unselfconsciously took liberties with phrenology: as I will 
discuss in Chapter III, he revised his phrenology chart and redefined faculties to meet the 
needs of his own psyche. For him, the heart of phrenology was its usefulness as a system 
of self-validation, self-help, and self-expression. It is these aspects of phrenology that 
Whitman distills and preserves later in life, even after he begins to admit the absurdity of 
most of its more controversial claims. Horace Traubel’s previously cited record of 
Whitman’s thoughts in 1888 should be considered in full: 
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I am what the boys call a stayer—I am very cautious: my caution has kept me out 
of many scrapes: has saved me from this death scrape [he had been ill]. Thirty 
years ago or more a circle of celebres in phrenology gave my head a public 
dissection in a hall—for one point, marked my caution very high—seven and 
over. Their seven was backed by my experience with myself. I live even today 
most conservatively—avoiding things that would be sure to be fatal to me. I know 
what Holmes said about phrenology—that you might as easily tell how much 
money is in a safe feeling the knob on the door as tell how much brain a man has 
by feeling the bumps on his head: and I guess most of my friends distrust it—but 
then you see I am very old fashioned—I probably have not got by the phrenology 
stage yet. (Traubel 385) 
 
The emphasis of this passage is on Whitman’s experience of himself, not on phrenology. 
In what amounts to a circular argument, he first turns outside of himself for an expression 
circulating among the “boys” (“a stayer”), applies the term to himself, and then asserts in 
his own words his cautious nature and ability to avoid “scrapes.” Only then does he turn 
to phrenology, which serves two rhetorical functions. First, it proves or explains 
Whitman’s experience, providing him with a name for a facet of his psyche: CAUTION. 
Secondly, the phrenological anecdote in turn is proved and explained by the very same 
experience used to prove and explain phrenology: Whitman’s avoidance of fatal scrapes. 
While this circularity undermines the logic of the passage and the empirical foundation of 
phrenology, it suggests that Whitman may have been much more invested in phrenology 
as psychological theory and mental lexicon than as physiology. More important than his 
actual “bump” of CAUTION is the fact that Whitman’s cautiousness is a distinguishing 
feature of his personality, is exceptional, and has served him well. By the end of the 
passage, Holmes’s critique of phrenology does indeed diminish the pride Whitman takes 
in having been examined by phrenological “celebres” and leads him to admit that 
phrenology’s claim to locate and measure mental faculties is unlikely. However, for 
Whitman this admission does not diminish the fact of his admirably prudential nature, or 
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the fact that phrenology provided him with a way of recognizing, articulating, and 
publicizing it.  
 Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., accomplished doctor, poet, novelist, essayist, and 
father of the Supreme Court justice, believed like Whitman that phrenology was best 
understood as a language, but then arrived at very different implications. The critique by 
Holmes to which Whitman refers appears in the eighth chapter of The Professor at the 
Breakfast-Table (1860), a collection of fictional conversations around a boarding house 
breakfast table that often read like essays. Despite its seemingly unrestrained 
digressiveness, chapter eight coheres around a set of interconnected themes: the 
problematic relationships between facial expression and language, surface and interior, 
spirit and body, and representations of self generally. At one point, the “Professor” 
regales his fellow boarders with “A Short Lecture on Phrenology,” in which he sends up 
phrenology for being the very thing that allowed Whitman to accept it: a language—and 
one particularly easy to manipulate. Holmes begins by defining pseudoscience as 
consisting of “a nomenclature, with a self-adjusting arrangement, by which all positive 
evidence, or such as favors its doctrines, is admitted, and all negative evidence, or such as 
tells against it, is excluded” (197). Phrenology, he deadpans, is not a pseudoscience, but 
has a “self-adjusting mechanism” that is “very similar to that of the Pseudo-sciences.” 
The example Holmes then provides of the workings of this mechanism reveals a thorough 
knowledge of phrenology. If a thief with a large ACQUISITIVENESS visited “Messrs. 
Bumpus and Crane” (i.e. the Fowlers), they would record, sketch, and cast the head as 
hard evidence supporting their system. If a thief with an apparently very small 
ACQUISITIVENESS came to them, they would attribute the thief’s propensity to steal to a 
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small CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. If there were no ACQUISITIVENESS to speak of, perhaps an 
overdeveloped ALIMENTIVENESS could account for the thief, who undoubtedly stole for 
food. Phrenology could explain anything, absorb any anomaly: Byron was a genius, but 
his head was small. Phrenology’s response, says the Professor: “It is not the size alone, 
but the quality of an organ, which determines its degree of power” (199-200). 
 In addition to explaining this “mechanism,” and to drawing the unflattering 
analogy between phrenology and guessing the contents of a closed safe, the Professor 
lampoons this pseudoscience for its myriad neologisms, again emphasizing its purely 
linguistic nature: “Gelasmiphilous, 6! Musikiphilous, 5! Uraniphilous, 5! Glossiphilous, 
8!! and so on. Meant for a linguist.—Invaluable information. Will invest in grammars and 
dictionaries immediately” (197). For Whitman, phrenology’s potential as a psychological 
lexicon and as a self-affirming philosophy rested on its rich and novel terminology as 
well as its flexibility as a system of thought—the very qualities that undermined its 
credibility for Holmes. For the doctor, phrenology mystified and persuaded the gullible 
through opaque and exotic terms, not through empirical proof. The ridiculousness of 
Holmes’s terms also suggest he thought it an affront—perhaps even a threat—to the 
orthodoxies and rules of the English language itself.  
Nevertheless, being a mere “nomenclature” did not entirely undermine 
phrenology’s usefulness. In the same way as Whitman, Holmes thought phrenology had 
potential as a vocabulary for understanding human personality and behavior. He also 
appreciated its emphasis on biological determinations of character (a major theme of his 
novel Elsie Venner). In “Border Lines of Knowledge In Some Provinces of Medical 
Science,” Holmes grants phrenology a considerable amount of credit even as he describes 
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it as “one of the will-o’-the-wisps” and a “delusion.” Phrenology, he says, has shed light 
“on human actions by its study of congenital organic tendencies.” He fondly recalls 
seeing Spurzheim and George Combe, the latter having taught a fair deal of “good sense 
under the disguise of his equivocal system.” To realize its true value, Holmes 
recommends that phrenology reclassify itself as “anthropology” and continue to “study 
man the individual in distinction from man the abstraction, the metaphysical or 
theological lay-figure.” “Its studies of individual character are always interesting and 
instructive,” he maintains in the essay, originally delivered as a lecture to incoming 
Harvard medical students (245).  
 The brunt of Holmes’s criticism, therefore, fell on phrenology’s pretensions to 
have mapped the brain. But looking at Holmes’s response to phrenology alongside 
Whitman’s highlights aspects of the pseudoscience easy to ignore today, but that made it 
appeal to people of its time. Distracted by its weird cranial cartography, the Barnumesque 
showmanship of its adherents, and its boldly unsubstantiated claims of certitude, we 
forget that phrenology functioned as a philosophy, a guide to living, and as a vehicle for 
expressing and understanding the nineteenth-century self. Its rich psychological lexicon 
and the flexibility of its concepts allowed it to function in just these ways. Constructing a 
model of the self comparable to that constructed in Leaves of Grass, the discourse of 
phrenology was able to encompass the diversity of psychological demands placed on 
nineteenth-century American minds.  
 Moreover, phrenologists themselves recognized phrenology as a linguistic project. 
While phrenology has been duly criticized for failing to progress with respect to 
collecting data, experimentation, and its physiological theory, it did in fact change over 
Borst&133&
time. As discussed in Chapter I, phrenologists from Gall onwards were engaged in 
refining the names of the faculties, both better to reflect the function of the faculties (as 
they understood them) and better to support a progressive and harmonious view of nature. 
As the American Phrenological Journal demonstrates, phrenology had many implications 
for language: it offered a reformed vocabulary of the self that embraced feeling and 
instinct, a theory of language that similarly emphasized feeling, and a new way of 
interpreting literary texts based on its new vocabulary and theory of language. This 
reformed vocabulary impacts not only close contemporaries of the Fowlers, like Whitman 
and Holmes, but also later founder of American psychology and pragmatism, William 
James. 
 In 1853 and 1854, a series of articles addressing language from the perspective of 
phrenology appeared in the American Phrenological Journal. “Phrenology Exemplified 
in Language” and “Phrenology Exemplified in Literature” (the latter in two parts) set 
forth theories of language and interpretation based on the premise that language is 
“constructed after mind, as its model.” Just as the Washington Monument is an 
expression of mental organs associated with “Veneration, Love and Patriotism,” so too 
“an author’s book is a portrait of his own faculties.” The same principle applies to 
individual words, “no,” for instance, and a host of other negatives, being constructions 
and subsequent expressions of the faculty of COMBATIVENESS. The first of the three 
articles goes so far as to posit that all of language could be reorganized around the 
phrenological roots of each word. “[. . .] We have our conscience words, firmness words, 
hope words, religion words, and so on,” he explains, “Hence we may at some time have a 
new grammar of our language, on a phrenological basis” (“Phren. Exem.” 73). 
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 In the second and third articles, the author, “L.R.,” extends the premise that 
language derives from mind to the interpretation of texts. Using a wide number of classic 
literary sources including William Shakespeare and Alexander Pope, he identifies 
passages that demonstrate the truths of phrenology, particularly the idea that the mental 
faculties express themselves not only in the shape of the skull, but also through gestures 
and the general disposition of the body. That in The Tempest Shakespeare has the 
shipwrecked visitors prick their ears at first hearing invisible Ariel’s music provides an 
example of the “natural language” of the organ of WONDER.  Sir Walter Scott’s 
description of a woman with “a soft and pensive grace, / A cast of thought upon her face, 
/ That suited well the forehead high” exemplifies an effective portrait of a “well-
developed moral and intellectual brain” (“No. I” 2). Other texts are selected because they 
perfectly capture the function of a particular faculty, or because they express general 
phrenological principles like the potential contradictoriness of the human mind due to 
opposing faculties. For the latter, he cites Edward Young’s Night-Thoughts: “How poor, 
how rich, how abject, how august, / How complicate, how wonderful is man!” (“No. II” 
25).  
 The idea that language is modeled after mind leads L.R. to apply phrenology to 
etymology. Apart from the phrenological perspective, his investigation resembles how 
Emerson and Henry David Thoreau sought to revitalize the meanings of everyday terms 
like “spirit” and “economy” by tracing their histories. According to L.R., original 
meanings and values could be restored by observing “the phrenological force of a single 
word, and the light thrown by phrenological truth upon an expression of yet unsettled 
meaning, although it is in universal use.” He chooses the word “virtue” as an example of 
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such an expression, pointing out that because of its root word, vir, “it must really signify 
MANLINESS” and bravery. But in present day America the meaning has changed, virtue 
now referring only to the “exercise of the moral sentiments.” The moral man has been 
developed to the neglect of the intellectual and physical, the “moral sentiments” being 
taught “not to harmonize, but systematically to cripple and suppress, half the faculties of 
our nature!” L.R. thus draws attention to two aspects of the phrenological self also central 
to Whitman’s poetic self: the potentially contradictory nature of the personality and the 
need to celebrate all sides of the self, including the body. He quotes Edmund Spenser to 
illustrate his point, the lines he selects paralleling Whitman’s famous “I am the poet of 
the body and I am the poet of the soul”: “For of the soul the body form doth take; / For 
soul is form, and doth the body make.” Like Whitman’s poetry, the language of 
phrenology could renew a sense of virtue as “the right exercise of every human feeling 
and ability,” particularly those feelings and abilities denied by an overly moralizing 
society (“No. I” 1-2). 
 In addition to functioning as an interpretive lens with the potential to revitalize 
our sense of meaning, phrenology also worked to polish its own terms. In a sense, this 
was the only real “progress” it ever made, its basic principles remaining fairly constant. 
As with what became the faculty of SPIRITUALITY, terms could be revised to reflect a 
faculty more accurately, to coincide with a particular ideology or cultural trend, or to 
appeal more to the public. In 1857, the American Phrenological Journal published a 
series of articles on “The Nomenclature of Phrenology” by William C. Rogers. Rogers 
sets out to improve the names of the faculties, noting that “Phrenology has suffered much 
from its imperfect nomenclature,” having in mind criticism like Holmes’s of its awkward 
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neologisms. He evaluates the terms and their variants, sometimes offering what he thinks 
are more familiar and therefore more appealing alternatives: “parental love” instead of 
“philoprogenitiveness” for instance. He is also critical of how “perversions of faculties” 
are sometimes “named as faculties themselves,” as in the case of COMBATIVENESS, for 
which he proposes a new term, “resistance” or “RESISTIVENESS” (9-10).  
 The discussion of COMBATIVENESS is one of the most interesting in the article 
series because of the debate it records between Rogers and the editors of the journal. 
Because the faculty was originally “discovered by noting the heads of those famous for 
its abuse,” it came to be called COMBATIVENESS by Spurzheim. The real function for 
Rogers has a less specific—and a less inherently negative—purpose: “resistance, 
resistance to any and every obstacle, physical, moral, or human.” The faculty’s name as it 
stands, therefore, remains “a reproach to our noble science, and has brought it into 
disrepute” for the barbarity it ascribes to human nature. In a footnote, the editors respond 
that resistance implies only a “passive, defensive state,” while the faculty is really equally 
“an active power, a propelling spirit.” Indeed, as with other aspects and faculties of 
phrenology, COMBATIVENESS appears to embody a progressive, Jacksonian, can-do 
American spirit, and in this case a militant one, “an energetic spirit that goes ahead, and 
makes the first attack on that which should be overcome.”67 While the editors grant that 
COMBATIVENESS does not capture the aggressive and defensive sides of the faculty 
perfectly, it serves better than the term resistance in capturing the more important active 
aspect of the organ (10).  
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67 Reynolds has described the phrase “Go ahead!” as the Jacksonian era’s “favorite slang 
expression” (Waking Giant 3). 
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 Rogers responds to the editors in the next article, asserting that “resistance” is 
indeed an active power, because the powers it resists are “themselves perpetually present 
and are perpetually active.” Rogers appears to have in mind a more abstract sense of the 
term, as in John Locke’s ‘primary qualities’ (the extension and resistance of all objects, 
etc.). He admits that the faculty can result in an aggressive character, “but not of 
necessity combative.” Therefore, a word covering both ideas would provide the best 
name, “but as the language is too poor to supply the word, we must satisfy ourselves with 
a name approximately applicable.” The editors respond by taking issue with Rogers’ 
notion that the faculty normally manifests in behavior that is non-combative. They admit 
“that the name Combativeness sometimes grates harshly on “ears polite,”” but then 
proceed to catalogue the many ways the faculty is expressed combatively in everyday 
life, “in fierce debate, in spirited opposition by words, in fault-finding and scolding, over-
earnestness in hurrying workmen, or in excessive energy in business” (55). 
 The editors’ response demonstrates how phrenology’s language project involved 
the construction of a new natural, American self, very much resembling Whitman’s 
poetic project to do the same. Their list of daily displays of COMBATIVENESS read like 
Whitman’s catalogues of the varied bustle of American life, especially insofar as the 
mundane instances the poet so often selects aim to make manifest some deeper power of 
human personality. The editors’ response also illustrates how both phrenology and 
Whitman sought to reclaim through language the rude and fleshy aspects of human nature 
too offensive for “polite ears.” Beginning with Gall and Spurzheim, phrenologists 
wrestled with the teleological implications of certain faculties, Spurzheim, for instance, 
moving away from Gall’s bleak vision of human beings possessed of a faculty of murder. 
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Instead, he sought for more neutral terms like DESTRUCTIVENESS. While compared to 
Rogers the editors offer a view of human nature that might offend genteel sensibilities, it 
was not one that was inherently bad, like Galls’. Instead, COMBATIVENESS for them 
validates the wild and transgressive side of the human being, just as Whitman’s “barbaric 
yawp” did (87).  
 The connection between phrenology and language is most fully suggested at the 
beginning of the editors’ response to Rogers: 
It is rather amusing that we should find ourselves in an attitude of antagonism 
with our correspondent regarding the organ of Combativeness; but he knows 
perfectly well that our disagreement is a good-humored one, and that we are as 
anxious to perfect the nomenclature of Phrenology as himself. (55) 
 
The passage reiterates the idea that certain words or discussions relating to the faculties 
actually stimulate those faculties, while also demonstrating something of phrenology’s 
function as a self-help tool: instead of repressing potentially harmful involuntary 
impulses, phrenology sought to acknowledge and thereby understand and regulate them. 
As such debates over COMBATIVENESS indicate, part of the Fowlers’—and 
phrenology’s—work was to delineate and name these impulses in as morally neutral a 
manner as possible. In this light, Whitman’s urging the term ADHESIVENESS on his culture 
reflected not only his own interests, but also phrenology’s conscious aim to expand the 
lexicon of human personality in potentially controversial ways.  
Phrenology’s lexicon appealed to more luminaries than Walt Whitman and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr. during the second half of the nineteenth century. It also directly 
impacted a landmark text of modern psychology and American philosophy during that 
time: William James’s The Principles of Psychology. While James has little explicitly to 
praise about phrenology, the little he does is surprising. In Principles he grants that the 
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more capable popular phrenologists frequently read character correctly through bodily 
features. “A hooked nose and a firm jaw are usually signs of practical energy,” he writes, 
“soft, delicate hands are signs of refined sensibility.” But apart from this, James mostly 
dismisses phrenology, citing its lack of evidence, the lack of any real improvement made 
to it by its followers since Gall, and the fact that even if a firm jaw indicated energy, an 
organ of energy need not be lodged in the actual jaw. Two other points of his criticism 
invite closer attention. Citing Friedrich Albert Lange, James explains that phrenology 
does not actually surpass previous metaphysical notions of the soul: it simply replaces 
one soul with many, each faculty acting as a mysterious agent without any explanation of 
its interior operations. Along similar lines, James notes that rather than explain why or 
how instincts like hunger or being protective of children actually work, “Phrenology 
hardly does more than restate the problem,” renaming the one phenomenon 
ALIMENTIVENESS and the other PHILOPROGENITIVENESS (1: 28-29). 
But renaming is not always an ineffectual philosophical procedure, especially for 
James. He is criticizing two features of Fowlerian phrenology we have identified before: 
the merging of materialist accounts of the brain with metaphysical conceptions; and the 
solving of philosophical problems through language, through naming or renaming. While 
both qualities might undermine phrenology’s scientific pretensions, they also enable what 
phrenology performs in terms of cultural work. Furthermore, the project of naming 
faculties resonates with James’s own effort to establish psychology on a firm footing 
through careful description of experimental and introspective investigations. In Principles 
he identifies language as having been a principal source of error in past attempts to 
analyze the human mind. The lack of a “special vocabulary for subjective facts” inhibits 
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English from defining any but the broadest, simplest, and most extreme categories of 
emotion and mental phenomena: anger, joy, remembering, dreaming, etc. (1: 195). He 
argues that part of the reason for this is our tendency to derive our words from objects 
outside of ourselves, which fosters two misconceptions: that what lacks a name does not 
exist in the first place and that the thoughts so often named after their objects must 
operate exactly like them as independent, permanent, atomistic entities.  
One of James’s most significant claims, his theory of consciousness as a flowing 
stream, in which even the most clearly remembered memories alter with each act of 
recollection, depends upon the overthrow of both these biases. In deciding on the best 
“general term by which to designate all states of consciousness merely as such,” he 
reexamines the most obvious choice, “thought,” unhappy with its tendency to exclude 
such mental phenomena as sensation and emotion: phenomena as much a part of the 
stream of consciousness as memory, reason, or cognition. It is a problem in many ways 
parallel to that of Rogers and the editors of the American Phrenological Journal in their 
debate over COMBATIVENESS, though James’s solution is very different from that offered 
by either of them. Lacking a word that generalizes or falls between the terms thought and 
feeling, he opts to use both alternately “and in a wider sense than usual,” probably 
discomfiting at least some of his readers. He appears to take some satisfaction in the 
possibility, perhaps too nonchalantly adding that the strategy he has settled on “will do no 
harm, and may even do some good” (1: 185-187). 
Unlike the phrenologists, whom James criticized for simply renaming rather than 
explaining the mental phenomena they claimed to be investigating, James does not coin 
new phrases to identify the elements of consciousness he is newly recognizing. His 
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reliance, instead, on familiar vocabulary used in a slightly unfamiliar way may have 
something to do with his understated hope of “doing some good” through his choice of 
terms. An Emersonian, James respects words as natural facts having evolved into proven 
vehicles of meaning possessing force, weight, and aesthetic appeal, even as they may 
rigidify into prejudices that prevent us from reconsidering their original objects of 
reference. Furthermore, words as commonplace and essential to our understanding of 
ourselves as “thought” and “feeling” represent our habitual mode of recognizing the 
contents of our consciousness. Using a new, awkward, or ugly phrase to name our basic 
experience of consciousness would not only neglect the power of established vocabulary, 
but also leave these habitual forms of conceiving mental phenomenon intact. In a more 
than usual sense of the expression, new terms would not really change anyone’s mind 
about the nature of what constantly passes through our heads. Blurring the distinction 
between the old terms “thought” and “feeling,” however, held the potential to reshape 
some of our most habitual conceptions.  
 Given this particular care with terminology, James’s actual use of phrenological 
terms in key sections of Principles is striking. While surveying human instincts in the 
chapter entitled “Instinct” (first published as a magazine article in 1887), James names 
two instincts after the phrenological faculties of SECRETIVENESS and CONSTRUCTIVENESS 
(2: 432, 426). He does not acknowledge his source for these terms in the body of his text, 
but in a footnote writes that phrenology’s “list of ‘sentiments’ [. . .] in the main agree 
with our own list of instincts” (2: 440). Indeed, many of the impulses he describes have 
either an exact counterpart or a clear analogue to phrenological organs, including the 
instincts he labels imitation, pugnacity, sympathy, acquisitiveness, and parental love. 
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Given phrenology’s emphasis on impulses and feelings, its appearance in James’s chapter 
on instinct makes sense, and again suggests the seriousness with which it was taken even 
late in the century as a taxonomy of personality.  
 There are broader thematic parallels between James’s theory of instinct and the 
doctrines of phrenology as well. James argues that instinct underlies all action, even the 
most conscious, and that deliberation and hesitation appear in a human not “because he 
has no instincts—rather because he has so many they block each other’s path” (2: 393). 
The picture is further complicated by the effect of memory and reflection, which operate 
not apart from or against instinct, but by triggering instincts counter to those triggered by 
more immediate stimuli. While phrenologists maintained much of the traditional 
antagonism between reason and impulse, they like James see a spectrum of feelings and 
impulses responsible for human action. Their system of multiple ‘sentiments’ and 
‘propensities’ likewise operate sometimes with and sometimes against each other. 
Finally, any genteel sensibilities offended by COMBATIVENESS would be much more so by 
James’s post-Darwinian view, which ascribed to human nature more than one variant of 
COMBATIVENESS: pugnacity, anger, resentment, the “hunting instinct,” the “fighting 
instinct.” “It is just because human bloodthirstiness is such a primitive part of us,” writes 
James, “that it is so hard to eradicate” (2: 408-412).  
 The primitiveness of this instinct points to James’s Darwinism and to essential 
differences between his view of instincts and phrenology’s view of propensities. James’s 
instincts result from Darwinian evolution, in some cases persisting as troublesome 
vestigial impulses in times that no longer require them. Instincts are not absolute or 
universal and he admits his classifications may at times be arbitrary divisions, with 
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instincts like “imitation” ‘shading’ into “emulation” (2: 408-409). “It is likely,” he writes, 
“that there will always be controversy about just what to include under the class-name” of 
a particular instinct (2: 440). Part of the reason for this is the mechanism of instinct as 
described by James: instincts are usually “implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits” 
(2: 402). The initial instinct may be temporary, as well as the habit it forms (sucking, for 
instance). Or the habit can persist after the instigating instinct has disappeared (again, 
sucking is one example, with the habit disappearing when interrupted after the initial 
phase of the instinct has passed; or the habit can be prolonged after the “usual term” if the 
child continues nursing) (2: 398-399). Here James takes his own previous criticism of 
phrenology’s lack of explanation to heart, fully developing a theory about the mechanism 
behind the operations of instincts and habits. The theory also explains the difficulty of 
delineating individual instincts, which are always interacting with other instincts, shading 
into habits on the one hand and reflexes on the other, changing over time, and being 
modified by experience. 
 The advocate of phrenology shared James’s wish for a new vocabulary, one that 
included terms encompassing qualities traditionally held to be opposites: aggression and 
resistance, thought and feeling. To a point, phrenologists also viewed their vocabulary as 
provisional. James’s turn to phrenology in discussing instinct is fitting, considering 
phrenology’s elaborate terminology as well as the large role it assigned to sentiments and 
propensities in determining character. But even as they exhibit awareness of how 
language shaped ideas about the mind, phrenologists would simultaneously exhibit 
breathtaking naïveté, ignoring the prejudices and distortions pervading their own 
discourse. In an 1846 issue of the American Phrenological Journal, an anonymous 
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contributor calls language a “lumbering, tedious method of exchanging thoughts and 
feelings” that “can be too easily perverted,” especially when compared to facial 
expression, gesture, tone, and appearance (Signs 14). Such a stance might suggest some 
self-critique and care, but the grounds the author claims for favoring the “natural 
language” of the body over verbal language are laden with cultural, teleological, and 
religious assumptions:  
Desire to know human character is among the strongest aspirations of our nature. 
[. . .] To impart so all-powerful a desire to study character in this soul of man, and 
then refuse to impart the capability of gratifying it, would not comport with that 
established rule of Nature which provides amply for feeding all the desires she 
creates. (16) 
 
He goes on to argue that we eventually will have perfect knowledge of individuals 
through phrenology and physiognomy as they develop, making up for the inherent 
unreliability of language and the current imperfect state of these sciences. This is 
because: 
[. . .] In giving us a part, he [God] gives the whole. For the same reason that it is 
desirable for us to know a part of the characters of our fellow men, it is therefore 
desirable for us to know all. And it is as easy for the Deity to reveal all, as a part. 
Indeed, he would not begin without finishing. (17) 
 
The logical problems here are too many to list, but the majority of them come down to 
the writer speciously arguing from a position of facile common sense that equates nature 
as he wants it to be—as he thinks would make the most sense—with nature as it is. To 
some extent, this is typical of nineteenth-century theories of intelligent design. Other 
aspects of the article echo Romantic notions of organicism, of seeing the part in the 
whole, also pervasive in phrenology texts. The dubious achievement of this article is to 
cast both lines of thought in the most presumptive of terms while no less ardently 
believing them. 
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 The phrenologist of “Phrenology Exemplified in Language,” following his 
premise that language is “constructed after mind,” argues that many colloquial 
expressions used to describe qualities of personality are actually based on literal 
descriptions of the physical brain: 
In describing mentality, we apply the epithet “short-sighted” to persons in whom 
the anterior lobes of the brain are short, or slightly developed. In such persons the 
endowments of causality, comparison and foresight are present in so low a degree 
that they have almost no power of judging of the consequences of their acts, or 
predicting of the future. “Shallow” implies a more general deficiency of all the 
intellectual organs. The entire forehead will be found shallow, that is, having no 
great depth or extent in an antero-posterior direction; and the individual will be as 
his head is, superficial and “flat.” (74) 
 
The drive for transparency, for representation rather than figure, has been extended 
beyond the skull, beyond the “natural language” of the body to language itself, with the 
phrenologist collapsing metaphors into literal descriptions. No doubt Hegel might have 
come to the same conclusion about this passage as he did about the ossified reason of the 
skull-obsessed phrenologists, that what is being demonstrated here is not the real 
meaning of the word “shallow,” but the shallowness of the writer’s thinking about 
meaning and the mind. What is being demonstrated is the desire for the transparency of 
the shallowest of waters, a radically oversimplified sense of the connections between 
mind and body, word and meaning. 
 Looking beyond the bumps—beyond the public examinations and reform era 
enthusiasm—to the serious questions phrenology prompted regarding materialism, mind, 
and language clarifies the nuances of Whitman’s belief in this theory of the brain. While 
embracing its doctrines, he recognized them as constructed, provisional, and to be valued 
chiefly for their expressive power. It was this awareness of phrenology as a language—an 
awareness he shared with Hegel, Coleridge, Holmes, James, and to some extent 
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phrenologists themselves—that allowed Whitman to retain faith in the soul and 
individual action while accepting phrenology’s materialism and its implications of 
biological determinism. Though phrenology’s lexicon appealed to Whitman precisely for 
its richness and breadth, the self remained for him ultimately irreducible to any terms 
other than its own, a theme suggested by the poem “Faces,” but even more forcefully 
























Phrenology Revised:  




In March of 1846, Whitman appears to have undergone nothing short of a 
conversion to Fowlerian phrenology, so rapidly did his mind change about the science 
and its American prophet.68 As he assumed editorship of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, the 
newspaper was covering a series of lectures by Orson Fowler, which it initially described 
as “the greatest conglomeration of pretension and absurdity it has ever been our lot to 
listen to.” Throughout the piece in which this remark appears, the reviewer (quite 
possibly Whitman himself)69 treats Fowler with equal parts astonishment and mockery, 
but in so doing belies a fascination with the grandeur of the lecturer’s claims, as when he 
notes in shock that Fowler “actually professed to be able to distinguish the religious faith 
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68 I disagree with Thomas Brasher’s reading of these early reviews as wholly ironic in tone. 
69 Both Brasher and Hungerford suggest Whitman likely authored a number of the phrenology-
related book and lecture reviews appearing in the Eagle during his tenure. 
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of persons by an examination of their heads.”70 The writer also qualifies his criticism of 
phrenology in general by restricting it to Fowler’s brand specifically, explaining at the 
article’s close that he did “not mean to assert that there is no truth whatever in 
phrenology,” despite his harsh words for Fowler himself (“Chance” 2). 
Even though the reviewer had professed to find the lectures utterly absurd, 
someone from the Eagle under Whitman’s editorial supervision was drawn back to hear 
more almost immediately, reviewing another installment of Fowler’s lecture series only 
four days later. Although at times residually ironic, the tone towards the subject in this 
piece is dramatically changed. Fowler had drawn a great crowd and much applause, 
leading the reviewer to reflect hopefully that now “there is a fair prospect of the people at 
last waking up to a proper degree of interest in the great subject at hand.” Most of the 
review is spent explaining how the brain organs, rather than inescapably determined by 
nature, can be enlarged and improved through exercise: “Like a blacksmith’s arm,” the 
Eagle reports Fowler as saying, “to almost any desirable extent” (“City” 2). This idea of 
the brain’s plasticity receives particular emphasis in the phrenology of the Fowlers as 
compared to that of Gall and Combe, if not Spurzheim, and would have appealed to 
Whitman as poet of the self-fashioning individual. But had they noticed, even the 
Fowlers would have balked at how far Whitman took this logic of self-improvement: 
when he later published the results of his own phrenological examination by Lorenzo 
Fowler, Whitman took it upon himself to revise a few of the phrenologist’s findings. 
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70 Orson Fowler repeatedly made the point that because different religions emphasized different 
values and attitudes, they attracted or shaped corresponding personality types in their followers 
(Religion: Natural and Revealed). 
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Lorenzo examined Whitman’s head on July 16, 1849. Whitman preserved the 
results of this examination among his personal papers, where they remain today in the 
Trent Collection at Duke University. These results include a “Phrenological Description” 
of several pages as well as his phrenological “chart.” This chart consists of a thorough list 
of Whitman’s faculties and the scores Lorenzo gave them on a scale of one to seven. Six 
years after this examination Whitman published his chart for the first time, but with 
several differences, the most revealing being the changes he made to the scores of six of 
his faculties and the addition of a brief paragraph sketch of his character instead of the 
full “Description.” Beginning with Hungerford, scholars have agreed that Whitman’s 
large head, phrenologically speaking, was one of which he was very proud (a “rugged 
phrenology” he called it), and which confirmed him in his vocation as a poet (“Walt 
Whitman”). But of the discrepancies between the handwritten and published charts, 
opinion has diverged, some scholars neglecting to identify any discrepancies at all, others 
speculating that the two sets of numbers reflect two or more separate examinations. I will 
argue that Whitman revised his 1846 chart for publication and closely examine the 
changes he made. The phrenological definitions of the faculties he improved warrant 
further scrutiny than has been given them, while the two faculties he actually diminished 
have yet to be considered at all.71 
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71&Like Hungerford, Stern argues that the impressive results of Whitman’s phrenological reading 
“fortified” him as a writer (105). Addressing the discrepancies between the handwritten and 
published charts, Wrobel argues Whitman must have undergone at least two or three 
examinations and then selected the most flattering results to publish (“A Poet’s”). Aspiz focuses 
on how the poet reshapes his chart not in publishing it, but in the verbal self-portraits he sketches 
of himself in the 1855 Preface, portraits which draw from his chart while placing greater 
emphasis on faculties that phrenologists tended to associate with poetry, such as IDEALITY, 
EVENTUALITY, and CAUSALITY (Walt Whitman). Mackey may have Aspiz’s analysis in mind 
when he asserts Whitman “changed” some of his phrenological scores, but no substantiating 
explanation is provided of which scores he believes were actually changed. 
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A closer look at Whitman’s chart and the faculties he evokes throughout his 
poetry not only sheds light on Whitman’s conception of himself as a poet, but also 
reveals some of the subtleties of phrenology as a philosophy and as a Romantic or 
aesthetic science. To attend only to the absurdity of phrenology’s claims to have located 
the precise brain regions governing business acumen, parenting, or horseback riding is 
not only anachronistic (given the seriousness with which the science was taken by many 
in its early years), but also neglects the philosophical appeal of phrenological texts for 
readers confronting the metaphysical binds of the age: the oppositions arising between 
science and religion, reason and feeling, object and subject. Phrenological texts, like 
Whitman’s poetry, balanced and sustained these contrary yet psychologically necessary 
ideas. Both sets of texts acknowledged and explained an increasingly fragmented 
subjectivity, while providing models for its reunification. But despite these deep, 
conceptual affinities, Whitman did not simply accept phrenology—as most scholars have 
maintained—anymore or any differently than he accepted any other creed, and the 
complexities of his relationship to this pseudoscience reveal the complexities of his 
relationship to knowledge in general. However, before opening up these issues through a 
discussion of Whitman’s chart, the nature of the chart itself requires clarification, 
especially its publication history, which has been distorted by years of misrepresentation. 
The chart’s tangled textual history involves the four texts most directly related to 
Whitman’s phrenological examination: the relatively lengthy, handwritten description of 
Whitman’s personality traits by Lorenzo Fowler, which I refer to by its manuscript title, 
the “Phrenological Description”; the handwritten chart likewise kept among Whitman’s 
personal papers, which I refer to as the “handwritten chart”; the short, published blurb 
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describing Whitman’s character that precedes the published chart, which I term the 
“published description”; and, finally, the “published chart” of his faculties and their 
scores. Because the published description and the published chart were always published 
together during Whitman’s lifetime, they can be considered two parts of a single text. 
Such is not necessarily the case with the “Phrenological Description” and the handwritten 
chart, which appear on completely separate sheets of paper and in different handwriting, 
but which likely resulted from the same examination by Lorenzo Fowler. 
For ease of reference, all three texts are included below. First, the “Phrenological 
Description” as I have transcribed it from a photo of the original kept among Whitman’s 
personal papers: 
Phrenological Description of W. (Age 29 Occupation Printer) Whitman by L.N. 
Fowler N. York July 16—1849. 
 
You were blessed by nature with a good constitution and power to live to a good 
old age. You were undoubtedly descended from a long-lived family. You were 
not like many prematurely developed—did not get ripe like a hot house plant but 
you can last long and grow better as you grow older if you are careful to obey the 
laws of health of life and of mental and physical development. You have a large 
sized brain giving you much mentality as a whole. You are well calculated to 
enjoy social life. Few men have all the social feelings as strong as you have. Your 
love and regard for woman as such are strong and you are for elevating and 
ameliorating the female character. You were inclined to marry at an early age. 
You could not well bear to be deprived of you[r] domestic privileges and 
enjoyment. You are very fond of children or pets and would much desire to have 
your own intelligent and respected. You are also very fond of home and think 
much of having one of your own and of making it comfortable and attractive. You 
would like to travel and yet to go and leave family and friends would be a task. 
You are one of the most friendly men in the world and your happiness is greatly 
depending on your social relations. You are familiar and open in your intercourse 
with others but you do not by so doing lose your dignity. You would be or are a 
kind husband—an affectionate father and a sincere friend and a feeling obliging 
neighbor. You can easily pass from one thing to another and you prefer short 
comprehensive speeches to long yarns about nothing. You have much energy 
when you are aroused but you are not easily moved at trifles. You would if 
obliged to, [sic] fight bravely for friends, woman, moral character, children and 
honor. You choose to fight with tongue and pen rather than with your fist. You 
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are not quarrelsome but you mind your own business and like to see others do the 
same. You are cautious and look well to the future, to consequences and 
obstructions and are generally pretty sure you are right before you “go ahead.” 
Your courage is probably more moral than physical. Your appetite is most too 
strong naturally and your food relishes well. You are pretty well calculated to 
resist disease and to soon recover if you are attacked by it. You are no hypocrite 
but are plain spoken and are what you appear to be at all times. You are in fact 
most too open at times and have not alway[s] enough restraint in speech. You are 
more careful about what you do than you are about what you say—You are 
independent, not wishing to be a slave yourself or to enslave others. You have 
your own opinions and think for yourself. You wish to work on your own hook 
and are inclined to take the lead. You are very firm in general and not easily 
driven from your position. Your sense of justice, of right and wrong is strong and 
you can see much that is unjust and inhuman in the present condition of society. 
You are but little inclined to the spiritual or devotional and have but little regard 
for creeds or ceremonies. You are not any too sanguine and generally realize as 
much as you hope for—You are very sympathetic and easily moved by suffering 
and take much interest in those movements that are of a reformatory and 
philanthropic character. You are not any too fond of property but value it as a 
means—are not a penny-man and despise narrow-minded penuriousness—You 
have taste and considerable imagination but it does not blind you to fact or reality. 
You can adapt yourself to time[,] place and company but you do not try to act out 
another’s character but are yourself at all times. You have both reason and 
perception and hence can reason well. You have a strong desire to see everything 
and your knowledge is practical and available. You have a good mechanical eye 
and can judge well of and reccollect [sic] forms and proportions well. You have a 
good sense of order either mentally or physically. By practice might make a good 
accountant. You can locate well and have a taste for geography. You are a great 
reader and have a good memory of facts and events much better than their time. 
You can compare, illustrate, discriminate, and criticize with much ability. You 
can be sarcastic if you choose. You are a good physiognomist. You have a good 
command of language especially if excited. (L. Fowler, “Phrenological 
Description”) 
 
Next, Lorenzo’s chart evaluating Whitman’s faculties on a scale of one to seven, 
as again transcribed from a photo of a manuscript copy in Whitman’s papers: 
Size of brain—6 
Strength of System—6 
Degree of Activity—5 























Benevolence—6 to 7 
Constructiveness—5 
Ideality—5 to 6 
Sublimity—5 to 6 
Imitation—5 
Mirthfulness—5 
Intellectual faculties—5 to 6 
















Intuition of human nature—6 (L. Fowler, “Phrenological Chart”) 
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Lastly, Whitman’s published description and published chart as they appear 
together in “Leaves-Droppings,” a collection of reviews included in the 1856 edition of 
Leaves of Grass:  
Phrenological Notes on W. Whitman, by L. N. Fowler, July, 1849.—Size 
of head large, 23 inches. Leading traits appear to be Friendship, Sympathy, 
Sublimity, and Self-Esteem, and markedly among his combinations the dangerous 
faults of Indolence, a tendency to the pleasures of Voluptuousness and 
Alimentiveness, and a certain reckless swing of animal will. 
 Amativeness large, 6; Philoprogenitiveness, 6, Adhesiveness, 6; 
Inhabitiveness, 6; Concentrativeness, 4; Combativeness, 6; Destructiveness, 5 to 
6; Alimentiveness, 6; Acquisitiveness, 4; Secretiveness, 3; Cautiousness, 6; 
Approbativeness, 4; Self-Esteem, 6 to 7; Firmness, 6 to 7; Conscientiousness, 6; 
Hope, 4; Marvellousness, 3; Veneration, 4; Benevolence, 6 to 7; 
Constructiveness, 5; Ideality, 5 to 6; Sublimity, 6 to 7; Imitation, 5; Mirthfulness, 
5; Individuality, 6; Form, 6; Size, 6; Weight, 6; Color, 3; Order, 5; Calculation, 5; 
Locality, 6; Eventuality, 6; Time, 3; Tune, 4; Language, 5; Causality, 5 to 6; 
Comparison, 6; Suavitiveness, 4; Intuitiveness, or Human Nature, 6. (362) 
 
Whitman published the above chart three times during his lifetime, always as a footnote 
to “Leaves of Grass. A Volume of Poems, Just Published,” one of the three self-reviews 
he anonymously authored to promote the first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1855. In 
addition to appearing in the 1856 Leaves, the chart appears in some copies of the 1855 
Leaves that include a similar collection of reviews as “Leaves-Droppings,” as well as in 
Leaves of Grass Imprints, a volume consisting solely of reviews that was distributed 
“gratuitously” to promote the 1860 Leaves (cover). The revisions made to the self-
reviews in these promotional collections suggest Whitman’s continued involvement in 
the selection and shaping of their content. Clearly, he not only appreciated his chart and 
phrenology, but also felt that it would excite the interest and admiration of a wide 
readership, considering his grand ambition to be America’s poet. In addition, his chart 
was published a fourth time only a year after his death in In Re Walt Whitman, a 
miscellany of critical and biographical essays about Whitman (some by him) that the poet 
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guided to publication.72 Whitman, therefore, made phrenology as much a part of his 
legacy to the world as his introduction to it. 
 Scholars from Hungerford and Stern onward have maintained that Whitman 
published his chart four or five times (depending on whether they include the technically 
posthumous In Re Walt Whitman) and that it first appeared on September 29, 1855 in the 
Brooklyn Daily Times. The self-review, “Leaves of Grass. A Volume of Poems, Just 
Published,” did indeed appear in this issue of the Times, under its original title, “Walt 
Whitman, A Brooklyn Boy.” The chart, however, does not; it was only added as a 
footnote to the self-review after its reprinting in some copies of the 1855 Leaves. Also, 
according to Stern, it appears in three editions of Leaves: the 1855, 1856, and the 1860, 
which, as has been seen, is inaccurate (Stern 107).73 Hungerford, the first literary critic to 
discuss the influence of phrenology on Whitman, makes no mention at all of the 
“Phrenological Description” or the handwritten chart, and was probably unaware of their 
existence. Though he maintained that the published description and chart appeared in the 
Brooklyn Daily Times, he may not have been the original source of this misconception: in 
his multiple reprintings of the self-review, Whitman himself misleadingly noted “From 
the Brooklyn Daily Times,” without indicating that the chart was added only to reprints 
in gatherings of reviews. Perhaps the strangest misrepresentation of the chart’s history is 
Stern’s assertion that the “Phrenological Description,” the published description, and the 
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72 The editors of In Re Walt Whitman note, “Whitman has remarked to us that in a period of 
misunderstanding and abuse their [the self-review’s] publication seemed imperative. He 
consented before his death that they should here appear, as they have never elsewhere appeared, 
under his own name” (Traubel 13). 
73 My thanks to Ed Folsom, who clarified many of these issues surrounding the publication of 
Whitman’s chart via email. 
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published chart were all one document. Not only does she imply as much in Heads & 
Headlines (102-105), she essentially creates a copy of this nonexistent text in her 
Phrenological Dictionary, a compendium of the phrenological examinations of famous 
nineteenth-century Americans (76-77). The three texts appear as one, one after the other, 
with a footnote claiming they all appeared as such in the Brooklyn Daily Times. 
 Much of the difficulty in keeping this record straight stems from Whitman’s 
attention to the materiality of his texts and their publication: having come of age a printer, 
Whitman, as is known, frequently controlled the appearance of his book, its typography 
as well as its size and cover. Despite explicitly instructing his literary executors that the 
so-called Deathbed edition of 1891-92 should be considered the final, finished, official 
edition of Leaves of Grass, throughout his life Whitman’s publishing and printing 
practices led to a proliferation of individual texts distinguished by their own quirks and 
revisions (Complete 148). To designate one edition as definitive, because it accords more 
to contemporary tastes or the author’s own wishes, neglects in the case of Whitman the 
richness of the material book, the body of which he was as invested in as his own. What 
Leaves of Grass is depends on the particular form of it you have in your hand. If it is a 
modern reprint, the text itself is likely to resemble the 1855 or the 1891-92 edition. If it is 
based on the 1855 edition, however, it will most likely not contain the bundle of reviews 
that include Whitman’s phrenological chart, though out of 178 recently surveyed first 
editions 46 do in fact contain them (“Census”). The 1856 edition, which fully 
incorporated the chart, is not currently in print at all, though images of the edition are 
freely available online. Burying the facts of particular editions to rare book rooms 
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obscures how Whitman’s individualism and materialism informed the very physical 
construction of his books. 
 Attending to the material supplementing the first three editions not only promotes 
a fuller sense of Whitman’s publishing aesthetics, it also uncovers texts worth examining 
in their own right, texts that in Whitman’s eyes were much more than merely 
supplementary. Whitman carefully selected the reviews included in the various bundles 
and volumes that accompanied or were included in these editions, seeing them as 
inextricably bound to his poetry and its meaning. His collections of reviews included 
negative as well as positive appraisals, in addition to pieces that made no mention of 
Whitman at all, but called for a new American poetry in typical Young America fashion. 
Especially in the 1855 and 1856 editions, Whitman added this material to begin the 
process of interweaving his own text into the texts of his culture by marking out its place: 
his work had been prophesied by Young American journalists and was reacting on 
readers with a chemical violence, generating confusion, elation, and outrage. For 
Whitman reader reaction also contributed to a poem’s meaning; much later he would 
write in November Boughs that a great work could not “attain full purport [. . .] till it has 
accrued and incorporated the many passions [. . .] it has itself arous’d” (1142). Given 
their importance to the poet, Whitman’s chart, along with “Leaves-Droppings” and 
Leaves of Grass Imprints, could therefore be better represented in anthologies of the 
poet’s work than they at present are. While reviews of his work and his self-reviews 
appear singly in collections of contemporary criticism, nowhere do they appear as the 
unified volumes Whitman created to either supplement or actually include within his 
poetry, as he did with the 1856 edition’s “Leaves-Droppings.”   
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 The self-reviews, which included his chart, were part of Whitman’s poetic project 
not simply because they were actually printed within two editions of Leaves of Grass, but 
because they were themselves poetic productions. Like the famous Preface of the 1855 
Leaves, though to a lesser degree, they blur the line between prose and poetry; like his 
poetry, they undergo careful revisions in successive editions. They contain catalogues 
and rhapsodies, and at least once smuggle in an uplifting direct address to the reader 
(“First be yourself what you would show in your poem—such seems to be this man’s 
example and inferred rebuke to the schools of poets”) (“Walt Whitman”). One reviewer 
found them so characteristically Whitmanesque that he correctly identified the author in 
1856. Unabashed, Whitman included that very piece in Leaves of Grass Imprints along 
with the self-reviews the reviewer had exposed. Though Whitman did not in these early 
editions directly acknowledge his authorship of the self-reviews, he did make a telling 
revision to “Leaves of Grass. A Volume of Poems, Just Published.” While the 1855 
versions conclude, “there you have Walt Whitman, the begetter of a new offspring out of 
literature, taking with easy nonchalance the chances of its present reception, and, through 
all misunderstandings and distrusts, the chances of its future reception,” in 1856 Whitman 
added one last line: “preferring always to speak for himself rather than have others speak 
for him” (363). 
 When Whitman added his chart as a footnote to this self-review he continued to 
speak for himself, revising his source materials and producing new material to present 
best the results of his examination to the public. The “Phrenological Description” and the 
published description are both dated July 16, 1849, suggesting that their substantial 
differences are the results of revision rather than of two separate examinations. The 
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published description exhibits his editorial practice of kneading and rearranging 
preexisting material, as he did when he wrought sections of the poem “By Blue Ontario’s 
Shore” from passages of the 1855 Preface. More immediately, this practice can be seen in 
the self-review itself. In 1855 he writes:  
The effects he [Whitman] produces are no effects of artists or the arts, but effects 
of the original eye or arm, or the actual atmosphere or grass or brute or bird. You 
may feel the unconscious teaching of the presence of some fine animal, but will 
never feel the teaching of the fine writer or speaker. (“Walt,” Leaves; emphasis 
added) 
 
In 1856 this becomes: 
The effects he produces in his poems are no effects of artists or the arts, but 
effects of the original eye or arm, or the actual atmosphere or tree or bird. You 
may feel the unconscious teaching of a fine brute, but will never feel the teaching 
of a fine writer or speaker. (“Leaves” 361; emphasis added) 
 
The revision favors concision and the concrete, losing the abstract “animal” and 
transposing the preexisting—and much more visceral—“brute” to its former place. 
Dropping the prepositional phrase “of the presence,” which had the self-defeating effect 
of actually deferring the brute’s presence in the sentence, not only makes for punchier 
prose but also allows the passage to embody more fully its theme of immediacy in both 
experience and expression. The passage roots poetic utterance in the body and in nature, a 
pairing that suggests the two are one in the same, the poet breathing in the “atmosphere” 
of his experience to exhale “original” poetic effects, rather than mediating such 
expressions through the ready-made traditions of “artists or the arts.” As it does with the 
categories of self and nature, the passage also conflates the categories of action and 
perception, equating the “original eye or arm” in an equivocating phrase. Furthermore, 
the passage’s revisions reveal an aspiration to conflate the categories of presence and 
description by realizing as much as possible the idea of immediacy in the very style of 
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expression. Whitman’s revisions often tend in this direction of presence, of embodying 
rather than merely describing a subject in writing. They do so in the 1855 Preface, where 
Whitman indicates the phrenological structure of his poems—a structure that is then 
internalized to underlie the poet himself when the lines appear again in “Song of the 
Answerer.” And they also do so in his phrenological chart. The revisions he makes in the 
published description and the published chart enact the qualities he attributes to himself, 
collapsing the distinction between action and perception, “original eye or arm.”  
A recycling and reforming of language similar to Whitman’s transposition of the 
word “brute” occurs in the published description, of which there are actually two 
versions, the first published in the 1855 Leaves and the other in the 1856 Leaves (as well 
as in subsequent reprints of the chart). The former begins with three sentences Whitman 
later excises or changes: “This man has a grand physical constitution, and power to live 
to a good old age. He is undoubtedly descended from the soundest stock.” The opening 
lines of the “Phrenological Description” likewise address his constitution, longevity, and 
hereditary background, and in language at times identical to that later used in the 
published description: “You were blessed by nature with a good constitution and power 
to live to a good old age. You were undoubtedly descended from a long-lived family” 
(emphasis added). Not only does Whitman radically rework and add to Lorenzo’s 
description of him, he also revises this reworking, dropping the two introductory 
sentences and narrowing the focus of the published description to his phrenological 
faculties. In addition, he alters its final line, ending the 1856 version with a forceful 
phrase describing Whitman’s “reckless swing of animal will” (362), while the 1855 
version had before continued on weakly, “too unmindful, probably, of the conviction of 
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others.” Similarly, the changes he makes to the scores of his chart often embody qualities 
the chart itself attributes to Whitman—or qualities that Whitman proves himself to 






















Corroborating a Rugged Phrenology 
 
 Whitman altered the actual scores on his chart better to fit the specific self-image 
the “Walt Whitman, A Brooklyn Boy” self-review was meant to project, that of the poet 
as “one of the roughs” (Complete 50). Like the “Phrenological Description” and the 
published description, the texts of the charts are too different to be by the same person 
and too similar to be entirely different texts, or to be based on entirely different 
examinations. The handwritten chart evaluates the same forty faculties as the published 
chart and in exactly the same order. Thirty-four of these scores are identical; only six 
have been slightly modified. Given the presumably very subjective nature of examining a 
person’s head (which required demarcating the more or less invisible—and in reality 
nonexistent—boundaries between an individual’s faculties) and given the fact that over 
the years the Fowlers, like Spurzheim and Combe before them, tinkered with the names 
and categories of faculties, such a consistent pair of phrenological readings seems highly 
improbable. 
Moreover, all six changes made the chart comport more fully with a persona 
Whitman clearly wanted his phrenology and the self-review to convey, and they did so 
with a precision that is difficult to accept as anything other than calculated or in some 
respect willed. A clause (italicized below) that Whitman added to the self-review as a 
link to the appended chart reveals his motives for the latter’s inclusion. Towards the end 
of a catalogue of the qualities displayed in his face, he writes:  
[. . .] a face of undying friendship toward men and women, and of one who finds 
the same returned many fold—a face with two grey eyes where passion and 
hauteur sleep, and melancholy stands behind them—his physiology corroborating 
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a rugged phrenology*—a spirit that mixes cheerfully with the world [. . .] 
(“Walt,” Leaves; emphasis added)  
 
The asterisk directs the reader to the published description and chart at the foot of the 
page, while the phrase “rugged phrenology” alerts us to the qualities we are there 
expected to find, attributes that bolster Whitman’s persona as a working-class tumbler at 
home in himself and nature. Accordingly, his COMBATIVENESS, DESTRUCTIVENESS, and 
SELF-ESTEEM appear on his chart as 6, 5-6, and 6-7, the latter two scores denoting 
intermediate degrees of strength. Thus he possessed, respectively, what the Fowlers 
would have described as a “large” propensity to resist and defend (Illustrated 66), a “full” 
to “large” propensity to “BREAK, CRUSH, and TEAR DOWN” (Illustrated 67), and a 
“large” to “very large” “innate love of personal liberty” and “manly feeling,” as well as 
an “unbounded self-confidence” (Fowler’s Practical 45). In addition to his impressive 
SELF-ESTEEM, the published description lists as his most defining characteristics 
“Friendship” (ADHESIVENESS in the parlance of phrenology), “Sympathy” (referring to 
the phrenological faculty of BENEVOLENCE, for which he received a six to seven), and 
“Sublimity”, all of which corroborate the major themes of the self-review itself, which, 
like the chart, was primarily meant to reinforce the impression of Whitman as one of the 
roughs.  
 Whitman, in fact, appears to have based much of the content and structure of this 
self-review on these four “leading traits,” all of which underlie the four qualities the 
review focuses on ascribing to Whitman: his “egotism,” his naturalness, his distinction 
from literary aesthetes and elites, and—most important—his friendships with those of the 
working class. Whitman as a reviewer praises himself for being “ignorant or silently 
scornful [. . .] of all except his own presence and experience,” thereby enacting the 
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egotism he purports only to describe—a gesture that collapses signifier and signified into 
one performative utterance. As he continues to praise himself in the review for praising 
himself in his poetry, Whitman pays further homage to his poetic half by quietly 
paraphrasing the first line of “Song of Myself,” a line in which he famously declares the 
poem’s primary intent to praise the poet: “This poet celebrates himself,” he approvingly 
notes in the review. Consequently, the rhetorical position Whitman occupies as a 
reviewer of his own work not only generates a rich self-referentiality, but it also exhibits 
a SELF-ESTEEM as powerful as that suggested by his chart. Most important in the context 
of the self-review’s aims, this high self-regard links him temperamentally to the self-
reliant working class American.  
As do the other three traits highlighted in his published review. His large 
ADHESIVENESS makes him a ready and faithful comrade, while his large to very large 
BENEVOLENCE endows him with “an overflowing fountain of kind and tender feeling” as 
well as “a heart full of sympathy and goodness” (Fowler, Phrenology Proved [1837] 
157). In one of many passages of the self-review corroborating this personality profile, 
Whitman describes himself as “[. . .] a person singularly beloved and welcomed, 
especially by young men and mechanics—one who has firm attachments there, and 
associates there.” He continues, however, with a clause that complicates the notion of his 
outsized capacity for friendship, for he is “one who does not associate with literary and 
elegant people.” That these “elegant people” presumably lack the capacity to befriend the 
folk with whom Whitman identifies partially accounts for his own refusal to befriend 
such elites. But his large to very large SUBLIMITY offers a further explanation, and was in 
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fact so important to Whitman’s self-conception that he tampered with the score Fowler 
had recorded for him, raising it from a 5-6 to a 6-7.  
Whitman’s “Sublimity” corresponds to a major theme of the review: the poet as a 
“fine brute” in close connection to nature. As previously noted, this relationship is made 
possible by direct perception of and action in nature (“the original eye or arm”), and then 
manifests in the poet’s ability to translate the “actual atmosphere or tree or bird” into 
poetry. While Fowler’s explanation of SUBLIMITY as a faculty draws from the aesthetic 
term’s historically diverse range of applications (as a term to describe rhetoric, art, 
architecture, transcendence, psychological or emotional transport, etc.), he very much 
emphasizes its application to wild, grand, and stormy natural scenery.74 In both Fowler’s 
Practical Phrenology and the Illustrated Self-Instructor, SUBLMITY is the capacity to 
appreciate and emotionally respond to sublime objects, which for Fowler are found 
primarily in nature. Though Practical Phrenology indicates “the vast, magnificent, or 
splendid” may appear in “art” as well as “nature,” the only actual examples the text 
gives are of “roaring cataracts, towering mountains,” and other natural objects, with a 
“very large” SUBLIMITY making one a “passionate admirer of the wild and romantick” 
(48). In the Self-Instructor Fowler focuses on the same kinds of natural scenes, but also 
describes them as “manifestations of omnipotence and infinitude,” implying they have a 
religious significance; he further explains that in conjunction “with large Veneration” 
SUBMLIMITY delights in contemplating “infinite as appertaining to the Deity.”  In excess, 
SUBLIMITY can lead to “bombast, and a wrong application of extravagant words and 
ideas,” a notion that links the faculty to the Longinian tradition of the sublime as a term 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
74 Monk examines these various meanings of the sublime in his classic history of the concept as it 
developed in 18th-century English culture. 
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of rhetoric (99-100).75 Despite this propensity for perversion, and perhaps because of its 
spiritually elevating potential, Fowler felt that SUBLIMITY should be possessed to the 
highest possible degree, noting that it was “rarely ever necessary” to restrain it. In later 
editions of Phrenology Proved, Illustrated and Applied (the Fowlers had not yet posited 
the existence of the faculty in earlier editions), SUBLIMITY’s function is more fully 
explained: without it “no adequate conception of truth, Nature, or God, can be formed ” 
([1892] 126). 
As a conduit to the “wild,” then, Whitman’s powerful sense of SUBLIMITY takes 
him out of the parlor and into the market, the wharf, and the frontier as he imagines 
himself throughout his poetry living the lives of the intrepid common man. But it also 
validates what Wallace Stevens might have called his “rude aesthetic,” his wild use of 
slang and free verse to capture what he saw as the human spirit unbridled in America.76 
The Fowlers were the first phrenologists to suggest SUBLIMITY as a separate faculty, 
probably in 1840; before this the only traditional aesthetic category theorized by 
phrenology was beauty, which fell under the aegis of the faculty of IDEALITY.77 Though 
explanations of IDEALITY had at times alluded to the sublime, the emphasis was always 
on the beautiful: the harmonious and cultured rather than the infinite and dangerous, 
Fowler’s Practical Phrenology defining IDEALITY as “Imagination; taste; fancy; love of 
perfection, poetry, polite literature” (48). It would not be at all surprising, then, for 
Whitman to have given his SUBLIMITY a one point lead over his IDEALITY, making his 
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75 See Monk (10-28). 
76 From “The Comedian as the Letter C” (29). 
77 In 1840, the American Phrenological Journal printed “On the Primary Function of the Organ 
Marked ‘?’,” which, citing Combe, speculates on the existence of a faculty responsible for 
contemplating eternity and experiencing the sublime (Sampson). 
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cultivated side subservient to his grander passions. The faculty itself may have 
legitimized Whitman’s surreptitious revision of it, just as his SELF-ESTEEM may have 
inspired his self-review: as Wordsworth and other Romantics conceived it, the sublime 
was a scene of transgression and usurpation of power, in which the individual recognized 
the authority of the Imagination over nature. In his chart, Whitman was quietly defying 
the authority of the expert, the expert’s official text, and the natural state of the poet’s 
own apparent physiology.  
In addition to SUBLIMITY, Whitman altered five other faculties, three of which he 
raised: FIRMNESS, WEIGHT, and CAUSALITY, which increased from 6 to 6-7, 5 to 6, and 5 
to 5-6 respectively. Together FIRMNESS and WEIGHT clearly contributed to the ruggedness 
of his phrenology, the former giving him “Decision, stability, and fixedness of character” 
(Fowler’s Practical 45) and the latter an “Intuitive perception and application of the laws 
of GRAVITY, MOTION,” which in practical terms meant he had “an excellent faculty 
for preserving and regaining balance; riding a fractious horse; skating; carrying a steady 
hand, etc.” (Illustrated 110). The two faculties may at first seem quite unrelated, the one 
describing a character trait or emotional tendency, the other physical aptitude based on 
perceptual acuity. Fowler’s classifications of the faculties affirm just this difference: 
FIRMNESS is one of the “Selfish Propensities,” which “create those desires and instincts” 
that “provide for man’s ANIMAL WANTS” (Illustrated 63); while WEIGHT is classed 
among the “Intellectual Faculties,” which are responsible for “KNOWING, 
REMBERING, and REASONING” (Illustrated 104). However, in the case of Whitman’s 
chart, the two faculties are an inextricable pair, consistent with a Romantic habit of 
thought that found the physical and the ideational organically related—a habit that 
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constituted the very foundation of American Transcendentalism as well as phrenology.78 
A passage from “Song of Myself” in which Whitman describes himself as alive to the 
fundamental enigma of being illustrates the close connection these faculties had for him: 
Sure as the most certain sure . . . . plumb in the uprights, well entretied,  
braced in the beams, 
 Stout as a horse, affectionate, haughty, electrical, 
 I and this mystery here we stand. (28) 
 
A carpenter’s version of Keats’s negative capability, the lines suggest not only someone 
who is “capable of being in uncertainties” (43), but is vitalized by them, rendered 
“electrical.” In response to this state, Whitman grounds himself in the work of a house-
builder, and in the well-braced metaphors it gives him. Because he, like his father, had 
himself built houses for a living, his “stand” here is informed by the realities of necessity, 
personal experience, and utility, as well as by the rugged physicality of the work itself.79 
But his strength is not simply the byproduct of labor: the conceit focuses on the 
building’s frame, the strength of which lies in the firm support of braces and the 
perpendicular balance of “uprights.” Likewise, the architecture of Whitman’s mind is 
well-girded by his faculties of WEIGHT and FIRMNESS, his sure footholds in both the 
physical world and in his soul’s sense of purpose, which become signifiers of one 
another. In the language of Romantic correspondence, the more earthly WEIGHT signifies 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
78 Despite the interventions of Stanley Cavell and Richard Poirier recasting Emerson as a writer 
of serious philosophical rigor directly in line with ordinary language philosophy and American 
pragmatism respectively, the caricature of Emerson (and therefore Transcendentalism) as 
purveyor of impenetrable, airy mysticism stubbornly persists. However, over the last decade and 
a half a wealth of scholarship has demonstrated that the so-called Transcendentalist’s idea of 
nature was deeply informed by the most current knowledge of the material world. See Lee Rust 
Brown’s The Emerson Museum, “Emerson’s Moving Pictures” in Joan Richardson’s A Natural 
History of Pragmatism, Laura Dassow Walls’ Emerson’s Life in Science, and Eric Wilson’s 
Emerson’s Sublime Science on how Emerson’s wide reading in science supplied his writing with 
its essential methods and metaphors. 
79 See Loving on Whitman’s work as a house-builder (180). 
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mental FIRMNESS, just as carpentry signifies his poetry’s basis in the practical and 
necessary, serving as it here does as a bulwark before metaphysical doubt.  
But perhaps “signify” is too weak a word, as both WEIGHT and carpentry appear 
actually to ground or embody their arguably less material tenors, poetry and FIRMNESS. 
“Signify” suggests a stable binary opposition between signifier and signified and by 
implication between the material and spiritual; but the latter opposition already begins to 
break down in Fowler’s definitions of the faculties. WEIGHT is an intellectual faculty 
attuned to the most abstract and universal of physical laws, making it akin to 
transcendental conceptions of Reason. In practice, however, it primarily allows people to 
walk, climb, and throw things (Illustrated 110). FIRMNESS, on the other hand, while 
classified as something animal and instinctual, and liable to confer qualities as mindless 
as “mulishness” when perverted, in a healthy condition gives its possessor the 
perseverance and resolve needed to maintain principle and pursue higher purposes 
(Illustrated 84-85). Discussing FIRMNESS in Self-Culture, and Perfection of Character, 
Fowler rhapsodizes how “Immutability is written upon every law of nature. God is 
unchangeable”—a very elevated sentiment for a faculty classed elsewhere as a Selfish 
Propensity (229). So while higher FIRMNESS and WEIGHT gave Whitman’s phrenology the 
self-reliance and dexterity of a hunter or craftsman, they also blurred the distinction 
between spirit and matter, levels of being he sought to bring together throughout his 
poetry.  
 CAUSALITY was the other faculty to be raised in Whitman’s published chart. Like 
FIRMNESS, it was increased by only a half step; like WEIGHT, it was originally only “full” 
(or a 5) on the handwritten chart. It was, however, a very significant faculty, and Fowler 
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assigned it a major role in reasoning, planning, and philosophizing. In Fowler on Memory 
he defined it as:  
The power of perceiving and employing principles of causation: ability to 
discover and apply first principles [. . .]: desire to know the why and wherefore of 
things: ability to reason, or draw conclusions from given premises [. . .] (42) 
 
Like other aspects of phrenology, CAUSALITY brings together in one faculty psychological 
categories long sundered as separate faculties: perception, reason, and animal instinct. As 
a cognitive ability, CAUSALITY both perceived and reasoned from “first principles”; as an 
instinct, it was the drive to discover “first principles” and their logical implications. The 
faculty had broad applications, serving as a “keystone of common-sense” as well as 
aiding in the comprehension of natural philosophy and ethics (Phrenology Proved [1837] 
231-233). If Whitman’s large BENEVOLENCE and COMPARISON are any indication, his 
conception of the “rough” did not exclude such powerful intellectual and moral 
endowments, but in fact demanded them, being akin to the earthly and unschooled 
philosophers of life celebrated by Emerson and Thoreau. And yet, as fundamental to 
thought as CAUSALITY appears to have been, its score was not moved up a full point, as 
had been that of SUBLIMITY and WEIGHT. This may have been because an overly powerful 
CAUSALITY was contrary to the kind of poet-laborer Whitman spoke through in Leaves of 
Grass, a figure whose intellect, while robust, favored fact and feeling over logic and 
argumentation.  
In “Song of Myself” such an intellect—democratic, universal, and in touch with 
nature—emerges in the following cryptic lines, which attempt to state what Fowler might 
have called “first principles”:  
 Urge and urge and urge, 
 Always the procreant urge of the world. 
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Out of the dimness opposite equals advance . . . . Always substance and  
increase, 
Always a knit of identity . . . . always distinction . . . . always a breed of life.  
 
To elaborate is no avail . . . . Learned and unlearned feel that it is so. (28)  
 
Given the cosmos-defining implications of the first two lines and the repetition of 
“Always,” the “opposite equals” mentioned in the third line imply an equally vast scope, 
emerging from a primordial “dimness” to divide undifferentiated Being into an 
apprehensible system of binaries. In this context, “identity” and “distinction” read as 
secondary principles governing nature and as examples of “opposite equals”—the first 
principle that encompasses them all. But what of “substance and increase” then? Should 
they, too, be read as opposites, perhaps in terms of the inertness of matter as opposed to 
the dynamism of organic growth? If so, they can be read along with distinction and 
identity as part of a series exemplifying transcendental “opposites.” But given the 
vagueness of their opposition, it is also quite possible that they constitute a departure 
from that series. The text pulses with the same alternating forces of opposition and 
synthesis it ascribes to the universe. According to one interpretation, the items in the 
catalog are knit together as instances of the same first principle (i.e. an organizing system 
of binaries), but according to another each is distinguished from the concept of opposites 
as a first principle in and of itself—which ultimately serves to realign all five ideas 
(opposition, substance, increase, identity, and distinction) into a new relationship of 
identity as separate first principles. 
 As is often the case, Whitman’s catalog here both invites and defies easy acts of 
classification by leaving the relations between its items unstated. Dominated by nouns, 
the passage lacks the verbs needed to bring them into comprehensible patterns of subject-
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verb-object. Consequently, the connective tissue between the concepts listed in this 
passage remains to be supplied by the imagination, a faculty that in much Romantic 
thought was intuitive, flexible, and dynamic enough to apprehend the essential flux and 
spirit underlying nature. The variation and multiplication of meaning that results 
corresponds to what is really being identified as the first principle, the “procreant urge” 
underlying all nature, which requires ambiguity and vagueness for its articulation rather 
than the hard forms of logic, mathematics, or even conventional grammar. The passage 
generates interpretations; like the world, it is a living thing, “always a breed of life.” 
 To the extent that Whitman ponders the origins of being in his poetry, his 
CAUSALITY might be expected to be high. In the Preface to the 1855 Leaves of Grass he 
even states that along with several other phrenological faculties, a large “causality” is part 
“of the greatest poet from his birth” (20). Nevertheless, he would have had at least two 
strong reasons for not raising it a full point or higher as he had his SUBLIMITY and 
WEIGHT. First, a higher CAUSALITY as defined by Fowler might have actually worked 
against certain habits of thought Whitman was cultivating in his poetry, habits that 
emphasized feeling and fact and that acknowledged qualities in nature and consciousness 
resistant to explication. Thus in the “procreant urge” passage he is not so much 
discovering or identifying a first principle as contemplating and aesthetically representing 
its mystery. Such contemplations do not lead to the kind of mechanical deductive 
reasoning Fowler had in mind when explaining CAUSALITY as the ability to “draw 
conclusions from given premises.” Instead, Whitman writes of an “urge”—the protean, 
diversifying impulse lying behind or within all phenomena—which by its very nature is 
difficult to pin down into words. For phrenology, however, nature is transparent, its laws 
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not only self-evident but expressible, especially for someone with a very large 
CAUSALITY. Such an individual is: 
able to explain, or ‘clear up,’ abstruse points and difficult subjects; to carry 
conviction to the mind by his irresistible arguments; and always to present them 
in a manner perfectly intelligible; will grasp, as it were, with a giant intellect, 
those great and fundamental principles which enter into the nature and 
constitution of things. (Fowler, Phrenology Proved [1837] 236) 
 
For Whitman, on the other hand, “To elaborate is no avail”; and to have cleared up the 
“fundamental principles” might have amounted to nothing more than obscuring their 
essential obscurity. By preserving this obscurity, Whitman attempts to convey a true 
sense of the “constitution of things” not through argument, but through the aesthetics of 
his poetry. Thus he concludes the “procreant urge” passage, “Learned and unlearned feel 
that it is so,” indicating that the minds of farmer and theologian, trapper and lawyer, all 
can be united by feeling the mysterious yet constant principles of existence, not by having 
them explained by someone else. 
 A higher CAUSALITY might also have interfered with another habit of Whitman’s 
thought: his love of facts. Catalogs of simple facts and details constitute much of his 
poetry; he begins “Song of Myself” by professing his “love” for the very air he breathes 
(27). Feeling itself was a species of fact for him, an immediate experience more 
persuasive and real than anything argument could “elaborate” (a word—in the context 
used by Whitman—resembling “belabor” in sense as well as shape). According to 
Fowler, however, a large CAUSALITY had the potential to pull a mind away from the 
factual. “With the perceptive organs only moderate or full,” a person with a large 
CAUSALITY, “will be more delighted with the principles of natural science, than with the 
mere facts.” The same person with a 6 or 7 COMPARISON “will deal much more in that 
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which is abstract and metaphysical than in facts and details” (Phrenology Proved [1837] 
233-234). Whitman’s COMPARISON was 6; the average of his perceptive faculties was 
much closer to full than large. Consequently, his 5-6 CAUSALITY already put his mind at 
risk for metaphysical flights. The “greatest poet,” described in the 1855 Preface as having 
a large CAUSALITY, might therefore be best understood as a prophecy, an ideal 
possessing, unlike Whitman, other faculties strong enough to balance a large CAUSALITY. 
But in the context of Whitman’s phrenology as recorded by Fowler, a larger CAUSALITY 
promised visions of first principles at potential cost to his sense of the physical. 
 In addition to working against some of Whitman’s mental habits, there is a second 
explanation for his CAUSALITY not being higher: it kept him a representative figure by 
giving him a representative flaw. In Fowler on Memory, Fowler bemoans at length and 
with a great deal of pathos the general dulling of Americans’ CAUSALITY:  
Cast your eye over the foreheads of a hundred children, and then of a hundred 
adults, and if you do not see a marked superiority of the former over the latter in 
proportion, then you do not see what I am daily pained to observe—pained, not 
because children have such fine heads, but because adults have so poor ones. (45) 
 
CAUSALITY, “unbiassed [sic], will always come to the right conclusion,” but bad 
parenting and schooling warp it relentlessly, suppressing the child’s instinct to question 
and think independently with discouragement and the rod. Fowler recommends not only 
encouraging this innate spirit of inquiry, but also more specific curriculum reforms. 
Instead of teaching students to “read, spell, and write first,” teachers should teach “things 
first” by telling students “stories, showing them the operations of nature, trying 
philosophical, and other experiments, &c.; teaching them natural history.” This approach 
not only harmonizes the child’s mind with external nature, but also harmonizes education 
“with the nature of the mind in general”: because CAUSALITY (according to phrenologists) 
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was one of the first faculties to develop, it should be among the first to be educated by 
direct exposure to the causal operations of nature (44-47).  
In “Song of Myself,” Whitman dramatizes this cultural problem as well as its 
solution, casting himself as a causally deficient adult who turns to an “unbiassed” child 
for inspiration and guidance: “A child said, What is the grass? fetching it to me with full 
hands; / How could I answer the child? . . . . I do not know what it is any more than he” 
(31). For the gloss it provides on the title of Whitman’s ouvre, Leaves of Grass, these 
lines are among the most significant in all of Whitman’s poetry. While the association 
between childhood innocence and poetic inspiration was a commonplace in Romantic 
literature since the 18th century, here it appears to be specifically inflected by 
phrenology’s conception of CAUSALITY. The child’s natural curiosity and direct 
engagement with nature—his hands full of the grass he is questioning—admonish the 
speaker of the poem into an admission of his own ignorance, which in turn stimulates his 
own spirit of inquiry. The next thirty or so lines of the poem let loose a series of 
questions and guesses regarding the nature of grass and mortality. The poet’s first 
question, “How could I answer the child?”, also recalls Fowler’s specific injunction either 
to answer children’s questions correctly or not at all; otherwise “teaching them to think 
from incorrect data” would stunt their mental development (Fowler on Memory 44). But 
while celebrating (and provoking, as the child had provoked him) a sense of inquiry into 
the nature of things, Whitman seems to foreclose the possibility of arriving at definite 
answers, as he had in the “procreant urge” passage. Nature remains a “uniform 
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hieroglyphic” of endless signifying potential, line after line of the section beginning with 
“I guess” or “It may be” in response to the child’s original question (31).80 
This passage, which later becomes section 6 of “Song of Myself,” concludes by 
undermining a causal relationship so widely accepted that it undermines the notion of 
causality itself: “All goes onward and outward . . . . and nothing collapses, / And to die is 
different from what any one supposed, and luckier” (32). Death, the very type of 
incontrovertible necessity, has somehow been converted into an instance of superfluous 
fortune. While the claim is to some extent justified by the inexhaustible profusion of 
nature previously discussed, the lines still read as an enigmatic and ungrounded intuition, 
especially Whitman’s choice of the word “luckier,” which removes death from the realm 
of causally determined effects to place it within that of chance. Indeed, in so profoundly 
defying the notion of causal relation, the claim that death is unnecessary appears to 
undermine the authority of logic itself. On the other hand, the idea that to die is simply to 
go “onward and outward” is based on his experience of seeing nature continually press 
“onward and outward.” The meaning of the passage itself thus presses outward, refusing 
to settle either for or against deterministic notions of causality.  
 As his CAUSALITY demonstrates, Whitman may not have placed equal value on all 
the phrenological faculties, especially when portraying himself as a working-class rough, 
the self-image he projected most emphatically in the earliest editions of Leaves of 
Grass.81 Around the time his editorship began, the Eagle several times mocked audiences 
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80 See Aspiz on how similar phrenological ideas on education inform the poems “There Was a 
Child Went Forth” and “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking” (Walt 114).  
81 In later editions he softened this persona, switching his swaggering, open-shirted frontispiece 
portrait for an older, more respectable image in the 1860 edition, and dropping explicit reference 
to himself as “one of the roughs” in the 1867 version of “Song of Myself.”  
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of Fowler’s lectures for possessing a large MARVELLOUSNESS, the faculty of wonder and 
belief in the extraordinary, equating it with gullibility (“Chance” 2). Unsurprisingly, 
Whitman’s own MARVELLOUSNESS remained a 3 (of a possible 7) on both handwritten 
and published charts. His average VENERATION—a 4—is likewise understandable when 
we examine its phrenological definition: “respect for religion and things sacred, and for 
superiors” (Fowler’s Practical 47). Given Whitman’s mystic side, both faculties could be 
expected to be much larger, but their full implications clearly run counter to his earthy 
independence. For Whitman, bigger did not necessarily mean better. 
 Nor did it for the Fowlers, even though phrenology since Spurzheim had 
attempted to purge original sin from its view of humanity, casting all the faculties—
theoretically at least—as natural and perfectible (Gall, in contrast, had originally posited 
a faculty of murder). For the most part, the Fowlers seemed to have encouraged 
development of all faculties to the size of 6, or large. The 1854 edition of The Illustrated 
Self-Instructor and the 1837 edition of Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied both 
imply as much. The two books contain entries that define each faculty and explain how 
they interact. The entries also include subsections detailing how the faculties manifest 
themselves differently according to size, starting with 6, then 7, and then continuing in 
descending order from 5 to 1. This arrangement tends to idealize 6, as do the explanations 
themselves. At 7, or very large, many faculties are frequently prone to perversion, 
especially when other faculties are too weak to counter their influence. With a very large 
SELF-ESTEEM, for instance, a person is likely to be “pompous, supercilious” and with only 
“average Philoprogenitiveness, is very domineering in the family” (Illustrated 82).  
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However, this logic is inconsistently applied: there are many cases in which 
Fowler suggests that a score higher or lower than a 6 is the most desirable. SUBLIMITY 
and CONSCIENTIOUSNESS continue to elevate character the larger they become, while 
CONCENTRATIVENESS (later called CONTINUITY) is ideal at 4, or average, with anything 
larger making the mind prone to fixate on single objects, and anything smaller too much 
shortening its attention span (Illustrated 62).82 In the 1869 New Illustrated Self-
Instructor, the sequence of explanations is simplified to descending order from 7 to 1, 
even though the descriptions themselves remain similar to the 1854 edition. The 1869 
edition therefore diminishes at least the structural implication that 6 was an ideal score 
across the board. The contradictory suggestions here—that all faculties are equal, that 
some are better than others, that 7 is ideal, that 6 is ideal, that faculties are “ideal” not in 
themselves but only in relation to other faculties—reflect an ambivalence over the notion 
of equality. For the Fowlers, phrenology appeared to legitimize American democracy by 
embracing human variety; it provided a means, for example, of identifying the profession 
most suited to an individual based on their unique phrenology.83 Indeed, their views on 
individual human excellence sometimes sound proto-Darwinian, emphasizing not fixed 
types, but suitability to individual circumstances.84 But at the same time as they embraced 
difference, the American Phrenological Journal and other Fowler publications celebrated 
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82 Whitman had a 4 in CONTINUITY. 
83 In 1857 the American Phrenological Journal exhorted:  
The world has need of all the energy and skill of its inhabitants, and if each one could 
find his true pursuit, and would follow it honestly and faithfully, failures would become 
exceedingly rare, while the sum of human happiness would be vastly enhanced—the 
average of life extended, and there would be probably a third more accomplished by 
mankind than at present. (“Utility” 2) 
84 See for example “A Model Head” by J.L.C., discussed in the Introduction (48). 
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exceptional figures with extraordinary phrenological profiles (Christopher Columbus, 
Elias Hicks, the presidents of the United States, among many others). This implied 
hierarchical understanding of human character types was inherited from Gall, who 
originally viewed his science as an explanation for inborn differences in talent and mental 
power.85 Additionally, despite maintaining the ability for anyone to improve their 
faculties through exercise, the Fowlers published many articles evaluating what they 
considered prevailing racial, national, and gender phrenology types. This tension between 
valuing difference on the one hand and privileging certain types and individuals on the 
other reflects the larger cultural tension between the nation’s claims to be founded on the 
principle of equality and its deep-seated racism.  
The Fowlers thus set a precedent for dealing flexibly with phrenology’s own 
implications, for valuing some faculties above others and for embracing what numerically 
might look like a flaw in one’s phrenological character. Alongside Whitman’s need for a 
phrenology that corroborated his persona (as well as his unconventional poetics), this 
flexibility explains the remaining changes in his published chart, changes that actually 
decreased the size of two of his faculties: his PHILOPROGENITIVENESS and his ORDER. In 
Phrenology Proved, Illustrated, and Applied, Fowler explains PHILOPROGENITIVENESS as 
“Parental affection and tenderness—love of offspring, and of children generally—
fondness for pets, especially young animals, and for the infirm and helpless” (61). 
Certainly Whitman’s “rough,” while loving towards friends and lovers (he was large in 
both ADHESIVENESS and AMATIVENESS), would not have been served by an excessive 
predilection for puppies. A very large PHILOPROGENITIVENESS could also lead to 
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85 Tomlinson shows how this was in contrast to the egalitarianism endorsed by contemporary 
sensationalist theories of mind (56-57). 
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sentimental extravagances, making its possessor nearly idolize children, grieve for their 
loss “immoderately,” and, when in combination with a very large CAUTIOUSNESS, all but 
drown under a “multitude of groundless apprehensions” about their welfare (Fowler’s 
Practical 41). The handwritten chart placed Whitman on the threshold of such excesses, 
giving him a “6 to 7” in this faculty. Unsurprisingly, the published chart later gave him a 
6. 
 Perhaps even more problematic for Whitman, his large to very large 
PHILOPROGENITVENESS on the handwritten chart led Fowler to emphasize 
heteronormative domesticity as one of Whitman’s defining character traits in the 
“Phrenological Description,” arguably discussing it more than any other single 
characteristic mentioned in Whitman’s profile:  
Your love and regard for woman as such are strong and you are for elevating and 
ameliorating the female character. You were inclined to marry at an early age. 
You could not well bear to be deprived of you[r] domestic privileges and 
enjoyments. You are very fond of children or pets and would much desire to have 
your own intelligent and respected. You are also very fond of home and think 
much of having one of your own and making it comfortable and attractive. You 
would like to travel and yet to go and leave family and friends would be a task. [. . 
.] You would be or are a kind husband—an affectionate father. 
 
Both the line mentioning his fondness for children and pets and the final phrase regarding 
his affectionateness as a parent clearly derive from his exceptional 
PHILOPROGENITIVENESS, a major component of the domestic portrait presented in this 
passage. The portrait is further based on two other faculties that were recorded as large in 
Whitman: AMATIVENESS (“Conjugal love; attachment to the opposite sex”) and 
INHABITIVENESS (“The HOME feeling; love of HOUSE, the PLACE where one was born or 
has lived”) (Illustrated 51, 60). Such strong domestic inclinations directly contradict 
major aspects of both Whitman’s public persona and his private experience. Tacitly and 
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otherwise, he shaped a myth of himself as a self-indulgent loafer, bachelor, and even 
womanizer, hinting of an illegitimate child in New Orleans and dedicating an entire 
section of Leaves of Grass to heterosexual love or AMATIVENESS.86 In poems too 
numerous to name (though “Song of the Open Road” and “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” 
come most readily to mind), his poetic imagination celebrates ceaseless flux and 
movement through vast expanses of space and time. A fireside poet he was not, unless 
the fire in question warmed a hunter on the frontier or the earth throughout time.87 
Whitman’s life experience also contradicted this portrait of secure, heterosexual 
domesticity. As a child of four he and his family bid farewell to the ancestral Whitman 
estate and from then on moved every few years as their unstable economic position 
dictated. As an adult Whitman would continue to change residences as well as jobs 
frequently, working as a printer, teacher, house-builder, journalist, and editor in various 
Brooklyn, Long Island, and Manhattan locations, as well as travels further afield to New 
Orleans and Washington, D.C. But in even starker contrast to the good husband presented 
in the “Phrenological Description” was his powerful erotic attraction towards other men. 
Though we would now describe such attraction as homosexual, Whitman himself 
described his longings in terms of the phrenological concept of ADHESIVENESS, which for 
the Fowlers simply meant capacity for friendship. Whitman, however, used the term to 
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86 Late in life, he claims to have fathered children (“Tho’ always unmarried”) in his heated 
response to John Addington Symonds’ inquiry regarding homosexuality in the “Calamus” poems 
(Correspondence 5:73). See Introduction on Whitman’s basing clusters of poems around 
phrenological faculties. 
87 Angus Fletcher complicates this dichotomy with respect to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. 
Questioning F.O. Matthiessen’s influential devaluation of the more ‘conventional’ Longfellow in 
contrast to Whitman, Fletcher sees the two poets sharing, among other things, an 
“anthropological” interest in themes and rituals of change, with Whitman primarily occupied by 
“pure passage” and Longfellow the “completed initiatory cycle.” 
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both voice and cloak homoerotic urges for which he would later chastise himself in a 
much-cited notebook entry: “Depress the adhesive nature / It is in excess—making life a 
torment / Ah this diseased, feverish disproportionate adhesiveness” (Notebooks 2:889-
890). Most scholars now agree Whitman here refers to his intense passion for companion 
Peter Doyle. Despite such self-recrimination, ADHESIVENESS also allowed Whitman to 
give tremendous expression to a sexuality that would otherwise have been 
unacceptable—or incomprehensible—in his cultural context. ADHESIVENESS was not only 
a major subject in his poetry, providing the overarching theme to the “Calamus” section 
of Leaves of Grass; it was also a central concept in both his politics and cosmology.88 
While the handwritten chart and the “Phrenological Description” emphasized his 
PHILOPROGENITIVENESS and related characteristics, Whitman himself would turn to 
ADHESIVENESS again and again in his writing to explain both himself and the world. 
Though comprising a very substantial part of Whitman’s “Phrenological 
Description,” the strong domestic inclinations based on his PHILOPROGENITIVENESS, 
INHABITIVENESS, and AMATIVENESS disappear from both his published description and his 
published chart. Although his scores remain 6 for all three faculties, the published 
description makes no mention of Whitman being a good husband or father even as it 
alludes to many other traits highlighted in the “Phrenological Description,” such as his 
strong constitution, longevity, friendliness, and independence. Except for his Firmness 
(which may be intended in the phrase “animal will”), all of the faculties listed as “6 to 7” 
in his published chart become “Leading traits” in his published description. This would 
suggest that lowering his PHILOPROGENITIVENESS from a 6-7 to a 6 made it much less 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
88 See Introduction (20-21). 
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conspicuous: it was not necessarily a leading trait, a trait that ruled his character, and so it 
did not require special attention in the published description (though one faculty of 6 does 
get squeezed into his leading traits: ADHESIVENESS). INHABITIVENESS likewise recedes 
into the background of the published description. His AMATIVENESS, however, makes an 
appearance, but in a form very different from the heterosexual desire the Fowlers had in 
mind. The published description includes “Voluptuousness” among Whitman’s 
“dangerous faults,” though the inclination for sensual pleasure in general has no clear 
corresponding faculty in phrenology. AMATIVENESS seems the closest match, Fowler 
gingerly linking it to sexual desire by explaining that it “eventuates in offspring” when 
healthy, but in “licentiousness” when perverted (Illustrated 51). In the published 
description, the pairing of “Voluptuousness” with “Alimentiveness”—appetite, or the 
capacity to take pleasure in food—works to further redefine AMATIVENESS as a 
polymorphous sexuality unconfined by home, marriage, or even gender: the kind of open-
ended sensuality expressed at the beginning of “Song of Myself” when Whitman writes 
of being “mad” for the atmosphere to be in contact with his naked flesh (27). And though 
these faculties—along with the traits of “Indolence” and “reckless will”—are described 
as “dangerous faults,” they constitute dangers that the poet celebrates wholeheartedly 
throughout his poetry, and even appears to relish in the emphatic phrasing of his 
published description. 
In sum, fundamental aspects of Whitman’s private and public selves could not 
have coexisted with a PHILOPROGENITIVENESS that bordered on the very large. But a large 
PHILOPROGENITVENESS was another matter entirely. Still a robust size 6, this faculty does 
corroborate major facets of Whitman’s personality. Whitman, for instance, frequently 
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troped his role of poet as parental, his poetry being born of the union between himself 
and his nation. Furthermore, according to the Fowlers, PHILOPROGENITIVENESS 
manifested itself in ways not related to parenting that Whitman likewise exhibited. In the 
right combination of faculties, it could make a person “eminently qualified for teaching 
school” (Fowler’s Practical 41) as well as tender towards “the infirm and helpless” 
(Phrenology Proved [1837] 61). Though Whitman’s experience as an actual teacher 
appears to have been dismal, he frequently endorsed in his journalism the kind of 
humane, student-centered educational reforms supported by the Fowlers and the 
phrenologically-influenced Horace Mann.89 And during his Civil War hospital years, his 
famous devotion to sick, injured, and dying young soldiers was perhaps as much an 
exercise in PHILOPROGENITIVENESS as it was in BENEVOLENCE and ADHESIVENESS (though 
he makes no mention of any of these faculties in Specimen Days, apart from 
“benevolence” used in a general sense).90 
A large PHILOPROGENETIVENESS also corroborated Whitman’s identification with 
the female in “Song of Myself.” This was one of the more explicitly gendered faculties in 
the works of Fowler, who claimed that women generally possessed it to a greater degree 
than men (Fowler’s Practical 39). Although Whitman tended to keep mostly male 
company throughout his early life, this faculty may have provided some scientific ground 
for his repeatedly identifying with women in “Song of Myself.”91 In fact, his 
proclamation that he was “the poet of the woman the same as the man” immediately 
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89 See Introduction (12-13). 
90 As a word search of the online Walt Whitman Archive indicates, he refers to “benevolence” 
only once in the “Gifts—Money—Discrimination. . .Items from My Note Books” section of 
Specimen Days, and not in a phrenological context. 
91 See Reynolds on accounts of Whitman’s early lack of interest in girls (Walt 72). 
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precedes a stanza directly referring to phrenology (46)92. Another moment of 
identification occurs when he claims to be “Maternal as well as paternal” (42). More 
expansively, while identifying himself as various suffering heroes during another part of 
the poem, Whitman claims to screech as a wife recoiling from the sight of her husband’s 
dead body; two stanzas later he claims to feel or be a mother burned for witchcraft in 
front of her children. Underneath the surface equivocation of the line “All these I feel or 
am” lies a statement of deeper unity equating shared aesthetic experiences to shared 
identities: if A feels the same things in the same way as B, then A equals B—A is B. 
Philoprogenitive feelings therefore could link mothers and fathers; and if Whitman could 
feel the same philoprogenitive instincts as a mother he observed on the street, or that he 
imagined from the colonial past, he was that mother (64-65). 
The subjective conditions that knit Whitman into an identity with the suffering 
heroines of his catalog involve the feelings of being a parent, mother, or wife, in addition 
to the more universally shared experiences of grief and physical pain. But his most 
intense identification with a female figure in “Song of Myself” transpires through a very 
different state of mind. In the famous passage of the twenty-eight bathers, Whitman 
imagines a woman imagining herself among a group of young, naked men she sees 
frolicking in the ocean spray. In Whitman’s eyes, she actually does join the group as the 
“twenty-ninth bather” through the ardor of her imaginative gaze, though physically she 
remains in her “fine house,” kept aloft, apart, and alone by the strictures of class and 
morality. Whitman, kept in his own “fine house” of heterosexual mores, joins the scene 
by the same logic that places her there (as well as the reader): the intensity of his poetic 
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92 “I show that size is only development” (47). Whitman here refers to the Fowler’s emphasis on 
the malleability of the faculties through exercise. 
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vision makes it another form of touch. A few stanzas later the connection between his 
poetry and the woman’s erotic gaze becomes explicit as he proclaims that within him is 
“the caresser of life wherever moving” (36-37).  
His catalogs of details, especially in the twenty-eight bathers passage, belie a very 
selective eye, one that creates portraits vivid with intimate detail, but at the same time 
fragmentary and incomplete. This intimacy and selectivity are what make his poetic 
vision most like touch: while the eye could sweep repeatedly over a scene to create a 
complete picture, his poetry instead plucks only a few details to record, like a hand 
limited to sensing only the things it actually takes the time to touch one at a time. As in 
the following stanzas about the bathers, Whitman thus manages to evoke a picture at once 
palpably realistic in its detail and richly suggestive and enigmatic in its incompletion: 
The beards of the young men glistened with wet, it ran from their long hair, 
Little streams passed all over their bodies. 
 
An unseen hand also passed over their bodies, 
It descended tremblingly from their temples and ribs. 
 
The young men float on their backs, their white bellies swell to the sun . . . .  
they do not ask who seizes fast to them, 
 They do not know who puffs and declines with pendant and bending arch, 
 They do not think whom they souse with spray. (36) 
  
The poetic eye passes over beards, temples, ribs, and bellies, like the water beading 
across the young men’s bodies. Whether it runs from their hair to their own bodies or 
from their hair to each other’s bodies remains an open question; meaning manifests here 
with as much fluidity as the glistening water imagery running through the passage. 
Disembodied and promiscuous, the “unseen hand” has several owners, the most obvious 
being the woman and Whitman as the terminus of their poetic gaze. But the close 
resemblance between the unseen hand’s caress and the play of the water itself implies 
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that it belongs just as much to Nature (or its Over-Soul) as to any individual being. 
Despite the hand’s amorphousness and the vagueness of its descent either away from or 
further down the body, the hand’s excited, trembling touch of head and side imbues it 
with a physical reality. Following the erotically charged movements of the penultimate 
line, the ocean “spray” strongly suggests seminal fluid, again leaving the question open 
as to who “seizes fast” to whom, whether it is the woman’s or Whitman’s self-projection, 
or the men themselves sexually engaged with each other. Pointedly, the men “do not 
ask,” and instead simply enjoy a natural, unselfconscious delight in sensation—of their 
bodies as well as of the ocean, which as the metaphor’s vehicle receives an erotic charge 
from its tenor. Though Whitman, in contrast to the actual bathers, can only imagine the 
scene, this does not appear to alienate him from it. He and his proxy, the twenty-ninth 
bather, appear fully immersed in the libidinous abandon of the bathers, suggesting again 
the eroticism of thought and poetic vision. In fact, this intense erotic charge unites all 
aspects of the scene and its imagining, dissolving the boundaries between nature, self, 
selves, woman, man, sex, mind, spirit, body, seer, seen, subject, and object. The semantic 
play of the poetic passage, the sexual play of the men, the intellectual play of the gaze, 
and the natural play of the ocean spray mutually corroborate each other in a fusion of 
such intensity that separating these categories of being—let alone arranging them in a 
hierarchy—becomes impossible within the logic of the poem. 
Fowlerian phrenology worked to synthesize many of these same categories, 
embracing the body and sexuality as it did so. Though Fowler and other phrenologists 
frequently reinforced gender distinctions, and though Fowler’s discussions of 
AMATIVENESS tended to define sexuality in heteronormative and biologically functional 
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terms (as “eventuating” in offspring),93 Michael Lynch has shown how phrenology from 
Gall through the Fowlers also laid part of the groundwork for the concept of the 
homosexual as it emerged in medical and psychological discourse in the closing decades 
of the nineteenth century. As his correspondence with Whitman indicates, pioneering 
theorist of “sexual inversion” John Addington Symonds saw a homoerotic significance 
(that Whitman denied) in the faculty of ADHESIVENESS, which according to phrenology 
determined the ardor and frequency with which an individual formed friendships—in 
phrenology texts often characterized as same-sex relationships. Phrenology thus set a 
precedent for the theorization of homosexuality as an identity in “grounding friendship in 
the mental structure of the personality” (Lynch 94). As Foucault wrote of Karl Westphal 
in the same period (also cited by Lynch): “The sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (43).  
In the twenty-eight bathers passage, Whitman departs significantly from 
phrenology in completely confounding the AMATIVE and the ADHESIVE.94 Instead of 
pining for the figure of the lonely maiden trapped in her tower, Whitman identifies with 
the maiden’s pining for the young men below. His relationship to the woman is ADHESIVE 
(“Where are you off to?” he asks her familiarly), but rests on the AMATIVE yearnings they 
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93 Discussed in Chapter I (83). 
94 While I tend to agree with Lynch’s view that Whitman gave the term ADHESIVENESS an 
“exclusive reference to same-sex love” while phrenologists only emphasized same-sex 
attachments, his assertion that Whitman sets the faculty “over and against Amativeness” goes too 
far in positing a stable and strictly oppositional dichotomy between the two. The twenty-eight 
bathers section disrupts such binaries; the Children of Adam and Calamus sections of Leaves, 
devoted as they were to AMATIVENESS and ADHESIVENESS respectively, suggest the poet sought 
to encompass both passions as much as delineate their division. See also John Champagne’s 
“Walt Whitman, Our Great Gay Poet?” (Journal of Homosexuality 55, 2008, pages 648-664), 
which argues that too narrowly reading Whitman as homosexual potentially stifles the queerness 
of his poetry. 
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both have for the young men. In loving a woman ADHESIVELY in order to love men 
AMATIVELY, Whitman reverses the expected genders of the faculties’ objects. 
Furthermore, his portrayal of the twenty-eight young men erases the boundary between 
athletic comradeship and erotic congress in its emphasis on nakedness, touch, play, and 
pleasure. In celebrating pleasure for its own sake (as he does throughout the poem), 
Whitman also relieves the erotic of the kind of procreative obligations AMATIVENESS 
mandated. 
His tendency to flout conceptual and social boundaries, his expression of truths 
irreducible to logic, and his need to project the persona of a “rough” in the early editions 
of Leaves of Grass all contribute to the last revision of his phrenological chart: 
Whitman’s ORDER, which decreases one third of a full point, from a “5+” on his 
handwritten chart to a “5” on the published one (plus and minus signs indicated 
differences of a third). Though this interior mental faculty corresponds to the divinely 
ordained external order of nature itself, its “primary office” in individuals is 
comparatively trivial, it being “to keep one’s own things in order.” To cultivate it, 
children should be instructed to put away properly their clothes and toys (Fowler on 
Memory 90-91). Fowler’s Practical Phrenology boils ORDER down to “System; physical 
arrangement; a place for things.” A 5 would suggest Whitman “likes order; takes much 
pains to keep things arranged,” while anything larger would have had the potential to 
render him “annoyed” or even “tormented by disorder” (51). In editions of his work 
published during the 1840s, Fowler stressed his personal belief that ORDER applies only 
to the physical world and would therefore not apply to the arrangement of ideas. He 
admits, however, that “many” others believe differently and that he himself suspects the 
Borst&190&
existence of an as of yet undiscovered “organ of mental order” located right beside that of 
physical order (Fowler on Memory 93). Later, by the time of the 1854 edition of The 
Illustrated Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology, Fowler further reduces the 
divide between external and internal worlds with respect to ORDER, noting that in writing 
a powerful ORDER would put “every idea, paragraph, and head of a subject in its proper 
place” (112). 
Whitman’s own poetry, consisting so often as it did of catalogs of objects and 
details, also reduces this divide: things symbolize ideas and ideas are best symbolized by 
things, America and its citizens providing their poet prophet with the materials for a new 
scripture, a new epic. But in reflecting the vast tumult of industrializing, expansionist 
America, in celebrating his body and its pleasures as an integral part of this new reality, 
and in tallying the creeds and peoples proliferating during this period of reform, revival, 
and immigration, Whitman’s poetic imagination could be anything but orderly. “The 
United States themselves are essentially the greatest poem,” he writes in the 1855 
Preface. “In the history of the earth hitherto the largest and most stirring appear tame and 
orderly to their ampler largeness and stir” (5; emphasis added). Accordingly, in the line 
after he proclaims himself “one of the roughs” in “Song of Myself,” Whitman further 
declares himself “Disorderly fleshy and sensual” (50). His celebration of vital, dynamic 
disorder extends from the physical and social to the intellectual as well, as he scoffs at his 
more philosophically systematic critics towards the end of the poem: “Do I contradict 
myself? / Very well then . . . . I contradict myself; / I am large . . . . I contain multitudes” 
(87). All of his major themes—the working-class, the natural, the sexual, the nation—all 
intersect around this idea of disorder, which manifests itself aesthetically in major 
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features of his poetic style: his unrestrained free-verse, his indecorous use of slang, and, 
in the 1855 version, his idiosyncratic and frequent use of ellipses, suggesting gaps, 
breaks, and fragments.  
The reduction of ORDER on his chart therefore explicitly serves the same rhetorical 
purpose as his chart as a whole and the other revisions he may have made to it: to 
construct the poet as one of the roughs with a correspondently “rough” poetic style. But 
why? Why emphasize this aspect of his persona in the chart and the self-review to which 
it was appended? And why emphasize—or construct—this aspect of his persona through 
phrenology? In the posthumous In Re Walt Whitman, which gathered miscellaneous 
pieces by and about Whitman, the poet’s literary executors offer one explanation: it was a 
response to the critics. In a preface to the self-reviews they note, “Whitman has remarked 
to us that in a period of misunderstanding and abuse their [the self-reviews’] publication 
seemed imperative” (13). If some of the negative reviews Whitman included in the 1855 
Leaves of Grass, “Leaves-Droppings,” and Leaves of Grass Imprints are any indication, 
the criticism rested on his sensuality, vulgarity, and irregularities of style, form, and 
thought—precisely the qualities embodied by the figure of the disorderly rough, to which 
several negative reviews explicitly refer.95 But a phrenological explanation of Whitman 
as the rough cast these qualities in a positive light: they were natural, they were 
inherently good (or at least morally neutral), their idiosyncrasies added to the variety 
inherent in the human species, and, in the case of Whitman, they were adequately 
balanced by his ample rational and moral powers, which were also exhibited in his chart.  
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95 “Both its language and its thought seem to have just broken out of Bedlam,” said the Christian 
Examiner of Leaves of Grass (Leaves of Grass Imprints 6). 
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Using the chart as a critical lens through which to read Whitman’s poetry, 
however, begins to reveal that Whitman may have been constructing his private self as 
much as his public self through phrenology. In the case of the self-review that included 
Whitman’s chart, many of Whitman’s most familiar themes—the individual, the worker, 
freedom, the natural—are underpinned by a phrenological logic involving the faculties of 
SELF-ESTEEM, ADHESIVENESS, BENEVOLENCE, and SUBLIMITY, all of which the published 
description mentions as his leading virtues. Furthermore, the philosophical issues literally 
embodied in his phrenology are the same that appear in his poetry: the self-fashioning 
potential of the individual, the collapse of the divide between the physical and the ideal, 
their symbolic correspondence, the nature of causality and our ability to know it, the 
natural coexistence of reason and feeling (and their equal validity as components of the 
human mind), and the healthy balance of the animal and intellectual sides of the human 
psyche. That Whitman may have revised the scores on his phrenological chart does not 
mean he was being dishonest or loose about his belief in phrenology, but quite the 
opposite, that he took the science with a great deal of seriousness. The changes to the 
1846 handwritten chart are minimal in both number and degree, showing that Whitman 
accepted much of Lorenzo Fowler’s assessment of his personality. In fact, the changes 
that do exist are to some measure validated by the chart itself and the qualities of the 
rough it emphasizes: Whitman’s full to large COMBATIVENESS and DESTRUCTIVENESS, his 
willfully high SELF-ESTEEM and FIRMNESS, his transgressive SUBLIMITY. Whitman’s 
revisions not only of his chart, but of phrenology itself in modifying its concepts of 
AMATIVENESS and ADHESIVENESS, show a mind deeply engaged in the theories of the 
pseudoscience, not simply donning them as a prefabricated belief system, but inhabiting 
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them and making them his own. Whitman, like the idealized “greatest poet” he constructs 























Speech is the Twin of My Vision 
 
Like the Transcendentalists and the Romantics before him, Whitman found in the 
act of writing a solution to a constellation of philosophical problems inherited from the 
Enlightenment. Among these issues was the question of how to live with or refute the 
notion of a mechanistic universe and all its seemingly grim implications for a meaningful, 
autonomous, individual life. Frequently, William Wordsworth, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and 
Emerson found their own solutions by working more with than against the implications 
of empiricism, associationism, and materialism (a fact that remains overlooked whenever 
Romanticism’s supernaturalism—as opposed to its naturalism—is overemphasized). For 
William Blake, however, the division between his poetic work and that of Isaac Newton 
and John Locke was as clear as the etched lines of his prints, as was his rejection of 
mechanistic or reductively empiricist ideas of the self. Although Whitman embraced 
materialism in many respects (especially in earlier editions of his poetry), a brief 
discussion of Blake’s concept of the ratio will clarify how Whitman conceives but 
ultimately transcends materialism’s deterministic implications through his phrenological 
chart.  
Northrop Frye has called Blake’s “ratio” (a concept especially present in All 
Religions Are One, There Is No Natural Religion, and The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell), “the sum of normal experiences common to normal minds” (22). At the simplest 
level, it refers to knowledge derived from the five senses and from reflection on those 
senses, including natural laws and other generalizations drawn from experience. While 
from the perspective of a natural philosopher or scientist the ratio functions as the 
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“standard of reality,” from Blake’s perspective the ratio reduces knowledge to the “least 
common denominator” of human experience (i.e. facts that everyone can agree upon), 
deadening perception and the individual acts of poetic vision that vitalize it (Frye 21). In 
There Is No Natural Religion, Blake suggests that without creativity, imagination, or 
individual vision, perception is a passive affair of the mind as tabula rasa. While for 
many Enlightenment thinkers the blank slate model represented the way in which the 
mind actually worked, for Blake it is a limiting state of mind in which true perception 
cannot take place: 
If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic character the Philosophic & 
Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all things, & stand still, unable to do 
other than repeat the same dull round over again. (Blake 15) 
 
Without a character both creative and forward-looking, we simply see what has already 
been seen or known, a process that leads to nothing but the repetition of present 
conditions and conclusions. 
Whitman’s Democratic Vistas addresses this same problem of the limits of the 
ratio, specifically in terms of how it manifests in the nature of logical argumentation. 
Whitman wrote the essay as a response to Thomas Carlyle’s criticism of American 
democratic society, but does not employ the expected rhetorical moves in his refutation: 
the citation of supporting facts from America’s past and present successes or even much 
in the way of logical argumentation. In fact, Whitman implies in the essay that were he to 
utilize any of these moves he might end up agreeing with Carlyle, so damaged has the 
country become even in his own eyes (“the fear of conflicting and irreconcilable interiors, 
and the lack of a common skeleton, knitting all close, continually haunts me”) (936). 
Instead, as the title suggests, Whitman adopts a forward-looking perspective, using the 
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text to widen our vision on a coming scene rather than apologize for current conditions. 
He announces as much in the second paragraph, writing, “For our New World I consider 
far less important for what it has done, or what it is, than for results to come” (929). If the 
future of America were predicated solely on current conditions, the nation might have 
little to hope for but more of the same, the present following mechanically from the past. 
Instead, Whitman attempts a self-generated and self-fulfilling prophecy, announcing the 
role of the “divine literatus” that will unify the country in a literary text that already does 
(932).  
Democratic Vistas is fragmentary, written piecemeal over a long period of time, 
indulging various contradictions, swinging from the celebration of the adhesively bound 
community of citizens to that of the fully realized individual, from decrying the moral 
turpitude of American culture to recognizing the need to reevaluate the “lump” of people 
en masse as the very marrow of the nation (943). Favoring more subjective—and 
active—means of perception, Whitman resolves these contradictions of both self and 
nation through feeling, will, and belief:  
I feel the parts harmoniously blended in my own realization and convictions, and 
present them to be read only in such oneness, each page and each assertion 
modified and temper’d by the others” (930; emphasis added).  
 
Ideas based on conventionally scientific or philosophical modes of thought—the 
empirical, the deductive, the mathematical, the analytical—are bound to the past or suffer 
endless anatomization. The aesthetic, subjective field of thought Whitman here 
delineates, however, provides a space within which to realize a unity among logically 
disparate parts. While such a moment could be criticized as a lapse in philosophic rigor, it 
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is a conscious “lapse” that possesses its own theoretical sophistication, being a frame of 
mind whose very function is to “blend” ideas.  
 Like his poetry, Whitman’s prose in Democratic Vistas is driven by uplifting and 
propulsive cadences, rhythmically proving the energy and progress of the American 
experiment. His syntax sprawls, accumulating clause after clause, complexly qualifying 
previously made statements, rhetorically balancing opposites, amplifying his thoughts 
with appositional phrase after appositional phrase, yet still able to enclose all of it within 
the unifying finality of a period. His style is meant to inspire in himself and his readers 
faith and hope, the sentiments necessary for them to realize the binding democratic 
religion Whitman envisions in the essay itself. Thus Whitman escapes the dull round of 
external experience. In adopting a self- and nation-creating vatic voice, he consciously 
assumes a position outside of the ratio that has the potential to inspire readers to do the 
same. 
 Whitman started publishing parts of Democratic Vistas more than a decade after 
the 1855 Leaves of Grass, but the essay paints in broad strokes issues of causality (and 
CAUSALITY) that underlie both his early poetry and the revisions he may have made to his 
phrenological chart. Like Democratic Vistas, and like “Faces,” these earlier texts often 
adopt an idealizing perspective as a way not so much of obscuring an imperfect reality as 
realizing a better future. This prophetic point of view, however, coexists in Whitman’s 
work with a contrary insistence on celebrating the present moment, as unvarnished and 
flawed as that moment may be. In the 1855 version of “Song of Myself,” phrenology 
informs and balances both perspectives. 
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 A major purpose of Whitman’s writing—as well as the writing of Emerson and 
Emily Dickinson—is to sacralize the everyday, to instill the religious sentiment with 
respect to the secular, and to awaken in reader and writer alike a sense of the miraculous 
nature of each passing moment. Whitman’s pronouncement that there “will never be any 
more perfection than there is now” rings throughout “Song of Myself,” signaling his 
Transcendentalist sense of nature and humanity as the measure of all things (28). Nature 
is not fallen; human beings need not await an afterlife to realize perfection. As in the 
works of Emerson and Thoreau, a non-teleological conception of the universe runs 
through the poem even at the structural level, which is fragmented and frequently non-
linear. What is, is, and is more than satisfying to those able to see the glory of the real 
right in front of them. Thus in the Preface Whitman explains his intention to record 
reality accurately: “What I tell I tell for precisely what is” (14). This sentiment, of course, 
extends to the poet himself, whom Whitman celebrates in the raw, as one “Disorderly 
fleshy and sensual” (50). 
 At the same time, Whitman often implies a sense of dissatisfaction with the 
present in looking to the future for progress and improvement. While this turn away from 
the immanent occurs very clearly in the later, jeremiad-like Democratic Vistas, it also 
occurs—subtly and ambivalently—in “Song of Myself.” “O perpetual transfers and 
promotions,” declares Whitman towards the end of the poem, in an apostrophe to nature’s 
fluidity that suggests two very different types of movement: horizontal and vertical (86). 
“Promotions,” of course, implies more than a mere lateral change in position; it implies 
development into a better state. While the two conceptions sit quietly conjoined in this 
particular line, elsewhere Whitman is unable to ignore the questions their juxtaposition 
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raises. Pondering the “friendly and flowing savage,” Whitman asks, “Who is he? / Is he 
waiting for civilization or past it and mastering it?” The drift of the stanzas preceding and 
following this one suggest the latter, celebrating the primitive and the natural as timeless 
and always attainable virtues (“Behaviour lawless as snow-flakes . . . . words simple as 
grass”) (71-72). Nature, then, would move through transference, not promotion. But 
whom does Whitman mean by “savage”? Because Native Americans appear elsewhere in 
the poem, it is tempting to see his use of the term as ironic, suggesting not only that the 
people of one time or culture are as “advanced” as any other, but also that those who live 
in closest (and most savage) connection to nature are actually the most civilized. The next 
stanza, however, makes clearly defining “savage” difficult:  
Is he some southwesterner raised outdoors? Is he Canadian?  
Is he from the Mississippi country? or from Iowa, Oregon or California? or from 
the mountains? or prairie or bush-life? or from the sea? 
 
Wherever he goes men and women accept and desire him (72-73)  
 
Over the course of these lines, the question of identity and origin moves from the general 
to the specific and back, as well as back and forth from the artificial constructs of region 
and state to the natural facts of geography and environment, as well as physically across 
the frontier. By the time we reach the final line, it seems more likely that Whitman is 
speaking of self-reliant pioneers settling the West than Native Americans as noble 
savages (it would seem odd, otherwise, to describe the latter as being universally 
accepted or belonging to a particular state). Of course, Whitman’s point may be to 
conflate the civilized and the savage, and to redefine the latter as the positive condition of 
living in harmony with one’s place, whatever, wherever, or whenever it may be. But the 
passage, then, can also imply that the “savage” has been reincarnated as the frontiersman, 
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who has co-opted the identity of Native Americans in physically supplanting them. The 
question of whether cultures are “civilized” based on how “natural” they are or based on 
how far they have progressed from a state of savagery is ultimately left even more 
unsettled than when Whitman first asked it, as is the question of whether a state of 
perfection is the product of development or of the moment, of education or insight. 
 Throughout “Song of Myself,” Whitman has it both ways, celebrating both nature 
and self, material sensation as well as spiritual intuition, time as well as the timeless. 
While the passage on the savage registers the uneasy paradoxes generated by such 
pairings, elsewhere Whitman resolves the contradiction of seeing nature as a matter of 
both transfer and promotion, and he does so through those means most available to him 
as a poet: his choice of words. As do the texts of Emerson, and later of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, Whitman’s texts approach philosophical problems as 
problems of and in language, not somehow separate from it. Describing himself “moving 
forward then and now and forever,” Whitman mutes the teleological connotation of a 
term like “promotions” (58). But as in many if not most descriptions of the passage of 
time, such a connotation is difficult to erase completely, even from a conceivably neutral 
word like “forward.” Later in the poem, Whitman achieves greater success: “Every 
condition promulges not only itself . . . . it promulges what grows after and out of itself” 
(81). In this rendering, time becomes a series of moments of teaching or publication, 
sequential but equal. And with respect to teleology, time conceived simply as expression 
is neutral. “Promulges” also points ahead to Democratic Vistas, which strikes a way out 
of the ratio through a verbal act meant to produce a new “condition” out of itself. 
Whitman’s choice of verb, therefore, both describes and exemplifies his solution to the 
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problem of bringing forth the new from the old without reproducing the old: creative, 
deliberate, attentive expression. 
 The terms and concepts of phrenology provided Whitman with another 
vocabulary with which to account for nature’s two-sided dynamism of transfer and 
promotion—a conception that redeemed the present while also driving future reform. In 
other words, phrenology grounded his claim of being the “poet of the body” as well as 
“of the soul” (46). On the one hand, Whitman shared with phrenology texts like Orson 
Fowler’s Hereditary Descent an interest in the biological laws of inheritance, taking pride 
in his mixed Dutch and English genealogy and the character traits they afforded him.96 In 
the 1855 Preface he twice mentions the importance of heredity to the formation of the 
artist, explaining that to the American poet “the hereditary countenance descends both 
mother’s and father’s” (7); and later that “always of their fatherstuff must be begotten the 
sinewy races of bards” (15). Phrenology, like Whitman, also accepted as inarguable and 
essential to human nature those “animal” and “selfish” traits denied as sinful by the 
Puritans. On the other hand, in his earliest reviews of the subject, Whitman quickly honed 
in on Fowlerian phrenology’s emphasis on the individual’s ability to mold character 
through exercise. In “Song of Myself” this doctrine emerges specifically as a solution to 
the dispiriting implications of a materialism that might otherwise limit the potential of the 
self: “I chant a new chant of dilation or pride, / We have had ducking and deprecating 
about enough, / I show that size is only development” (47). These lines refer directly to 
two phrenological doctrines as they had evolved via Spurzheim: that the size of mental 
faculties indicates their strength and that their size can be increased through cultivation. 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
96 See Reynolds’ Walt Whitman’s America (9, 21-22). 
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They also suggest other correspondences between interior character and physical exterior. 
“Ducking and deprecating” connects bodily posture to character, a correlation discussed 
in many of the Fowlers’ phrenology primers, while the category of expansion implied in 
the phrase “dilation or pride” slips easily from the spatial to the psychological. Lastly, the 
lines again root the idea of “promotion” and growth in a verbal act. As a pun, “dilation” 
connotes expatiation and description at the same time as physical enlargement, while the 
word “chant” literally dilates in the chanting, being both repeated and amplified as a 
“new chant” within the line.  
 How does Whitman’s “chant”—be it in poetry or prose—dilate the self? Two of 
the ways it does so are as performance and as provocation. As performance, Whitman 
creates and assumes a persona: by posing for his frontispiece portrait as a rough or a 
dandy, by proclaiming himself throughout his writing as America’s bard even before 
anyone else has heard of him, and by acting out the qualities he hopes or believes he 
possesses in modifying his phrenological chart. By positing and extolling the importance 
of adhesively bound men, he could even be said to have played some part—intentionally 
or not—in creating the modern homosexual. In short, he wills his identities into being. 
But just as relevant in the context of Whitman’s interest in phrenology is the way in 
which his writing acts as provocation. From the very first stanza of “Song of Myself” he 
provokes with his egotism: “I celebrate myself, / And what I assume you shall assume, / 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.” Not only does he state his own 
self-importance, he lords it over his reader, commanding them, even as he simultaneously 
suggests a sharing of power in the sharing of atoms. A few stanzas later, he snaps a series 
of humbling questions: “Have you reckoned the earth much?/ Have you practiced so long 
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to read? / Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?” (27-28). Whitman 
uses such modes of address throughout the poem to challenge the reader, break down 
assumptions, and return her to the state of the child questioning the grass with fresh, 
unclouded eyes. 
The texts of the Fowlers also sought to provoke readers into new ways of being 
by stimulating particular faculties. In Fowler on Memory, Orson Fowler explains this 
process while discussing—and stimulating—the faculty of CAUSALITY:  
Our next inquiry asks how—by what means—so important a faculty can be 
cultivated and improved? I have already shown that to improve any faculty, its 
proper stimulus must be ascertained, and that placed before it to which it is 
adapted. (43) 
 
Texts, like this one, placed before the mind of the reader the objects and considerations to 
which a particular faculty was adapted. In the case of CAUSALITY the very question of the 
cause of its development would provide it with the means of developing. The section is 
full of such questions: “It is as natural for man to ask “why,” as to breathe or eat. Why 
this desire to know why?” (43). Phrenology itself becomes a demonstration of the 
faculties—their apotheosis—as well as the means for their improvement. It is difficult to 
consider Fowler’s discussions of ORDER (“a place for things”), for instance, without 
seeing it implicitly embodied in phrenology’s orderly compartmentalization of every 
facet of human nature (Fowler’s Practical Phrenology 51). 
 As a series of transfers, time produces no real change. Similarly, a mechanically 
deterministic world, in which like produces like and each event is reducible to an 
inarguable chain of causes, would repeat the same dull round over and over again. That 
said, in such a world the present would be as full of meaning and truth as any other 
moment in history, as would nature itself. As a series of transfers with the possibility of 
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promotion, however, such chains of cause and effect could be truly disrupted, allowing 
for unforeseen consequences, creative acts, and freedom. Whitman, loving the real but 
also heeding the imagination’s demand for more, could find in phrenology a conception 
of the self that accounted for both sets of desire: a self rooted in the fact of flesh, blood, 
sex, and history, and one that could will a more fully developed self in the space the 
future opened.  
Whitman’s published chart—with its precise alterations—encompasses just this 
multifaceted sense of self, enfolding its past, present, and future incarnations into one 
representation. Deriving most of its material from Lorenzo’s observations, the document 
presents the objectified Whitman: Whitman as external phenomenon, in the flesh, 
observable by science, a body to be passively sensed and seen with the eye. But it also 
incorporates Whitman as he desires and/or imagines himself to be or become. In this 
respect, the chart presents Whitman as subject as well as object, fulfilling his hopes of 
becoming a self-determining individual simply in expressing them. The poet’s revisions 
imply that the seeming ontological impasse between the self that is and the self that will 
be is resolved on a higher, subjective plane of action, creation, and expression. For 
Whitman to view himself only objectively, without feeling or imagination or desire, 
would have placed him in an objective state: his mode of perception would not only 
predetermine how he views himself, but, more fundamentally, what he is to be viewed to 
begin with. Similarly, for Whitman to view himself subjectively actually changes who he 
is, changes himself as an object. The former point of view fails to recognize that the 
observer is already participating actively in perception, the latter takes advantage of the 
fact. Thus Whitman enacts a higher SELF-ESTEEM by inflating his scores, by puffing 
Borst&205&
himself up in his own reviews. To wait for Lorenzo or anyone else (even Whitman 
himself) to observe and record a higher SELF-ESTEEM misses the point: Whitman must 
will such a quality into being—must act from it—before it can even be an object of 
sensory observation. His published chart and its revisions externalize the rugged, self-
reliant self he imagines, promoting—promulging—a subjectively desired personality into 
an object of recognition.  
“Speech is the twin of my vision,” writes Whitman in “Song of Myself”: the poet 
speaks what he sees but he also sees what he speaks (53). Phrenological language 
allowed him to do both, in one respect uncovering what was already there, in another 
stating it into existence. It allowed him—like Holmes and James and other nineteenth-
century phrenology believers or partial sympathizers—to probe and articulate the 
convolutions and contradictory mechanics of personality, a modern American 
personality. It gave him a lexical and conceptual frame to begin working through the 
implications of the mind’s materiality and the limits this perspective placed around 
conceptions of soul and agency. But rather than deny these limits, Whitman accepts them 
while still claiming for himself as poet and individual the final authority of self-
representation. Through his chart and poems like “Song of Myself and “Faces,” he 
responds to questions science, in our current age of neuroscientific enthusiasm, continues 
to pose regarding our responsibilities and powers in a material universe as material 
beings. In Whitman’s own time, these questions happened to belong to phrenology. By 
dint of its striking mix of insight and delusion, all the more apparent from today’s 
perspective, phrenology thus exemplifies the continuing utility and inescapability of 
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